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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the making of Thailand's external commercial policies, with 
particular reference to policies towards the European Union (EU). As an emerging 
country in the global political economy, it is to be expected that Thailand's external 
relations have a strong emphasis on commercial policies. However, the current 
literature on Thailand's external relations places a strong emphasis on foreign policy 
goals and the promotion of Thai national interests through diplomacy, even where the 
key goals pursued are those of economic advantage. This thesis is designed to take a 
broader view of Thailand's external commercial policy-making, and to consider a wide 
range of potential contributors to the policy process. 
The thesis thus explores the workings ofthe Thai state (both the political dimension of 
government and the bureaucracy of the Civil Service), but also goes on to examine the 
roles of private companies and of Private Consultative Committees in the commercial 
policy-making process. It does this by establishing an initial analytical framework (in 
Chapter I) drawing on ideas of corporatism, and on the accompanying concepts of 
interest aggregation and interest intermediation, since this is seen as a promising way of 
exploring the commercial policy-making process. It is argued that Thailand's style of 
external commercial policy-making might be expected to reflect corporatist processes 
entailing the use of interest mediation, giving an active role to firms and interest 
groups, in order to reach a negotiated external commercial policy. 
Having established this initial position, the thesis then goes on (Chapter 2) to explore 
the evolution of relations between Thailand and the EU, and to assess the challenges 
posed by the ED for Thai commercial policies. These challenges are partly at the state 
level, involving the use of national strategies to respond, and partly at the level of firms 
and commercial interest groups who need to gain information about and access to the 
EU marketplace. In Chapters 3 and 4, the thesis provides a more detailed study of the 
ways in which the state (Chapter 3) and private commercial interests (Chapter 4) have 
responded to the challenges posed by relations with the ED. This analysis is based 
largely on the material gathered through a set of interviews with state and private sector 
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representatives during fieldwork in Bangkok, and focuses especially on a number of 
agriculture and food-related sectors. 
The Conclusion of the thesis brings together the findings from the empirical 
investigation, and reviews the evidence for the corporatist model. The thesis finds that 
Thai external commercial policy reflects two levels of interactions. The primary level is 
the 'state to firm' level, whilst the secondary level reflects interactions firstly between 
firms and Private Consultative Committees and secondly between the state and PCCs. 
As a result, the active intermediation of commercial interests and the involvement of 
interest groups seems to be at a low level, and the corporatist framework is only partly 
supported. The thesis then argues that the findings seem to indicate a process of 
external commercial policy-making based on collusion between government and major 
companies instead of corporatism and interest intermediation, and thus that a 
'clientelist' model might be more appropriate as a means of analysing Thai external 
commercial policy-making. 
II 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................... I 
Table of Contents ......................................................................... 111 
Table of Abbreviations .................................................................. V 
Tables and Charts ........................................................................ VI 
Introduction ................................................................................... 1 
CltaJlter 1 ........................................................................................ ~ 
Analysing Thai External Commercial Policy-making ............... 7 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Thailand in the Global Political Economy ...................................................................... 9 
A 'State-Centred' Approach: Thai Commercial Policy as National Interest. ............... 11 
A Corporatist Approach: States, Firms and Thai External Commercial Policy-
Making .......................................................................................................................... 16 
The ED as a Case Study for Thailand's External Trade Policy-Making ...................... 24 
The ED in the Global Political Economy ..................................................................... 25 
Commercial Power as Influence ................................................................................... 27 
ED institutions and Policy Making ............................................................................... 30 
Conclusion: Thai Commercial Policy-Making and Thai-ED commercial relations in 
context. .......................................................................................................................... 36 
Chapter 2: ..................................................................................... 38 
Thailand-EU Commercial Relations from 1969 to 2005 ......... 38 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 38 
Origin of the Thai-EC Partnership ................................................................................ 39 
A growing partnership and a developing Thailand ....................................................... 41 
Increased intensity in the Thai-ED Partnership ............................................................ 43 
The Asian Economic Crisis, Trade Imbalances and Consequences ............................. 49 
The Present Partnership and Onwards .......................................................................... 52 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 54 
c::1t~pteJr 3 ...................................................................................... :;t) 
Thai Governments and Commercial Policy-Making Towards 
th~ ]S:1lJ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• :;t) 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 56 
Main actors in Thai state policy-making ...................................................................... 58 
The Thai Government: Determining Policy Direction ............................................. 58 
The Thai Civil Service: Policy-making and Policy Implementation ........................ 63 
The Thai State relations with the EU in Context.. ........................................................ 70 
Shrimp GSP battles ................................................................................................... 73 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 79 
Chapter 4 ................ , ...................................................................... 82 
III 
Firms, Trade Associations and Thai-EU Commercial 
~~I~ti()IlS ••..•••••••.•...••.....••......••••••..•..•...•..•.•.....••.•.••••...•.•.••.•.•......•. ~~ 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 82 
Private Sector Actors and Their Importance in Thai-EU Commercial Relations ..... 85 
Firms ......................................................................................................................... 87 
Private Consultative Committees .............................................................................. 92 
Interest Groups .......................................................................................................... 96 
Private Sector Strategies ............................................................................................... 97 
Firm Strategies .......................................................................................................... 98 
Private Consultative Committees Strategies ........................................................... 104 
Policy Coordination .................................................................................................... 106 
Primary Relationship: Firm-Government ............................................................... 107 
Secondary Relationships: 'Firm to Private Consultative Committee' and 'Private 
Consultative Committee to Government' ............................................................... 113 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 117 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 121 
Actors and Effectiveness in Thai-EU Commercial Relations .................................... 12 I 
The Roots of Thai-EU Trade Conflict ........................................................................ 123 
State Policies, Firm Strategies, and PCC Mediation .................................................. 124 
The effectiveness of Thai actors in the policy-making process .................................. 128 
Corporatism or Clientelism ? ...................................................................................... 131 
Bibliography .................. " ... , ............... , .......... , ............. ,', ............ 138 
Official Documents ..................................................................................................... 138 
Book & Joumal ........................................................................................................... 140 
Magazine ...................... '" ....... ..... ......... .................................... .............................. ..... 149 
Newspaper .......................... .................... ...... ...... .............................. ...... ...... .............. 150 
Interview list ............................................................................................................... 152 
Interview main questions: ........................................................................................... 156 
IV 
Table of Abbreviations 
ACP 
ASEAN 
ASEM 
CP 
EC 
EFTA 
EU 
FTA 
FTI 
GATT 
GDP 
GPE 
GSP 
IFPI 
IPE 
MFA 
MOA 
MaC 
MOF 
Mal 
NGO 
NTB 
PCC 
SME 
TBA 
TCC 
WEEE 
WTO 
African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations 
The Asia Europe Meeting 
Cheur Chareon Phokkapun 
European Communities 
European Free Trade Association 
European Union 
Free Trade Agreement 
The Federation of Thai Industries 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Gross Domestic Product 
Global Political Economy 
Generalised System of Preference 
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
International Political Economy 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
Ministry of Commerce 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Industry 
non-governmental organisation 
Non Tariff Barrier 
Private Consultative Committees 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Thai Banker's Association 
Thai Chamber of Commerce 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
World Trade Organization 
v 
Tables and Charts 
Chapter 1 
TABLE 1.1: World Food Export by Country 2000-2002 ........................ 10 
TABLE 1.2: Thailand Export per GDP ............................................ .ll 
Chapter 3 
TABLE 3.l: Thai Governments 1980-2001.. ..................................... 58 
Chapter 4 
TABLE 4.1: Thailand's Exports by Main Product ............................... 86 
TABLE 4.2: Thailand's Major Poultry Exporters to the EU .................... 87 
TABLE 4.3: CP Group Poultry exports: top 5 National Markets .............. 88 
TABLE 4.4: CP's Shrimp Exports, 2003-2006 .................................... 89 
Chart 4.1: F.T.I. Office Organization Chart ..................................... 91 
Chart 4.2: Thai Chamber of Commerce & Board of Trade of ............... 93 
Thailand Organization Chart 
Chart 4.3: The Thai Banker's Association Organization Chart .............. 94 
Chart 4.4: Policy Coordination and Policy Influence Channel. .............. 115 
VI 
Introduction 
Thailand has had a long modern history of being an export-oriented country, depending 
on exports to sustain the economy in general. This has traditionally been in the area of 
unprocessed agricultural products, although in the past ten years, textiles and electronic 
components have also become a major part of Thailand's exports. It is surprising that 
external commercial policy has never been the platform for any politicians' campaigns. 
Exporting firms are also quiet about external commercial policy, with most of them out 
of the news analysis, and just getting on with their company's goal of increasing exports 
to existing customers and expanding new markets. If a mechanism for the interaction 
between the Thai state and Thai firms exists, it is very difficult to see. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to find out who the main actors are in Thai 
external commercial policy, how policy is made, and how the main actors interact with 
each other in order to make external commercial policies. Consequently, this research 
will examine Thailand's external commercial policy history to explain trends in how Thai 
external commercial policy is created, how effective it has been, and if problem solving 
mechanisms really exist. 
Chapter I of the thesis sets the framework for the later empirical analysis. At this 
stage of the argument, the theory of corporatism is used as an analytical framework. 
Corporatism makes use of the argument that firms who are acting in correspondence with 
interest groups can influence the government into a particular negotiated policy direction. 
Chapter 1 also provides background on Thailand's external commercial policies, in order 
to show the potential for a corporatist analysis. It is argued that the three main actors in 
the Thai external commercial policy process are the Thai state, Thai firms, and 
Thailand's various Private Consultative Committees. In chapters 2-4 of the thesis, this 
argument is subjected to empirical investigation, first focusing on the Thai-EU 
relationship, then looking more closely at the role of the Thai government and finally 
exploring the role of the private sector, represented by individual firms and by Private 
Consultative Committees. Finally, corporatism as an analytical framework is reviewed. 
The main conclusion of the thesis is that Thailand's external commercial policy reflects 
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the collusion of the Thai state and Thai firms, and mostly neglects the mediation role 
which Thai private consultative committees provide. Thus, it may more appropriately be 
described in terms of clientelism than those of corporatism proposed at the beginning of 
the thesis. 
The thesis is divided into four chapters following these stages of argumentation. 
Chapter I examines Thailand's role in the global political economy and discusses how 
Thailand's commercial policy is closely linked to Thailand's national interest. This 
means that commercial policy is an extremely important issue for Thailand's economic 
survival. Chapter I later links the role of Thai states and Thai firms to the theory of the 
corporatism and makes the argument that Thai firms have becoming increasingly 
important in Thailand's external commercial policy-making. Corporatism is used as a 
conceptual framework to help in understanding how Thai commercial policies are 
concluded, especially as concerns the role of interest intermediation between the major 
actors. 
Chapter 1 's role is also to propose the Thai-ED trade partnership as a way to 
understand Thai commercial policy-making. The ED is a complex and unprecedented 
transgovernmental actor, which creates many difficult challenges to Thai external 
commercial policy-making. Although it is complex, the ED has some very clear policy-
making procedures and a very solid institutional structure which makes the analysis of its 
interaction with Thai actors visible. There are arguments which say that these institutions 
and policy-making processes make the ED a difficult partner. The area of analysis for this 
research to ask if Thai policy actors feel that the ED is a difficult partner and if they do, 
why they feel that way. Areas for major challenges are expected to include how Thai 
actors understand the ED and its institutions, several visible and invisible trade barriers 
the ED may present to outsiders, and how the ED's complexity of policy-making 
procedures affects Thailand. 
Chapter 2 provides context for the subsequent analysis of the Thai-ED 
commercial relationship and provides an examination of the partnership's development 
from 1969 to 2005. This provides a historical context which starts from the period when 
Thailand's economy was stilI in its beginning stages, and when Thailand's first steps in 
the global political economy were being made. This first stage was when Thailand's 
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formal economic partnership with the European Community was established, both on a 
bilateral basis and an interregional basis (in the form of the EC-ASEAN agreement). This 
led on to the second period, when Thailand's economy began to grow very fast and trade 
frictions between the EC and Thailand were becoming a more visible problem. The final 
stages made in this analysis are the periods during the Asian economic crisis, and the 
effects of the Asian economic crisis until 2005-2006. This final stage has been important 
in defining Thailand's partnership with the EU, and Thailand's actors and commercial 
policy making processes were becoming more sophisticated. 
Chapter 3 draws on the background as provided in Chapter 2 and closely 
examines the Thai state and its role in the commercial policy making process. The 
purpose of this chapter is to see how the various actors in the Thai state have interacted, 
and how the delegation of power in the Thai state works. Chapter 3 firstly examines the 
Thai government, who are responsible for external trade policies in the broader picture. 
The third Chapter then examines the role of the Thai civil service, with a very strong 
focus on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, the two units 
which are considered to be the most important state actors in Thai external commercial 
policy making. The roles of some other more technical ministries such as the Ministry of 
Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture are also mentioned. This Chapter concludes with 
a case study of the Thai-EU Shrimp Battles as an example of the interaction which Thai 
state policy makers consider to have been a successful case of its commercial interaction 
towards the EU. 
The main argument which is developed in Chapter 3 is that the Thai civil servants 
are the group of actors which are in strongest control of Thai external commercial policy. 
Although the government provides some broad guidelines, the MF A and the MOC 
generate policies on their own and engage in negotiations with the EU, usually 
unsupervised by the government. This, however, still causes problems. The MFA has 
been seen as lacking technical expertise as well as lacking sufficient staff, while the 
MOC's technical orientation means that they lack contacts and do not receive sufficient 
information about the channels of contact which exist and are crucial. This makes it 
difficult for optimal policies to be introduced. 
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Chapter 4 examines the role of the Thai private sector in greater detail and 
considers two more actors: the Private Consultative Committee and firms. It first analyses 
the importance of the Thai private sector in the external commercial policies and later 
examines the strategies the respective private sector actors use to interact with the EU. 
This Chapter also argues that there are two levels of policy coordination: the primary 
relationship, which is between firms and the government, and the secondary relationships 
which include those of 'firm to private consultative committee' and 'private consultative 
committee to government'. These relationships shape the direction of Thai commercial 
policy making and are critical to our understanding of how Thai external commercial 
policies are created. 
The main argument in Chapter 4 is that large Thai firms are extremely crucial 
actors in the Thai policy-making process, while the Private Consultative Committees and 
small and medium enterprises are not very important and influential in the process. Also 
important is the primary relationship between the firms (particularly large firms) and the 
government, because this is where most of Thailand' s commercial policies are made. The 
secondary relationships exist to act as a supporting mechanism to the primary 
relationship. This finding is important because it puts into perspective the unequal power 
of Thai actors, where the Thai state and large Thai firms are most important, followed by 
smaller firms. The role of the Private Consultative Committees. which was expected to be 
important, is seen as a supporting mechanism to the rest ofthe policy process. 
The Conclusion analyses two important issues generated by the discussion in the 
substantive chapters. The first question presents the issue of effectiveness. Firstly, the 
Conclusion examines the effectiveness of Thai actors in the Thai-EU commercial 
relations. The analysis and comparison of the Thai state, Thai firms, and private 
consultative committees are made to determine how effective they are in the history of 
Thai-EU commercial relations. Secondly, the Conclusion analyses the effectiveness of 
the Thai policy-making process. In other words, this section determines ifthe process has 
been an obstacle to effective policy-making. This relates to analysis of the interaction in 
the various relationships between Thai actors as mentioned in the previous chapters. 
The Conclusion also comes back to the analytical framework of corporatism and 
considers how it may be inadequate for the analysis of Thai external commercial 
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partnerships. Corporatism makes the assumption that actors mediate their interests within 
the society and that actors can be treated equally and fairly. The analysis in the 
substantive chapters notes how Thai actors are actually unequal to each other and that 
instead of interest mediation, there recently appears to have been a process of interest 
collusion between the Thai state and certain firms. The conclusion shows the inadequacy 
of corporatism as a single conceptual framework and proposes clientelism as an 
additional conceptual framework for the analysis of Thai external commercial policy-
making. 
Throughout the chapters, this research use both primary and secondary sources to 
construct knowledge of the Thai commercial policy-making process. As mentioned 
previously the main purpose of this research is to find out who are the key actors in Thai 
external commercial policy, how policy is made, and how the main actors interact with 
each other to make external commercial policies. In order to achieve this goal, it was 
important to know both what the context of Thai external commercial policy is, and to 
know how the actors think in detail. In this research, this was achieved through a 
combination of journals and publications, newspaper articles, and a large number of elite 
interviews with the main actors in Thai external commercial policy-making. 
Chapters I and 2 of this research make use of secondary sources as well as 
primary sources such as official documents from the MFA and the MOC. These two 
chapters, which are primarily historical and contextual in nature, also draw on 
newspapers and research produced in Thailand from several universities and institutions 
as well as the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). Most of the primary and 
secondary resources are Thai, which fits with this research's perspective of viewing the 
process from a Thai frame of reference. Secondary resources are from academic articles 
on the EU, and have been used to analyse the EU's institutions and policy-making 
processes. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are based mostly on elite interviews. In the process of this 
research, 45 interviews were conducted with government officials, high-ranking civil 
servants, important private consultative committee members, and management position 
firm officers. In the government sector, extensive interviews were conducted with civil 
servants at the MF A and the MOC. The interviews with members of Private Consultative 
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Committees included those conducted with the Thai Banker's Association, Industrial 
Association Federation, and the Thai Chamber of Commerce. The firms used for this 
analysis include the Charoenphokapand Group (CP Group), Pak Food Company, and 
Sanguanwong Starch Group, all firms that export to the BU but which have different 
levels of export performance and different levels of power in Thai politics. The 
interviews followed a guideline set of questions which can be found in the Appendix to 
this thesis. 
This combination of primary and secondary sources and elite interviews has 
highlighted some very important ideas about Thai external commercial policy-making. I 
hope that this research will provide further insights into Thai external commercial 
policies, particularly concerning the nature of the main actors, the interaction between 
them, and the efficiency of the Thai policy making process. 
6 
Chapter 1 
Analysing Thai External Commercial POlicy-making 
Introduction 
Thai external commercial policy-making is key to Thailand's survival because the 
country depends very heavily on exports to sustain a developing economy. Most current 
research on Thai international political economy pay a lot of attention to the role of the 
government in carrying out trade policy, but pay very little attention to other actors in the 
policy-making process. In the modem political economy, other actors such as firms and 
non-state organizations also have an important role. As a consequence, the Thai external 
commercial policy-making process has become much more mature, more complicated, 
and has more to it than meets the eye. 
The purpose of this research is to explore how Thai external commercial policies 
are made and what the relationships between the most important Thai policy-makers are. 
The research examines the traditional role of the state, but later offers more analysis from 
first hand interviews with other policy-makers such as those from firms and private 
consultative committees. The role of the state in making external commercial policies is 
also clearly divided into the political side and the bureaucratic side, which are 
significantly different. To give a clear picture of Thai external commercial policy-making 
as a whole, this research analyzes the process in the context of Thailand's external 
commercial policy-making towards the European Union (EU). The research first gives a 
general picture of the history of Thailand's relationship with the EU. Later, the Thai-EU 
relationship is examined in detail through first hand interviews with policy-makers as 
well as primary and secondary sources. 
In order to establish a strong foundation and an analytical framework for the 
analysis of the Thai-EU relationship, this chapter will firstly discuss Thailand's role in 
the global political economy. The first section will thus explore how Thai policy-makers 
perceive commercial policy as a focus of national interest. This is pursued at the bilateral 
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level, at the regional level (ASEAN), and at the multilateral level (WTO). The argument 
in this section is that Thailand creates commercial policies almost entirely in pursuit of 
national interest and sovereignty, and that this shapes the direction of policy. 
The second section aims to analyse the role of states and firms and their 
interaction in Thailand's external commercial policy-making process. While the role of 
the state is expected to be extremely significant given Thailand's status as a developing 
country, Thailand's modern political economy means that there may be a place for the 
role of firms too. This section will relate to literatures on liberal corporatism. It will be 
argued 'that policy reflects the way in which the state, firms, and interest groups may 
agree together behind the scenes and go through a political exchange process while stiIl 
engaging in interest intermediation. This raises the question that, in Thailand's policy-
making process, firms may have a role in influencing the state through several channels, 
including through interest groups. On the other hand, the state could also become a 
facilitator for firms in their commercial policy-making process. 
The third section of this Chapter justifies the use of the EU as a case study of 
Thailand's external trade policy-making by taking a closer look at the EU side of the 
relationship and discussing how the EU uses its commercial power to exercise influence 
within the global political economy. The trade and economic relations between Thailand 
and the EU point towards a strong disparity between Thailand and the EU in terms of 
economic strength. It is important to point out that the Thai-EU political relationship is 
also unremarkable, with Thailand playing at best an important role in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations. This is in significant contrast to the EU's well-documented 
global economic power as well as its growing political influence. The disparity between 
Thailand and the EU as concerns economic power might be expected to present some 
important challenges for Thailand's external trade policy-making process, especially with 
regard to negotiations and conflict resolution methods. 
The fourth section of the chapter discusses in greater detail the EU institutions 
and policy-making, including a discussion of the major challenges Thai policy-makers 
faces as regards the EU's unique nature. The section will include a necessary analysis of 
the EU's global economic power, main EU actors and policy-makers in the EU's external 
relations, and an examination of the EU's dominating interests in the IPE. Once again, 
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the ED's institutions and policy-making process make the ED a particularly·an interesting 
case study through which to explore commercial policy-making in Thailand because it 
focuses attention on how Thai policy-makers might try to cope and adjust with the ED's 
overall uniqueness and complexity. 
'The conclusion to this chapter explores the possibility that there is complex 
interaction between Thai firms and the Thai state in Thailand's commercial dealings with 
the ED, contrasting with the state-centred approach advanced in the early parts of the 
chapter. This conclusion also asks whether and in what ways the Thai state and Thai 
firms may be acting as partners in this commercial relationship, and further advances the 
possibility that Thai firms may act on their own initiative in pursuing their corporate 
objectives in Thai-EU commercial relations. 
Thailand in the Global Political Economy 
One of the most obvious features of Thailand's role in a global political economy is how 
small its economy is, particularly when one excludes its significance through ASEAN. A 
study of Thai external commercial policy with the developed world is a study in trade 
imbalance and inequality of status, and understanding the trading mentality of the smaller 
partner is absolutely necessary. Thailand is a developing country in South-east Asia with 
GDP per capita of $9200USD ranked 68th in the ranking of 194 countries GDP per capita 
(Bank of Thailand 2006), 19th in Asia and 3rd in Southeast Asia after Singapore and 
Malaysia respectively (International Monetary Fund, Document: 2006). 
Thailand's GDP depends heavily on exports. In 2000-2006, Thailand exported 
over 50% of its GDP and the most important export products of Thailand are electronic 
parts and agricultural products. More than 60% of the labour force is employed in 
agriculture. Agricultural products, therefore, can be identified as sensitive products in 
exports, giving rise to a range of trade disputes and also becoming the centre of a range of 
government schemes. Thailand is also one of the most important food exporters in the 
world, exporting in the year 2000-2002 products valued at $10.65 billion, $11.07 billion, 
$9.94 billion respectively as shown in the following table. 
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TABLE 1.1: WORLD FOOD EXPORT BY COUNTRY 2000-2002 (International Trade 
Statistics 2003, WTO) 
'World I"ood Export by Coulltry 2000·2002 
Destination Value (Billion Dollars) Growlh Ital€(%) Itatin (%) 
200(1 ZUlU 2002 2(101 2002 ZQOO 2001 20(12 
European UUlon 180,38 182,9% 195,95 1,44 7,00 41,76 4Un 4!,83 
lJSA 54,04 53&6 52,&9 ",0.13 ·1,80 1251 12,31 11,29 
Canada l7.53 19.18 18.75 8.79 ·2,24 4()& 4.39 4.00 
Chin. 13.56 14,22 16,16 4,87 13.64 .314 12:5 1.45 
Thailand 1.0.65 11.07 9.94 3.94 10.1.1 l.47 l.5J Z.ll 
'M~exico 8.11 &.14 8,03 0.37 ·1.35 LSS 1.86 1.71 
Singapore 3.08 2,71 2.85 ·10,06 2.89 1171 Q,63 0.61 
Kor,'rt. Rcp. of V;6 252 2.46 ... 5,26 ·2.38 062 058 0.53 
Japan 217 3()6 2,21 41.01 "'27,7& tl.50 Q,7(J 0.47 
Others 139.63 139.6(l 159.16 ·002 14.01 32,33 3192 33.9& 
World 43l,91 437.40 468.40 1;27 7.09 100 100 100 
RIffi'reJlCe: ifllel'1lalional T rode Statistics 2003 , WI'O 
Given its relatively subordinate position, Thailand cannot use its commercial and 
economic power to provide itself with a better negotiating position, set ideas and agendas 
for the global political economy, or use normative power to increase its political role in 
the global political economy, Nonetheless, as noted above, trade is one of the key 
economic aspects in Thailand's growth and the citizens' weIl-being and is inevitably one 
of the top priorities of any government. 
The purpose of this section is to show the relative size of the Thai economy and 
how Thailand manages its growth by using trade policy through Thailand's position in 
the global political economy, This section wiIl focus on the issue of how Thai policy· 
makers perceive external commercial policy-making and make it accord to national 
interest. This is an extremely important point in understanding Thai external commercial 
policy-making as well as the Thai-EU commercial partnership and the review given here 
intends to make a framework to establish the basis for a policy evaluation, Main Thai 
policy·makers see commercial policy as crucial to national interest, and this strongly 
affects the manner which external commercial policy is created, In this section, this idea 
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is analysed at the bilateral level, the regional level (ASEAN), and the multilateral level 
(WTO). At each of these levels, the perception of commercial policy as national interest 
affects the attitude of key Thai actors in external commercial policy-making. 
A 'State-Centred' Approach: Thai Commercial Policy as National 
Interest 
A study from the Faculty of Economics, Kasetsart University,(following table) showed 
that in 2006, Thai exports added up to 63.17% of Thailand's total GDP. This figure has 
gradually increased in the past more than years, from just 29.73% of Thailand's total 
GDP in 1993 (Kasetsart University 2006). 
TABLE 1.2 : Thailand Export per GDP 
(Kasetsart University: Faculty of Economics 2006). 
Value: millions of bahti 
i""--~""···" r··""·····o;~·of····--"·· !~-""--"--"""" i"·····_"··················-"···""·"-" I 
Year, Trade I export Export per i import . Trade I 
value I I balance 
I I GDP I 
i J I I [199312, 111,709.0-r-940~862. 6 -1-29:73-----'1;17o ~846~4 [-:229, 9si8-1 
r199412;50~862.?-ii;137~1.6-r~-31.34----i1;369-;260. 4 ~: 231,658.7j 
/1995 3,169,901.411,406,310.1/ 33.59 11,763,591.3 -357,281.2' 
1
19"96 '1' 3;243;864.5 -[1:;411;039:31"""--30:60·' ii;83-2~825."2 r·-421,785.ii" 
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This brief description of Thailand's exports related to GDP explains how important 
exports are to Thailand's GDP. It also shows that the growth of trade can bring both 
negative and positive impact at the same time, because even when exports are on the 
increase and supporting Thailand's GDP growth, Thailand's trade deficits are also 
continually growing. 
This description is important because for developing economies such as Thailand, 
exports are vital to the growth of the economy as well as the economic survival of the 
country, and this is reflected in key policy-makers' attitude towards external commercial 
policy-making. Thailand's National Security Council specifies the growth and 
development of the economy and society as one of the five most important national 
interests (Thanasathit 1999:7). This has been effectively transferred into the importance 
of Thailand's commercial policies and the way these policies help to enhance the 
economy's growth and development (Thanasathit 1999:6-8). Thepchatri explains that 
during the first few years of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the government 
encouraged diplomats to focus specifically on economic issues (2003:24). Although the 
policy was seen as unclear, the Ministry of Commerce became strongly involved in active 
negotiation of bilateral Free Trade Areas (FT As) (Thepchatri 2003 :25). 
Thailand has recently increased its focus on bilateral trade agreements, in the 
form of FT As with various individual countries. Currently there are no FT As between the 
EU and Thailand. Bilateral trade relations between the EU and Thailand are framed by 
the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) scheme, through which commercial 
policy concessions can be granted to Thailand. Thailand is one of the largest users ofthe 
GSP system, and several of the conflicts between the EU and Thailand can often be 
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linked back to the variation in these GSP privilegesl . From this point of view, it is 
important to emphasise how there are clearly two trends developing in Thai policy, one 
being in favour of the initiation of FT As and the other against it. The argument, in either 
case, is very strongly based on national interest and how Thailand can maximise trade 
through creation of - or rejection of - the various FTAs. The Thaksin government in 
particular, in collaboration with a number of firms, was a strong supporter of the creation 
of FTAs. The Federation of Thai Industries which consists of several hundred industrial 
firms, has also shown strong support for the Thai-Japan FTA and said that it would help 
Thailand's exports in food, textiles, and leather goods (Krugthepthurakij 29th March 
2007). The Thai National Shippers' Council has explained how exports of textiles would 
increase by 35% while those of shrimp and poultry would increase by 50% when the 
Thai-Japan FTA is implemented (Krugthepthurakij 29th March 2007). Moreover, the car 
industry has strongly supported the Thai-Australia FT A, saying that it would increase 
exports of cars built in Thailand by 31 % (Prachachartthurakij 7th August 2006). 
But, there is another side to the debate about FT As, which includes economists, 
academics, and non-governmental organisations who have strongly voiced their concern 
over the usefulness of FTAs, particularly those which are poorly negotiated. Somkiart 
Thangkitvanij, head of the Thailand Development Research Institute disagrees with the 
government's FT A with the United States, because he is concerned about the protection 
of Thai intellectual property rights. Although the proposed agreement was estimated to 
increase investment in Thailand as well as increase GDP by 1.6 to 1.8%, Somkiart 
warned that the FTA would cause severe damages to Thailand's small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) (Manager Daily 12th July 2006). There is another argument against 
FTAs which concerns the balance between 'invisible loss' and 'visible gain'. This was 
studied by Lawan Thanadsilkul who explained how the Thai-US FTA would put pressure 
on Thailand's existing economic policy institutions (Prachachart Thurakij 3,d July 2006). 
Moreover, several groups ofNGOs have strongly disagreed with FTAs, such as the FTA 
with Japan. They have sent a case to the Supreme Court for a ruling against the cabinet's 
decision (Manager Online 30th March 2007). 
1 Later chapters will go into further detail of problems in the GSP scheme, particularly in the area of 
Thailand's shrimp exports. 
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Although there are different attitudes towards Thailand's FTAs with other 
countries, it is apparent that aJl sides feel that commercial policies are important to the 
national interest. This tension between governments and corporations on one side, and 
academics and NGOs on the other, is a reflection of frictions in the Thai external 
commercial policy-making process which will undoubtedly have an effect on any 
partnership Thailand has. It also raises questions about the roles of the actors and their 
relative importance, especiaJly when we consider how the proposed FT As usuaJly get 
signed despite the protests of academics and NGOs. It is important that despite the 
difference in opinion regarding the usefulness of FTAs, both sides of opinion similarly 
argue that national interest is a central question in the agreeing of FT As. 
In addition to bilateral FT A agreements, Thailand has been an active member of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and this has given Thailand 
additional resources with which to safeguard its national interest in areas of commercial 
policy. The collective power of ASEAN is so significant that the EU notes ASEAN as 'a 
key partner for Europe', with a combined GDP of 656 billion euros and a population of 
503 million people, making it one ofthe largest regional markets in the world (Europai. 
One of the ways this power has been used is to make use of ASEAN's coJlective power 
to improve FTA deals. This has proven successful in the Thai-India FTA negotiations, 
where simultaneous negotiations between ASEAN and India forced the Indians to 
provide further concessions to Thailand in accordance with the paraJlel agreements made 
with ASEAN at the same time (PrachachartThurakij 19th March 2007). A second way in 
which Thailand makes use of ASEAN to enhance its national interest is through making 
use of the ASEAN plus 3 (APT) framework, where the addition of South Korea, Japan, 
and China adds even more bargaining power to the grouping. This is reflected in the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework where the APT group has direct access to the 
EU through various meetings as well as a summit of leaders every two years. A third way 
Thailand can make use of ASEAN in its external commercial policy-making process is to 
play the US against the EU in issues concerning trade. A US Treasury Executive 
appointed to ASEAN affairs noted how the US regards ASEAN as an important driving 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/extemal_relations/aseanlintro/index.htm 
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extensively at all three levels, including bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. This 
analysis is important because it helps to give further understanding of how Thai policy-
makers may be thinking when they deal with the issues of trade with the EU. For 
example, the preservation of the ideas of free trade may not be as important to the key 
Thai actors as the benefits Thailand might gain from a preferential trade agreement which 
does not fully include free trade. It is also interesting to see how political issues may not 
be as important as economic issues in Thailand's external policies, and mixing the two in 
negotiations might have negative results. Finally, it is interesting to see, especially at the 
bilateral level of FT A negotiations, how the government and firms have similar views 
which are sharply in contrast with more of academics and NGOs. 
A Corporatist Approach: States, Firms and Thai External 
Commercial Policy-Making 
Thailand's status as a developing country with a predominantly centrally managed 
economy puts the government in the position of one of the most important actors, 
particularly when considering issues related to international trade. Logically, Thailand's 
chief interaction with the EU has been in areas concerning commerce. But as the 
preceding argument has shown, some of Thailand's larger firms are known to be very 
influential and powerful in negotiating policy with states, positioning firms as potentially 
major actors in the Thai policy-making process. 
The proposition is that even in a developing country, the roles and interests of 
firms could be seen as a significant mechanism and potentially as important as those of 
the state in international commercial dealings. Susan Strange believes that technology, 
markets, and politics are most responsible for change in today's global political economy, 
and that the state's role is currently in 'retreat' (1996). Strange also suggests that power 
has shifted from weak states to stronger ones with global or regional reach; that power 
has shifted from states to markets and to non-state authorities actualising power from 
their own market shares; and that some power has dissipated because nobody has 
exercised it (1996: 189). In States and Markets, Strange argues along similar lines and 
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mechanism for the region's economic expansion and stability, in addition to China and 
India (Jeffer, The Economist Magazine: 2006) The US is ASEAN's largest trade partner, 
with Japan second, and the European Union only third. This provides Thailand, as well as 
ASEAN, with an alternative partner to trade and to negotiate with (MFA International 
Trade document June 2003). A fourth way Thailand can preserve national interest 
through ASEAN is by making use of the ASEAN Free Trade Area to enhance 
intraregional trade. At the moment, intra-ASEAN trade adds up to 20% of Thailand's 
total trade, which is the highest percentage amongst all trading partners (MOC intra-
ASEAN trade statistic 2007a). This points towards an increased degree of intraregional 
dependency, which means that Thailand could opt for a stronger relationship with its 
neighbours who are more equal in status, rather than rely on the EU for economic 
support. 
Finally, Thailand has attempted to protect its national interest in external 
commercial policy multilaterally through groupings within the WTO framework. 
Thailand is a member of the Cairns group, the 19 strong agricultural exporting countries 
grouping, which has continually pushed for liberalisation of trade in agricultural exports 
at the WTO Doha Round. The Cairns group position covers three main areas of the 
agricultural negotiations, including market access, domestic support, and export 
competition3• In Hong Kong 2005, the Cairns Group joined with the 020 of developing 
countries to renew calls for elimination of the distortions and the restrictions in 
international agricultural trade, a more which the grouping viewed as necessary to 
develop the benefits of trade reform (Cairns Group Press Statement 16 Dec. 2005). 
Although the Doha Round is still undergoing negotiation, it is an excellent example of 
how small countries such as Thailand can join a larger group to exercise an influence 
within the WTO, in order to preserve their own national interest. With raw and processed 
agricultural products being a very important part of Thailand's exports, amounting to 
17% of its total exports, Thailand's participation in the Cairns group is critical to its 
national interest (MOC Thailand Export 2007b report). 
This section has argued that Thailand perceives external commercial policy-
making as a way of preserving and enhancing the national interest. This happens 
3 http://www.caim.group.org/wto -"egotiation,.html 
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proposes that transnational relations consist of social and political groups as well as 
economic enterprises (1994:22). 
The role of firms has dramatically increased in importance in Thai politics and its 
importance increased most markedly during Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's 
government (2001-2006). During this period of time, corporate interests and government 
interests were often accused of being indistinguishable, and it is apparent that this type of 
situation can be analysed using ideas of corporatism. Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 
argue that this system of corporatism, in which state and firm interests are mixed 
together, has increasingly become very normal and acceptable in Thailand, alongside the 
country's continual modernisation process. Whilst the theory of corporatism has recently 
decreased in popularity among social scientists, a form oT corporatism continues to thrive 
in the Western world because of a strong system of checks and balances and high 
transparency which is suited to the role of interest mediation (1994:20). A trend towards 
a different strand of corporatism with weaker checks and balances and poorer 
transparency has also developed in other parts of the world such as Latin America and 
Asia (Jilberto and Hogenboom 2005:147-258) There are some arguments that the 
Western world, especially America, are not happy to have to admit that certain groups in 
the society may have the power to strongly influence the economic and political system 
(Wiarda 1997: IX), but this does not rule out its usefulness in analysing Thai external 
commercial policy. The corporatism mentioned in this work is treated as an economic 
and social theory, rather than a form of political culture or the political economic 
arrangement of authoritarian governments. There are confusions and unclear views on 
which perspective is best-suited to look at corporatism, but corporatism here will be 
considered primarily as providing a conceptual framework which is used to explain and 
understand the Thai-EU partnership rather than a prescriptive theory designed to predict 
and to suggest future policy. 
Therefore, when we put an emphasis on commercial policy as reflecting the 
manner in which the Thai state and firms govern trade policy-making, corporatism should 
be considered a strong candidate for a conceptual framework for analysis of Thailand's 
commercial partnership with the EU. Schmitter, one of the pioneers of corporatism, 
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viewed the theory in terms of institutional structure. His definition of corporatism has 
been key to its future development (1979:13) 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter 1979: 13). 
Importantly, Schmitter's seminal piece clearly defined neo-corporatism as a form 
of interest representation clearly different from pluralism, statism and syndicalism 
(1974). Corporatism has also been defined as 'a system of social and political 
organization whereby major societal groups or interests are integrated in the 
governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance, tutelage, and 
control, to achieve coordinated national development' (Wiarda 1997: IX). Views of 
corporatism have continually shifted, and have moved on from a focus on interest 
representation to a focus on interest intermediation (Williamson 1989: 14). Lehmbruch 
offers this additional definition: 
Corporatism is more than a peculiar pattern of articulation of 
interests. Rather, it is an institutionalized pattern of policy-formation 
in which large interest organizations cooperate with each other and 
with public authorities not only in the articulation (or even 
'intermediation,) of interests, but - in its developed forms - in the 
'authoritative allocation of values' and in the implementation of such 
policies. (Lehmbruch, 1979[1977J: 150) 
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Moreover, Williamson also agrees that the development of corporatist theory 
suggests that there is some equivalence of influence among citizens and different interests 
within society, that the leadership of interest associations are ultimately under the control 
of the members, that the state is an essentially democratic neutral set of institutions, and 
that there are opportunities for participation in interest group politics (1989: 19). The 
character of the actors within the decision-making process and the way they interact with 
the state however became a distinguishing factor in whether corporatism was dealing 
with a structure of interest representation or whether corporatism was a system of policy-
making (Schmitter 1982, Molina and Rhodes 2002:308). Schmitter labels the former 
'neo-corporatism l' and the latter 'neo-corporatism 2', putting a clear line between 
himself and Lehmbruch's own definition of the theory (1982). This is an important 
distinction, and to analyse the Thai-EU partnership, it is more useful to understand that 
corporatism can be used both to understand interest representation and to explain how 
policy-making can be conducted by taking into account the patterns of interest 
representation between the state, businesses, and interest groups. 
The uses of corporatism for the analysis of policy are manifold. Cawson suggests 
that one of the main contributions of corporatism is reflected in capitalist democracies 
and focused on exploring different patterns of relationships between state systems and 
organised interests. The second main contribution is the manner in which it forwards a 
comparative analysis of public policy-making rather than one centred within nation-
states. This analysis has to focus on relationships between state agencies and interest 
organisations in particular policy areas (Cawson 1986: 20). Furthermore, an empirical 
study of the Swedish public administration also found that preferences are often changed 
in discussions when other interests are involved, and the decision-making process within 
a corporatist framework often shows deliberation, rather than negotiations between 
contesting interests (Oberg 2002: 455). Consequently, Oberg argues that corporatism can 
explain how trust in and between the represented organizations deliberating policy within 
the corporatist framework can be encouraged and sustained (2002: 455). The purpose 
here, as noted above, is to explore the extent to which ideas of corporatism can be used to 
explore the making of Thai external commercial policy. 
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The first major feature of Thai external commercial policy-making, the power 
asymmetry between Thai state, firms, and interest groups related to interest 
intermediation, is important to an understanding of how Thai external commercial policy-
making is made and how this might have an effect on its relationship with the EU.4 While 
corporatism stresses inequality and hierarchy in the distribution of power, corporatists 
identify 'organisation and the mobilisation of bias involved in organisation' as the most 
important power factor (Cawson 1986: 14). 
A second main feature of Thai external commercial policy-making is the way 
which the state usually dominates the interest mediation process and there is very often a 
closed and mutually complementary relationship with firms. This makes corporatism 
very suitable for the analysis of the Thai external commercial policy-making process 
since there is a closed relationship, rather than a disclosed, transparent and competitive 
one, between the state, businesses, and interest groups. This accords with claims from 
critics that Thailand's policy-making process is strongly elitist and excludes the 
grassroots from the decision-making process. Corporatism's focus on interest 
representation within 'closed relationships' closely reflects Thailand's elitist decision-
making process and makes the theory potentially suitable for the analysis of Thailand's 
commercial policy-making. 
A third feature of Thai external commercial policy-making is to support the move 
towards a modem market economy, in which the state, firms, and interest groups tend to 
act regardless of market-supporting institutions such as APEC, ASEM or the WTO. This 
is different from modem ideas on economic development where it seems that roles of 
institutions are considered to be at least equally important to the role of individual actors. 
This links to another criticism of corporatism, which is that corporatism is inconsistent 
with the empirical evidence shown in the creation of market-supporting institutions, such 
as rule of law and civil society, which related to Third World economic liberalization 
(Kong 2004:20). At first glance, it would appear that corporatism's focus on relatively 
informal negotiation mechanisms among closed groups is a poor foundation for a move 
towards a modern market economy in a country such as Thailand. Kong, however, argues 
4 There have been indications that corporatism and Marxism may have many similar ideas although 
corporatists disagree with this notion. 
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that corporatism is consistent with neoliberal ideas in the manner with which corporatism 
encourages negotiation and compensating labour for the loss of employment and security 
(2004:21). In this manner, organized labour can be socialized to accept free-market 
economic norms. Kong further argues that with states accounting for up to 40 percent of 
GDP, even in developed neo-liberal economies, corporatism plays an important role in 
the coordination of economies and is consistent with the development towards a modern 
market economy (2004:21). 
Understanding the process of political exchange within the Thai external 
commercial policy-making process also requires an understanding about the Thai-EU 
commercial relationship and recent developments in corporatism which have emphasised 
the roles of networks. Instead of trying to measure corporatism and explaining corporatist 
systems with certain types of economic performance, analysts feel that new types of 
corporatism should be analysed 'in terms of networks; their logics in terms of processes 
that underpin them; their fate in terms of the evolution of integration and the changing 
currency of exchange' (Molina and Rhodes 2002:326). In a comprehensive review of the 
'return' of neo-corporatism, Molina and Rhodes noted that the role of actors in 
contemporary corporatism included a more active role of the state in negotiations, a 
weakening of trade unions causing an imbalance of negotiation power between partners, 
and a change in the process of bargaining due to the weakened power of these trade 
unions (2002:326-327). As will be discussed in chapters three and four, Molina and 
Rhode's propositions closely reflect the policy-making process in Thailand. Bull also 
explains how this political exchange relationship can be analysed through three 
conditions including the actors themselves, the actors' external environment, and the 
nature of the exchange itself (1992:270). These conditions have an effect on the 
autonomy of the actor, how its environment might constrain its behaviour, and how the 
issues involved might affect the political exchange within a corporatist environment (Bull 
1992: 270). Similarly, Bull's explanation of the political exchange relationship in 
corporatism can be used to analyse Thailand's external commercial policy-making 
process where the autonomy of actors is conditional on the environment the actor is 
functioning within. This is an issue which is covered in more detail in the empirical 
chapters three and four. 
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There have been suggestions that Asian countries have strong components for 
corporatism due to their foundations in society, community, and group solidarity, 
although there needs to be a distinction made between the 'societal' corporatisms of 
Europe and the state-dominant or authoritarian corporatism of the developing world, 
especially Latin America and East Asia (Kong 2004: 20). The authoritarian or state-
dominant model of social corporatism, Kong argues, does not allow an independent 
labour voice (2004: 20). According to Wiarda, the Asian countries' strong focuses on 
communal values means that group based corporatism tends to be prevalent in Asia. 
Secondly, corporatism is a promising approach because of Asia's emphasis on solidarity 
and avoidance of conflict. Thirdly, Asians put a strong emphasis on national unity and 
tend to avoid fonns of polarization which might tear society apart. Finally, Asians' 
acceptance of top-down hierarchy is also conducive to corporatism (Wiarda 1997: 83). 
Furthennore, according to some developing economies, corporatism has been linked to 
authoritarian political governments and ideas of state intervention, and analysts have also 
explained how the exchanges between functional interest associations and the state, 
through either institutionalisation or regular collaboration, help to sustain growth of the 
state economic intervention even beyond Keynesian lines (Almodovar and Cardoso 2005: 
352). The influential and sometimes elitist role of the Thai state in external commercial 
policy-making is linked to Almodovar and Cardoso's proposals that the state plays a key 
role in the political economic exchange that is at the centre of the policy-making process 
(this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). 
It is no coincidence that Wiarda's rationale for the spread of corporatism in 
various countries in Asia particularly relates to Thailand's basic values. The Thai 
government under General Prem Tinlasunlanonda during 1980-1988 may have been 
considered to be a corporatist government because of its establishment of associations 
from the private sector to help provide advice to the government on key commercial 
issues. The key government actors who encouraged the establishment of such 
associations actually had strong links to the private sector as well (Bunchaiyanun 1987, 
85). Similarly, Fonner Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun has also agreed that heading 
his government can be described as a liberal corporate style government (Wrangel: 
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Anand interview archive\ Laothamathas explains that official government sponsorship 
and encouragement has played a major role in the development of Thai businesses 
associations. This appears to make government-business relations in Thailand fit the 
corporatist model well. Moreover, the Trade Association Act and the Chamber of 
Commerce Act, currently considered the main Thai legislation on business associations, 
also contain many corporatist elements (Laothamathas 1996: 92). 
These views on corporatism provide a conceptual framework for understanding 
Thailand's external trade policy-making. Corporatism has generated several questions to 
ask about how the state might act, if firms were not involved in the commercial policy-
making and negotiation process at all. It also asks the question whether the state might be 
very active in trying to support external commercial policies if commercial interest 
groups are not involved. And the most important thing is that it forces this research to 
acknowledge the possible significance of processes of exchange - collusion and 
competition - between states and firms in the issue of external commercial policies. 
Exploration of collusion and competition between the state and firms in Thailand in 
dealing with the EU concerning international commerce will be crucial in this research 
since it highlights the importance of the respective roles of states and firms. 
This chapter has now established the importance of - and the tensions between - a 
'state-centred' approach to Thai external commercial policies based on the pursuit of 
national interest, and an approach centred on processes of exchange between actors in the 
policy-making arena. The latter approach leads to a number of important questions about 
the terms on which exchange takes place, and about the prevalence of competition and 
collusion between governments and firms. The next section argues that these general 
questions can be explored through a focus on one of Thailand's most significant external 
commercial relationships, that with the European Union. 
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The EU as a Case Study for Thailand's External Trade Policy-
Making 
The previous sections showed how relatively unimportant Thailand is in the global 
political economy. They also showed that even if Thailand is unimportant in the global 
political economy, doing well in it is absolutely important for Thailand. This is shown in 
how Thai policy-makers see commercial policy as matter of national interest in all the 
forums they take part in. 
To analyse more how Thai external trade policy-making actually is carried out, a 
suitable case study is needed. Since Thailand is an export-dependent country, the partner 
of Thailand in the case study should be a partner which is important for Thailand. It is 
also good if the partner is one with well-developed policy-making procedures and with 
policy-makers which have very exact roles. If this partner is important for Thailand and 
has well-developed policies and policy-making, it will show how Thai policy-makers are 
able to work with each other to pursue the national interest in external commercial 
policy-making. 
This section will show how the EU is a suitable case study by doing two things. 
First, the EU's power in the global political economy and in relation to Thailand will be 
analysed. This is important because it shows how the EU's power in commerce is 
different from that of Thailand and how Thailand can be seen as dependent on the EU. It 
is also important because it shows how the EU can use its commercial power to influence 
other countries, including Thailand. The difference in power between the EU and 
Thailand is expected to be very important in the case study. The second part of this 
section will be about the EU's policy-making procedures and institutions and how they 
can be considered to be an obstacle for their commercial partners. Several argue that the 
EU's institutions make it a difficult partner to talk to. This makes the EU's policy-making 
and institutions very suitable for use as a case study for Thailand's external commercial 
policy-making because it promises to show how Thai policy-makers can work together 
to cope with and adjust to the EU's demands. Equally important is how the Thai state and 
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firms may be able to work together to maximise Thai commercial policy's effectiveness 
in dealing with the EO. 
The EU in the Global Political Economy 
In the context of the EO's numerous relationships, Thailand is simply not considered as 
one of the EO's important trading partners. In terms of total trade, Thailand's share in 
trade with the EO is insignificant. For example, in terms of services, EO trade with 
Thailand in 2004 added up to only 0.6% of the EO's trade in services. However, for 
Thailand, the EO is certainly one of Thailand's most important trading partners. The EO 
currently accounts for an overwhelming majority of Thailand's trade surplus, adding up 
to 89.3% of Btl75 billion in 2003. The EO also makes up 15% of Thailand's total trade. 
Thailand also holds a place as one of the top users of the EO's GSP regime6• 
The EO makes a good case study for Thailand's external trade-policy because of 
the imbalance of power between the two and the EO's use of soft power as a basis for its 
external relationships. Equally important is how the EO is among Thailand's most 
important trade partners. Establishment of the EO's role in the GPE is particularly 
important because it lays out the basic foundations on which the Thai-EO relationship is 
built. This analysis of the EO's role in the global political economy should serve to 
further consolidate the understanding of how the EO's political economic power stands in 
relation to Thailand's as well as to frame the foundational context of the relationship. 
In making use of the EO to analyse the Thai external commercial policy-making 
process, we firstly need to consider the importance of this economic disparity, since the 
disparity is expected to play a very strong role in the relationship. Secondly, the way in 
which trade and economics have played leading roles in the relationship, as opposed to 
politics and traditional diplomacy, needs to be considered. This has implications for the 
role of the state and the role of the firm, with a main research question being whether the 
trade and economic based relationship might mean that the role ofthe firm may actually 
have increased in importance relative to the role of the state. The economic focus of the 
relationship also appears to demand a role for commercial interest groups which is 
6 http://ec.europa.eufcomm/externaIJelations/thailandlintro/index.htm 
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expected be an important part in influencing the policy process, in accordance with ideas 
on corporatism and interest intermediation. 
This section establishes the significance of the EV in order to mark the foundation 
of the EV's strategic economic power and any consequential political influence arising 
from the EU's economic power. The section lists a number of important factors which 
may result in the EV's use of its commercial power as an influence in the world, and in 
its relations with Thailand. This ranges from the EV's use of its commercial and 
economic power to provide itself with a better negotiating position in the area of trade, 
set ideas and agendas for the global political economy, and the normative use of its 
economic power to expand its desired role as a 'civilian power' in the GPE. The 
following section goes into further detail to attempt to establish what kind of 'actor' the 
EV might be, whether it can be considered as a state-like actor in the global political 
economy, and how the EV's unique 'actor-ness' might have an effect on Thai-EV 
commercial relations. 
The EV's role in the aPE acts as an extremely important foundation for the Thai-
EV relationship, particularly since it raises the question of how the power disparity 
between the two partners could affect the partnership. Unless included in the ASEAN 
structure, Thailand's share of the world market is minimal and might be considered as 
unimportant market for the EV. Moreover, the political influence of Thailand is even 
smaller when 'compared to a trade partner like the EU. This raises some very serious 
questions on how unequal economic power might affect the role of the state, the role of 
institutions and the role of firms in Thailand. 
This power and dependency approach is meant to further clarify the domestic 
process approach (as noted in earlier arguments in corporatism) by noting how the Thai-
EV commercial partnership works at a macro or structural level. The economic disparity 
between the EU and Thailand is expected to bring out tensions in the partnership which 
require solving and planning at the Thai domestic level. Consequently, the discussion in 
the following sections provides a foundation for further understanding in subsequent 
chapters on how matters at the macro level have been handled at the domestic level. 
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Commercial Power as Influence 
The EU is one of the world's largest poles alongside the US in tenns of aggregate GDP 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006:45), and accounts for 20 percent of international trade flows 
and about 30 percent offoreign direct investment flows (Woo1cock 2000 :374). Moreover 
the EU integration process has created dynamic growth of intra-trade within the EU, 
which after 1995 enlargement represented more than 60 percent of total trade for the 
average EU country. The enlargement of the EU has also created a drive towards self-
sufficiency, which might be seen as a significant barrier to outsiders. 
In addition, the EU's resource creates power for the EU in the world economy and 
provides the EU with a good negotiating position in the area of trade which places them 
in a position to preserve their interests. The EU, in short, has the power to shape the rules 
in order to preserve and promote their interests. These rules sometimes are seen as a tool 
to create difficulties by tightened policies and could make an outsider lose out in the 
bargaining process. 
The EU's commercial power is unique and this has helped the EU to become an 
international actor by playing a role as a source of ideas and agenda-setting for the world 
economy and for outsiders. Piening indicated that these two roles, commercial power and 
international actor, have a direct relation since trade and economic relations serve as 
essential foundations to all foreign policy, especially since most relations are dictated by 
economic interests (1997 :14). 
The issue ofthe EU's economic power is indirectly linked to why it is a difficult 
partner for outsiders, because it shows how much bargaining power the EU has over 
smaller nations and groupings specifically because of its commercial strength. The EU is 
not only one of the largest economic powers in the world, but also the biggest donor 
because it provides a 47% share of official development aid in the world followed by 
Japan at only 19% (Pinder 2001:51). This type of bargaining power needs to be carefully 
considered when analysing the EU's external relations with Thailand and the manner in 
which Thai policy actors react to this type of bargaining power needs to be analysed in 
subsequent chapters. 
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The EU also has used its economic power to especially benefit a selected group of 
countries, hence simultaneously excluding others from competitively engaging with the 
EU. These significant numbers of preferential trade agreements can be seen as narrowing 
and limiting outsiders' chance to trade with the EU. The three groups of EU preferential 
trade agreements consist of EFTA, ACP (Cotonou Agreement) and Euro-Mediterranean. 
The EU reserves 1.1% and 1.6% of imports from ACP country and the Mediterranean 
countries respectively which is a large enough number to limit other outsiders' chance in 
trading with the EU (Tsoukalis 2003:77). It can easily be assumed that if the outsider 
wants to export to the EU the same products as these preferential trade groups export to 
the EU, those outsiders will encounter difficulties in tightened regulation and rules which 
try to block them. 
Evidence shows how the EC is becoming a 'growing and increasingly structured 
presence in the international area' (Alien and Smith 1998:290) and how outsiders are 
increasingly required to deal with a more complicated actor than in the past. Smith and 
Alien also add that the EC is not only an 'actor' or presence' but also a process which 
includes complex institutions, roles and rules which structure the activities or the EC 
itself and those of other international actors it conducts relationships with (Smith 1996, 
Alien and Smith 1998. White explains that the EU is a 'unique but also non-unitary 
actor', which is a main actor in many areas of contemporary world politics (2001). Such 
characteristics can potentially complicate the problems faced by outsiders in trying to 
gain access to EU markets, and thus enter into their external commercial policy-making. 
The EU is also increasingly being considered a civilian power, or a normative 
power, which has an influence on defining and tightening the rules for outside trade. This 
is especially true when the EU deals with a smaller economy such as Thailand because 
the power disparity is very wide. The normative power of the EU has five core norms: 
peace, liberty, democracy, rule ofIaw and human rights. (Manners 2002:242). The EU as 
a normative power uses soft power as a tool partly through its economic power. The EU 
is currently an international body which still lacks the ability to gain leverage from 
military force or hard power. In contrast, the USA presents itself to the world as a state 
which has both hard and soft power. The USA can use these two powers together even if 
the USA may not need to exercise their hard power directly to influence international 
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trade, since the existence of hard power allows its soft power to be exercised more 
efficiently. Meanwhile, the EO's true strength remains only in areas of soft, or economic, 
power. The EO's exercising of this soft power is rather efficient, and can appear quite 
'hard' to outsiders who feel its effects. 
The EO's global economic power is undoubtedly one of its most valued assets in 
the governance of its external relations and may consequently re-enforce the perception 
of the EO as a difficult partner. This section has demonstrated that the EO's power in 
economic diplomacy has allowed it to manage its external relations by influencing 
trading partners with economic incentives. It has been implicit in this analysis that the 
EO's economic power is a factor which gives it a very powerful status within the global 
economic community. The EO's market is highly coveted by outsiders due to its sheer 
size, and loss of access would be costly. This may give the EO a strong position in 
negotiations with a range of functions. It has also shown how the EO has shaped the 
global economic arena by being an important player in the creation of the WTO forum. 
This has undoubtedly been the case due to the EO's preference of how global trading 
should be conducted, and means that its partners would have to conduct trade according 
to rules the EO prefers to use. Finally, the EO's role as a normative power has formed the 
EO's status as a 'soft power', meaning that its conduct of commercial relations may be 
aimed towards non-commercial issues such as human rights and good governance. These 
are norms which the EO has consistently pushed with its economic partners, and have 
often been the subject of some controversy. 
These issues are important for Thailand because it may mean that the central role 
as concerns the issue of countering the EO's economic power and economic diplomacy 
might be given to the Thai state rather than to Thai firms - in other words, the 'state-
centric' argument advanced earlier might be privileged by this situation and by a focus on 
overall power structure. Since the EO's economic power is determined largely by how 
the member state governments have consolidated their power by giving power to the 
European Commission to negotiate on their behalf, it may imply that Thailand's 
governments and bureaucracy are given the burden of dealing with this at high level 
summits and negotiations. This in turn could mean that the Thai firms become sidelined 
in the negotiations, although this is a question this research will analyse further. 
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This observation on the EU's commercial power as an influencing factor is 
strongly relevant to the Thai-EU partnership because the EU's sizeable economic power 
could be considered to create a strong power disparity in the partnership. The EU's 
position means that the EU could shape the relationship according to its own preferences 
through enforcement of various political economic influences through the use of trade. 
This could include taking advantage of the power disparity in obliging Thailand's 
cooperation in complying with liberal trading standards as well as non-commercial norms 
such as human rights and good governance. The EU's global economic influence and 
relative commercial power also places the onus on Thailand to take careful note of the 
EU's preferences in order to gain access to the EU's markets. 
EU institutions and Policy Making 
In the previous section, we focused on structural approachess to understanding the EU 
and how they may affect Thai policy-makers. This section turns towards a process-based 
explanation and focuses on the EU's institutions and policy-making process instead. 
Defining the EU is one of the problems which many outsiders are facing and is a critical 
question for Thai policy-makers. It will be very useful for outsiders to define it correctly, 
in order to realize the position and quality of the EU and thus create appropriate strategy 
in dealing with the EU. Traditional thinking would see that the EU is just an 
intergovernmental institution. This makes it the same as other intergovernmental 
institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, or the North 
American Free Trade Area. There have also been attempts to compare the European 
Community (EC) to a growing federal state (Jackson, 1995), but among academics it is 
being increasingly accepted that the EU less than a state, but more than an 
intergovernmental organization. 
This section notes four unique challenges for Thai policy-makers in trying to deal 
with the EU. The first challenge concerns the EU's complexity as a unique international 
actor. The second challenge is how to deal with the EU's status as 'more than a state, less 
than a transnational government'. The third challenge is dealing with the EU's different 
modes of policy-making. The fourth challenge is how Thai policy-makers may be able to 
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cope with the EU's institutions, particularly between the Council and the Commission, 
and the tension between national and supranational positions. 
The EU makes for an interesting case study for Thailand because of its very 
unique nature as an actor which is not a state, but with state-like functions. According to 
Peterson and Shackleton, the EU is a political organization which is less than a federation 
and more than a government (2002), a kind of confederation but not yet a federation 
(Chryssochoou 2000), and neither a state nor an ordinary international organization 
(Peterson and Shackleton 2002). The EU is a 'Unique' institution, according to Peterson 
and Sjursen, '(Vho try to define the difference between the 'European Union' and 'Europe' 
in order to help see a clearer picture of the EU in the world economy (Wallace and 
Wall ace 2000:2). 
In a country which lacks resources in policy-making such as Thailand, the EU's 
policy-making process poses some serious problems which require further analysis. The 
first challenge for Thai policy-makers concerns the EU's complexity. Smith argues that 
the EU is a 'mixed system of participation, regulation, and action'; it is 'complex, and 
multilayered'; and because it has mixed competences within its institutions, there 
continues to be a 'complex framework for continuous bargaining' (Smith 1994:457). 
Bretherton and Vogler view the EU as sui generis and define it as 'a multiperspectival 
polity whose construction reflects both the experimentation of policy entrepreneurs and 
the opportunities afforded by the changing structures of the international system'. They 
also argue that the EU as an actor is still being defined, and that the dynamics within the 
institutions and the member states make it difficult to consider the EU as a single actor 
(1999:44, 2006: 137). 
The second challenge for Thai policy-makers concerns the EU's status as 
encompassing more than one state and dealing with more than one government. There are 
some other arguments such as Wallace and Pollack who argue that the term 
'intergovernmental' does not correctly define the varying policy modes in the EU, 
especially since the term is used to describe other international organisations where the 
intensity of cooperation is rather limited (2005:37). Wallace and Pollack also propose 
that the EU is an example of 'intensive transgovermentalisrn' to show the larger extent of 
cooperation. This leaves room, she argues, for interpretation that the member 
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governments are ready for intense cooperation, but feel that the EU's institutional 
framework is still 'inappropriate or unacceptable' for being called federal institutions 
(2005:38). Moreover, the EU is still under construction since the enlargement of the 'EU 
has never shown expectations and no clue 'where' it should end (Peterson and Sjursen 
1998:18). How Thailand deals with this transgovemmental and transitional nature 
through its own policy-making mechanisms is a test of how well Thai policy-makers are 
able to adjust to difficult challenges in their external commercial policy-making process. 
The EU's governance style, which is still under construction, poses a crucial 
problem for outsiders, since it means that they have to follow rapid changes within the 
EU. These changes will also always have an effect on EU policy, thus, it would be very 
difficult for Thai policy-makers to adapt their strategies according to the dynamic 
changes within the EU. Outsiders such as Thailand, therefore, should understand the EU 
by its form and its system rather than just an implication of policy since the policy can 
change rapidly according to the current situation of the EU and world market. In other 
words, it is not enough to view only the EU's policies, but outsiders need to look at how 
the EU's institutions form these policies in order to understand the natural trend of EU 
policies. 
The third challenge for Thai policy-makers is dealing with the fact that the EU has 
no single mode of policy making and actors in the EU also have different roles in 
different modes of policy making (Wall ace and Wallace 2000: 28-35). According to 
Wallace, the EU has five variants of policy process, and each policy process modes 
places differing roles on each of the EU institutions. The five variants include the 
distinctive Community method, the EU regulatory model, multilevel governance, policy 
coordination and benchmarking and intensive transgovemmentalism (Wallace 2005). 
These modes appear to have been created as consequences of the EU's need to adapt to 
various policy areas. Thai policy-makers are likewise required to understand these 
different modes of policy making to understand the changes in policy, individual 
influence of the EU institutions, and policy processes. 
The fourth and related challenge for Thai policy-makers is dealing with how the 
EU is a multi-level system which is producing multi-level governance where different 
institutions, at different levels, negotiate to reach a decision. This means that Thai policy-
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makers will have to find a way to cope with and to understand the EO's own internal 
institutional struggles, particularly between the Commission's 'supranational' standing 
and the Council's 'national' positions. Policy-making procedures are reached at either the 
history-making, policy-setting, or policy-shaping level. At these different levels, 
institutions are involved in negotiations to reach a decision with varying degrees of 
influence at each stage (Peterson, 1995). 
At all levels, particularly the history-making and policy-setting levels, more 
specifically the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA), the role and interest of the nation-state are represented by the European 
Council and the Council of Ministers, the direction controller mechanism of the EO. The 
European Council, composed of the heads of government of each EO member state, gives 
direction to policies and makes the most important decisions for the future of the EO. The 
Council of Ministers has been seen as the stage to preserve their national interests. This is 
normally done through participating Ministers in many fields from the member states. All 
rules, which are produced, must be approved at this stage. Otherwise there won't be any 
major rule emerging. (Peterson 1995). Although the history-making level is not always 
directly relevant to Thailand's national interest, it is still critical to take note of how the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers continue to be strong representatives of 
national positions, and that national positions continue to play a significant role in the 
EO's policy-making mechanisms. 
More relevant to Thailand's national interest due to their direct contact with Thai 
policy-makers and direct role in strategising with individual partner countries is the role 
of the European Commission. The Commission and its appointed 'European' bureaucrats, 
generally regarded as the supranational part of the EU, create, implement, and partly 
enforce policies within the EO. They give force to the integration process and deliver the 
EO towards a given destination. The Commission is considered as one of the most 
important driving forces towards integration because of its ability to create proposals 
right from the policy-shaping level, where other institutions have a highly limited role 
(Peterson 2002). However, they are still controlled since proposals must be examined and 
passed by the European Parliament (EP) and finally approved by the Council. 
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Thai policy-makers may also need to consider the power struggle between the 
EU's institutions and the tension between the national and supranational positions within 
the EU. The complex institutions of the EU can create an imbalance of power within the 
institution itself, and at certain stages, it seems rather certain that the Council is one of the 
most influential institutions in the EU. For example, according to Moravscik, the Council 
was the only institution which played a significant role during the 1997 Amsterdam IGC 
and agreements were reached only in areas where most members gained with relatively 
little losses in interest for other members (1997:70). In addition, it has also been argued 
that individual member states have managed to influence the EU agenda to their relative 
gains or preferences and improve the competitiveness of trade with the new Single 
Market (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:58). 
In Peterson and Bomberg's argument, the Commission also plays an almost 
equally important role in the establishment of policy within the EU. This is especially 
true at the policy-formation stage and at the sub-systemic level, where the issues are still 
technical and relatively unpoliticised. At the sub-systemic level, Peterson and Bomberg 
explain that choices are shaped in important ways through decisions taken in policy 
networks occurring within the institutions of the EU (1999:29-30). The Commission, 
thus, is able to shape and form policies before handing it over to other institutions, a 
formidable power in itself. In addition, the Council may have the final say in major 
decisions, but the Commission is undeniably significant as the institution which shapes 
and forms policy proposals. A satisfactory judgement of this very complex debate seems 
to be that one institution is often more powerful than the other, depending on the policy 
area and the interests involved. In the area of external relations, the Commission appears 
to have more control over policies than other institutions. 
The problem of the Commission's competency, or ability to act by itself, seems to 
have been a problem since it could form an obstacle to the EU's capacity to act with 
credibility and coherence towards outsiders. Articles 133 and 310 of the Treaty on 
European Union give the Commission competency in matters concerning external 
commercial relations and give the Commission rights to talk to the world on matters 
about trade. Nonetheless, the Commission is still restricted by the fact that it will have to 
negotiate in accordance with the Council's national positions and that states still exercise 
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informal veto rights at the negotiation mandate and ratification stages (W oolcock 2000, 
Meunier and Nicolaidis 2000:331). There are arguments along similar lines that this 
problem of mixed competencies, and of exclusive versus shared competency, will take 
away the EU's ability to speak with one voice as well as decreasing the EU's credibility 
in global negotiations by creating uncertainty (Smith 2001:792, Meunier and Nicolaidis 
2000:343). It could also affect the nature of the international political economy, as 
'fragmented actors' are believed to be less capable of producing packages of linked deals. 
They are also more likely to be protectionist in nature (Meunier and Nicolaidis 
2000:331). 
The multi-layered nature of EU institutions also allows the intervention of interest 
groups which may make the policy direction shift from where it should logically be. 
Interest groups have a significant effect in shaping and influencing EU policy. Moreover, 
there are a number of interest groups who have a crucial influence within the EU. In 1992 
the Commission estimated that there were some 3,000 interest groups in Brussels, 
including more than 500 European associations, and that in total some 10,000 people 
were employed as a lobbyist of one sort or another in Brussels (Commission of The 
European Communities 1994), Mazey and Richardson 200 I :32). Direct lobbying by 
firms has also increased between 1985 and 1997 when more than 350 firms established 
their own EU affairs offices in Brussels (Coen 1997:91). These interest groups normally 
lobby their national administrations, but they will also have direct access to European 
policy maker or actors in institutions. It is also important to note that outsider 
governments might also be effectively acting as interest groups in the EU governance 
system and this is a subject which requires further investigation in this research. 
This section illustrates how the EU's institutional and policy-making complexities 
might have an effect on Thailand's governments and firms attempting to deal with the 
transgovernmental institution. A highly complicated policy process could mean that Thai 
governments and firms are unable to determine a point of entry to influence or negotiate 
with the EU. This research accepts that there are various points of entry in the EU policy-
making process which might be made, but subsequent parts will attempt to find out which 
points might be considered to be most effective. This might mean that both outsider 
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governments and firms will together have an equally important role in attempting to 
access the EU's governance system as well as a role in influencing it. 
The idea of a complex and arguably complicated EU policy-making process 
offers some serious implications in the manner in which the Thai government interacts 
with the EU. One could suggest that a developing country with state sectors possessing 
limited resources and specialized knowledge concerning the EU's unique policy-making 
process would struggle to develop expertise to both understand and deal with the EU's 
various institutions. Consequently, there is a possibility that Thai firms, with a strong and 
direct interest in gaining access to the EU markets may have developed a means or the 
expertise to cooperate with the Thai state sectors to maximize their opportunities to enter 
the EU market. This raises the question that Thai state and Thai firms, with possibly 
conflicting means of achieving their goals could enter into a policy competition in order 
to maximize their interest - but also that they might collude in forms of political 
exchange, as argued earlier in the chapter. 
Conclusion: Thai Commercial Policy-Making and Thai-EU 
commercial relations in context 
Conceptualising the Thai-EU commercial partnership needs to take into account the 
issues of the EU's global economic power and the implications of this economic power. 
This presents a number of issues related to the impact of structural disparities and to the 
use of commercial power itself. Alongside this, the issue of the EU's status as a unique 
international actor and its extremely complex policy-making procedures and institutions 
also needs to be analysed. It is also necessary to consider the nature of Thai policy-
making, particularly in the area of international commercial policy-making, and the 
growing presence and importance of Thai firms and commercial interest groups. The 
possibility that corporatism, with its focus on processes of political exchange and interest 
mediation, would be the best framework for explaining Thai policy-making should also 
be considered. 
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The key questions in this research centre on the possible uses of power, the 
importance of power disparity, the complexity of the actors involved and the interaction 
between states and firms. First, this research questions how Thai states and firms interact 
to produce a set of intermediated strategies in order to deal with the EU's economic 
power and complex institutions. This research secondly questions how the EU's 
economic power and the EU's complex institutions and policy-making process will have 
an impact on Thai states and firms' strategies in their attempts to gain access to EU 
markets. A third key question is how the different or similar characteristics of Thai states 
and firms have an impact on their mutual co-operation, also when they have to interact 
with the EU. 
Three key research propositions emerge from questions raised in this chapter. 
First, this research will consider roles of the Thai state as a facilitator for Thai firms in the 
Thai-EU partnership. The Thai state in this area will also include any governmental 
involvement in international institutions such as ASEAN's dealings with the EU, or the 
Thai government's participation in ASEM. This can be suggested as the main point of 
contact, especially since the EU's complex institutional structure mainly encourages 
direct communication between governments and discourages direct contact between the 
EU's institutions and smaller Thai firms with little significance. 
The second key research proposition is the possibility that Thai firms may act as 
their own facilitators in Thai-EU relations. This is based on the proposition that firms 
have an independence in pursuing their own objectives free from the interference of 
states. In today's global political economy, multinational firms do have the liberty to 
pursue their own corporate policies to maximise their own corporate interests and there 
may be suggestions that influential Thai firms may actually have arrived at this level. 
The third key research proposition is the partnership of the Thai state and Thai 
firms in the Thai-EU commercial partnership. This could mean both collusion and 
competition between the state and firms in achieving a mutual set of objectives. This 
proposition is based strongly on the ideas of corporatism, which argue that the state and 
firms will go through a process of interest mediation before setting out the official 
commercial policies which would have an effect on external commercial policies. This 
would involve consultation, co-operation and evaluation from both states and firms to 
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each other on existing policies before setting out any new strategies and policies. 
According to the developing role of Thai firms and its inclusion in the policy-making 
process, this third key observation has a strong possibility to exist in Thailand. 
In chapter 2, we will consider the development of Thai-EU commercial relations 
during the period 1969-2005, with specific attention to developments during the 1990s 
and early 2000s. This will provide the basis for more detailed study in chapter 3 of the 
'state-centred' approach to Thai-EU commercial relations and to Thai commercial policy-
making, and of the ways in which government structure can influence patterns of policy-
making and policy effectiveness. This addresses the key aspects of our first research 
proposition above; it will also form a basis for moving on in chapter 4. to deal with the 
roles of firms and business associations in Thai policy-making, and to explore the 
interaction of state and firms. 
Chapter 2: 
Thailand-EU Commercial Relations from 1969 to 2005 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on EU-Thai commercial relations from 1969 to the present period, 
dealing with various aspects of the partnership. First, it points to a number of general 
trends in Thai-EU commercial relations and problems which have occurred. A second 
area for analysis deals with specifically sensitive issues which have caused problems 
during the given period. A third area for analysis concerns the manner in which 
negotiations have been conducted and the major actors involved in any problematic 
situations. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a foundation to answer the main 
research questions provided in the previous chapters. In other words, the main 
foundations which need to be considered are Thai strategies in dealing with the EU as 
well as strategies for solving commercial problems. This analysis of trends is also 
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expected to uncover the major Thai actors involved in Thailand's commercial relations 
with the EU, and any instances of cooperation or competition between these actors. 
Finally, it is important to note if Thai policy-makers have found the EU's unique nature 
difficult to deal with, and how Thai policy-makers have attempted to cope with the EU's 
unique nature. 
It is important to remember that this broad view of the history of Thai-EU 
commercial relations from 1969 to 2005 is not meant to be comprehensive. It is meant to 
show trends and the behaviour of Thailand's key commercial actors in creating strategies 
towards the EU as well as in solving problems that have arisen during the key moments 
in the Thai-EU Partnership. Chapters 3 and 4 are where the role of the key Thai actors as 
well as their actions and policy-making procedures are discussed in greater detail. 
Origin of the Thai-EC Partnership 
The origins of Thai-EU commercial relations can be traced back to 1969 (Nuansuwan 
1977: 36). While the EC mentioned the desire to aid Third World countries through 
trade, this was a period in which the EC was attempting to spread its influence in the 
Third World in order to spread the broader ideas of trade liberalisation. When the UK 
joined the EC in 1973, Asia had already begun to prove itself as a competent trader. This 
effectively made it ineligible to join the Lome Convention which was founded in terms of 
development policy. According to Holland, this effectively limited the possibility of 
upgrading relations for the next two decades (2002:60). The EC had agreed on a Textile 
Agreement with Thailand and other 11 Asian countries which subsequently resulted in 
the introduction of a asp system on the I st of July 1969. This was the first time the asp 
system had been introduced to Thailand as a system which aimed to help Thai exports 
grow in the EC market. 
While the EC stressed being a good economic Samaritan as the reasons for 
provision of the asp to Thailand, it was insubstantial relative to the aid other regions of 
the world were receiving. Development aid coming from the EC to Asia was largely 
aimed at the three South Asian states (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh), which were given the 
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best market access in accordance with the 1971 GSP regime. Even as such, the aid to 
South Asia was only seven percent of Europe's total aid budget (Holland 2002:61). 
Subsequently, the economic relationship between the EC and Thailand was 
limited in substance. The most visible attempt to set up a framework for regular 
institutional contact between Thailand and Europe started with the establishment of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 1968. This allowed for the 
possibility of region-to-region negotiations which allowed for informal contacts to be 
made from 1976 to 1980 (Forster 2000:790). Most noticeably, the Malaysian and 
Singaporean concern that ASEAN market access might be reduced due to loss of 
preferences from the Britain's accession to the European Community resulted in the start 
of an institutional link between ASEAN and the EC. This built up into formal 
consultations which resulted in the beginning of a full dialogue relationship, with regular 
attendances, at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings (ASEAN-PMC) with other 
industrialised states from the Asia Pacific in November of 1978 (Leifer 1998:200). 
ASEAN and the EC were in their developing stages at the time, but 1967 to 1980 
would be considered a period when a 'machinery for regular institutional contact' was 
being created through informal contacts (Forster 2000:790). This was later formalised 
with the creation of the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement in March 1980. In 1973, the 
delegation of Sir Christopher Soames, Vice President and Commissioner for External 
Relations of the EC Commission, travelled to Thailand for a meeting between the EC 
Commission and ASEAN Ministers. This was the second meeting at this level after the 
first one was held in Brussels in June 1972, and the first to be held in an ASEAN country. 
This points towards Thailand as holding one of the leading roles in the EC-ASEAN 
process. This came at a period when Thailand was perceived as being highly successful 
in the past three decades with its real GDP between 1961 to 1986 growing at a rate of 7 
percent per year. This made Thailand the centre of interest for several industrial 
countries, including the EC member states, mainly the UK, France, and Germany. The 
central attraction was Thailand's natural resources, attractive investment prospects, cheap 
labour, and the government's export promotion schemes (Nualsuwan 1981:32). 
Thailand's relationship with the EC continued to be defined by the European's 
relationship with ASEAN, and before 1980, both ASEAN and most of Asia showed little 
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sign of the economic boom which would occur soon after. The 1980 Cooperation 
Agreement, while formalising the relationship, was agreed to be rather intangible and 
based on principles. Leifer, for example, described it has having 'more of form than of 
substance' (1998:203). McMahon explains how the agreement held 'little substantive 
change', because even after establishment of the agreement, normal GSP levels continued 
to be the preferred means used for trade agreements (in Holland 2002:62). Similarly, 
Forster described the agreement as 'weak' because it did not provide EC budgets or 
instruments for interregional activities. In addition, it was also limited to trade more than 
second-generation economic issues such as investment (2000:791). 
A growing partnership and a developing Thailand 
In any case, the 1980 Cooperation Agreement between the EC and ASEAN paved the 
way for further economic cooperation in the years to come. Since ASEAN was becoming 
a supplier of primary products with a growing market of 250 million consumers, it 
became a gateway for European companies to enter the Asia-Pacific marketplace (Forster 
2000:790). In this manner, the Cooperation Agreement was a 'good starting point for 
assessing the nature of the relationship' (Leifer 1998:2000). This framework for 
interregional cooperation benefited ASEAN and the EC by formalising informal contact 
and also promoting a number of functional activities of mutual benefit. The agreement 
helped trade between the EC and ASEAN members to increase rapidly from just over 12 
billion Ecu in 1980 to nearly 58 billion Ecu in 1994 (Leifer 1998:201). 
Thailand may have become one of the main beneficiaries from this rising 
relationship between EC and ASEAN. After the Cooperation Agreement, Thailand's 
exports to the EC between 1984-1989 grew by 22% per year. Especially in 1988, 
Thailand's exports to the EC grew by 20% of total Thai exports (Nuansuwan 1977: 37). 
Thailand's export efforts were aided by the Thai government's economic development 
plan which concentrated on the development of industries and basic infrastructure such as 
transportation and electricity generation. This was a period when Thailand was 
attempting to turn away from its agricultural dependency and was trying to become an 
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industrialised nation. During the period between 1961 to 1988, the Thai aggregate 
agricultural production reduced from 39.45 percent to 16.9 percent of total GDP. 
During the 1970s to 1980s, the first co-operation between Thailand and EC arose 
from the 1982 Tapioca Agreement. The agreement aimed at helping the Thai 
Government's crop diversification efforts and at improving Thai possibilities of exporting 
to the EC. 'Almost 200 million Ecu were committed for crop diversification and 
irrigation projects in the North-East of Thailand, the main tapioca-producing region.' 
Apart from the Tapioca Agreement, EC also introduced more than 12 projects to aiming 
to support Thailand's ability to export to the wider world (International Trade Strategy 
paper 1987:15). 
During this period, trade friction between the EC and Thailand with regard to 
agricultural products had already started to appear. In 1976 drought in Europe caused a 
shortage of grains within the EC member states, causing the EC to import large amounts 
oftapioca to compensate as livestock feed. In the next year, when the draught ended, this 
resulted in overproduction, especially in France which is a major producer. In October of 
1977, the French government urged the EC to put a limit on tapioca imports which they 
claimed had a highly negative impact on production of grain within the EC. The French 
also claimed that the demand for grain in the EC was decreasing, which contradicted 
actual statistics (Osatiarthum, 1980: 210). In fact, the demand for grain was increasing 
from 1968 to 1977, tapioca demand within Germany, a major producer, had increased 
from 3.3million tons to 4.7 million tons. The French, while arguing that the demand was 
decreasing, actually increased their production 3.6million tons to 6.3 million tons 
(Asavasirayothin 1979). 
During the period leading to 1982, Thailand's exports of tapioca to the EC had 
increased so dramatically that the European governments were claiming that it was 
affecting the grain production infrastructure within Europe. Tapioca was being used 
instead of European grain for feeding livestock and while France and Italy were able to 
produce barley oat and maize, it still could not compete with Thai tapioca prices. 
Thailand's increasing dependence on the EC market meant that when the EC insisted that 
Thailand sign the 1982 Tapioca Agreement to impose a quota on Thai tapioca exports, 
the Thai side had to oblige. It is important to note that Thailand's dependency on tapioca 
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exports was such that the local Thai tapioca market's success depended entirely on how 
much it could export to the EC and which direction the EC's subsidies were headed at. If 
the EC was granting too many subsidies to member states, it could possibly kill off the 
Thai tapioca market (intanoochai 1990:264). 
Another factor which put pressure on the Thais to accept the 1982 Agreement was 
because Thai exports were originally facing a reduced 6 percent export tariff. If the Thai 
government were not to sign this agreement, the EC could have been entitled to charge 
the maximum tax fee of 18 percent. The agreement was divided into three phases which 
gradually reduced the Thai tapioca quota from not more than 5 million tons in 1981 to 
less than 4.5 million tons in 1985 (Asavasirayothin 1979). If the Thais were to face the 18 
percent tariff, it would not have made Thai tapioca less competitive, but it could have 
been subject to numerous substitute products for livestock feed. 
Increased intensity in the Thai·EU Partnership 
During 1986-1987, the Thai baht value had been decreased due to a global economic 
downturn which helped Thai exports to grow so quickly that there was a trade surplus of 
Thai exports to the EC. That was the period which made EC market one of Thailand's 
most important exports, and Thailand, therefore, was very dependent on the EC market. 
These several years were significant years for trade between Thailand and the EC. 1986 
was the first year that industrial product exports increased higher than agricultural 
products which was a great advantage for Thailand since products in the industrial sector 
tends to give more profit than others and do not rely on unsustainable natural resources 
and weather factors like agricultural products. 
While Thailand and the EC was facing its first trade friction, the EC's commercial 
status with Asia was rather unenthusiastic. Forster describes the relationship as 
'dysfunctional', and the Commission had become more interested in building a Single 
European Market between 1986 and 1992 (2000:793). This was made even more difficult 
by the EC's institutional complexities, European confusion on how to group Asia as a 
region, and by a growing number of political differences between the EC and ASEAN. 
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Problem areas included human rights, different interests of member states, and the 
supranational institutions, making it difficult to create an acceptable method to 
renegotiate the now obsolete 1980 Agreement (Forster 2000:793-795). 
In 1986, Thailand became one of the founding members of the Cairns group 
which was designed to reduce agricultural subsidies, such as the one the United States 
was being accused of. The United States agricultural subsidies were considered to be 
even more problematic than the EC's Common Agricultural Policy. In Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, GATT members agreed to a mandate to negotiate on agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round as a consequence of the lobbying power of the Cairns group. When Thailand 
joined the Cairns group, it was also clear that the EC was beginning to see Thailand as 
one of its major agricultural trading partners. Thailand joining the Cairns group may also 
have been seen an indirect declaration of trade war against the EC, as the EC expressed 
clear displeasure with the Thai role. The acting French Minister ofForeign Affairs openly 
declared that he knew of the significance of the Thai role in the Cairns group and was 
aware that Thailand had a role in the accusation that the EC's agricultural policy was 
unfair (Asavasirayothin 1979). Ever since, the French government have established 
themselves as Thailand's adversary when it comes to matters regarding agriculture 
(Manager 18th Feb. 1992:15). 
From 1986 onwards, the EC was the most important Thai export destination. 44% 
of Thai total export to the EU was under GSP. The EC granted GSP to Thailand without 
any conditions while the USA provided GSP support to only 20% of Thailand's exports 
and expected to reduce more because of the economic downturn during these several 
years in the USA. In 1987, about 70 percent of Thai tapioca was being sent to the EC 
making it the 2nd largest export after textiles (Osatiarthum, 1980: 210). 
In 1986, Thailand tried to negotiate with the EC to obtain more clothes and textile 
quota for exports to EC, because Thailand saw an ability to manufacture textiles at a low 
cost but at a high quality for export. The quota had not been increased until 1989 which 
was the year that Thailand exceeded the textiles quota (Nuansuwan 1977 : 46). The EC, 
therefore, decided to remove GSP from some categories in the textiles sector such as 
ladies clothings produced from animal fur or cotton by accusing Thailand and another 
four countries of dumping. This was the first time that Thailand had faced a removal of 
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its OSP privileges as well as the first time it faced an anti-dumping investigation 
(Nuansuwan 1977: 46, Setthakijthai DecI986). 
In 1989, World Bank reports indicated that Thailand was one of the booming 
Asian countries which were experiencing an increase of over 10% ODP annually. This 
was true even though Thailand continued to have transportation and infrastructure 
limitations. Meanwhile the rise of the Newly Industrialised Countries started off some 
conflict of interest between Europe and Asia with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
South Korea becoming serious threats to important areas of production (Holland 
2002:60). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, Thailand also faced problems with different 
standards imposed by members of the EC such as France and Italy, which had very high 
standard requirements. This created problems for the seafood sector in particular. France 
and Italy used to ban canned crab and canned prawn from Thailand because there were 
contaminants called EDTA which were used to maintain the freshness of products. 
Thailand had to negotiate for 7 months to receive an approval from France and Italy to 
accept canned crab and canned prawn exports from Thailand again (Thairat, 16th Qct 89 : 
2). 
However, Thailand was able to export tuna to the EC and was ranked 3rd in tuna 
exports to the EC. This was despite Thailand having to pay an export tax of 24% without 
any GSP, while other countries such as those in the ACP group were able to export to the 
EC at a lower tax rate with GSP. During the late 1980s, Thailand's strategy to promote 
Thai exports to the EC was through joining trade exhibitions and arranging a group of 
representatives to negotiate and mediate trade disputes which arose in the EC over Thai 
exports (Tweedej 2001: 62-83). Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce planned to create 
a Thai distribution centre at Rotterdam, the port city centre of the EC, as a pre-emptive 
strategy for the coming of the EC market integration in 1992 (Skuljai 1999:1). 
Between 1988 to 1990, tensions between the EC and Thailand intensified due to 
intellectual property infringements in Thailand. This was due to the widespread sales of 
pirated cassette tapes. France and Germany filed complaints with the European 
Commission requesting the investigation ofpiracy in Thailand's music industry. In 1990, 
the European Commission stated their concern about the ubiquity of piracy in Thailand. 
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The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the representative of 
449 music companies, sent in a delegate to investigate the problem of piracy. It turned 
out that over 90% of tapes on sale between 1985 to 1990 were pirated copies. IFPI 
claimed that this had resulted in losses of over 640 million Ecus per year (Suangsuda 
1995 : 49). 
Consequently, the European Commission threatened trade measures against 
Thailand if the situation did not improve. Thailand rejected the claims of the IFPI 
delegate, stating that the European music industry in Thailand was worth no more than 
240 million Ecus per year. The Thai government refused to take any measures and in 
January 1992, Thailand sent a delegate to Brussels to negotiate further on the issue. In 
March of 1992, the European Commission unanimously agreed that Thailand was 
infringing copyright laws and this was resulting in 'material injuries' to the European 
music industry. The Commission concluded that it would initiate trade countermeasures 
against Thailand beginning in April 1992 (Suangsuda 1995 : 49). 
On the 30th of July 1992, the Thai Commerce Ministry Permanent Secretary was 
sent to negotiate with the European Commission. Talks broke down due to the Thai 
delegates' refusal to accept the EC's demands due to its inflexibility and impracticality. 
The EC's fixed negotiating stance included demands for all pirated tapes to be 
confiscated immediately and without condition. The Commission subsequently submitted 
an exchange of notes, but the Deputy Thai Minister of Commerce refused to sign the 
document. According to Pridiyathom Devakula, Deputy Thai Minister of Commerce, it 
was a 'loss of national dignity' and that Thailand would have to accept the EC's cut in 
GSP of Bt5 billion because 'nothing was more important than Thailand's national 
dignity' (Matichon 2 Aug 1992:5). This was a period when the Thai media claimed that 
the EC was being especially repressive to Thailand because of political unrest resulting 
from the Bloody May7 events (Matichon 8 July 1992:4). 
7 Bloody May: 'Excessive Use of Lethal Force in Bangkok: The Events of May 17-20, 1992: A bloodless 
military coup toppled a popularly·elected government in Thailand in February 1991. A year later, one of 
the leading generals declared himself prime minister, sparking massive political opposition from a broad-
based pro·democracy movement. Hundreds of protesters demanded the general's ouster and called for 
constitutional changes. The government responded by opening fire on a May opposition rally, resulting in 
52 deaths, hundreds of injured, and many disappearances'. 
(http://physiciansforhumanrights.orgllibrary/report-bloodymay·1992.html) 
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After a week of negotiations, the European Commission reduced its demands and 
allowed for more flexibility in Thailand's handling of the music industry copyright issue. 
On the 11 th September 1992, the Thai delegate to Brussels finally agreed to sign the 
document, quickly averting a major trade crisis between the EC and Thailand. On the 
Thai side, this was a lesson which clearly pointed towards different attitudes between the 
political and the bureaucratic sides. The bureaucratic side (which consisted of Thailand's 
civil service units) appeared to understand the problems involved in the event of the loss 
of the EC GSP, while the political side (politicians and political appointees) was far more 
concerned with national sovereignty and dignity (Preechawongarun 1994:108). 
Between 1990 to 1992, a similar trade dispute with regard to canned tuna, which 
threatened the commercial relationship between Thailand and the EC, also took place. 
This started from English customs officials raising the concern that the Thai canned tuna 
being exported to the UK was not the Bonito Sarda species which Thailand claimed it 
was. If these concerns were true, Thailand would face another cut in the GSP, because 
Thailand was currently receiving an export tax reduction of 18% from the full tax of 25% 
for other tuna species (Thairath 17 January 1994:1, 12). Germany, one of the largest 
importers of Thai canned tuna, requested further information on these claims, but the 
Thai Department of Foreign Trade insisted that the exported tuna were indeed the Bonito 
Sarda. Another problem posed by the EC side was that the tuna were not in accordance 
with the rules of origin. According to rules of origin, the exported tuna needed to be 
caught only within Thai seas, but the EC member states claimed that Thai seas did not 
have the Bonito Sarda tuna (Thairath 24th January 1994: 9). 
After investigations resumed, the European Commission decided to cut 
Thailand's canned tuna GSP. This was despite Thailand's insistence that the canned tuna 
were indeed caught within Thai seas and that they were Bonito Sarda tuna. The EC 
continued to pressure Thailand after cutting the canned tuna GSP by scheduling the slow 
reduction of tuna imports from ASEAN by 1993 (Thairath 24th January 1994: 9). Another 
similar trade problem which resulted in cuts in the GSP included contaminants and 
chemical substances in frozen chicken in 1992 (Chicker Exporters Association 
document: 1992). In addition Thailand was subject to anti-dumping investigations in the 
47 
- ------------------------------------
areas of television, disposable lighters, miniature ball bearings, and cotton during this 
period (Thairath 17 January 1994: 12). 
In 1994, Thailand brought the ongoing canned tuna dispute to GATT. Thailand 
was the only country to bring the issue of canned tuna to GATT, adamant in its demands 
that the EU was acting unfairly. The ruling was made in favour of Thailand and from the 
beginning of 1 st of January 1997, the EU was forced to abolish its quota on canned tuna 
(MOC Document 1998) 
After 1992 Thailand began to build up a trade deficit against the EU. One of the 
main reasons for this is the EU's CAP reform which reduced the price of grains within 
the EU by 29% through subsidies, limiting the production of grains to match the demand 
within EU, and reduction of grain farming areas as well as giving additional subsidies to 
farmers who agreed to this policy. This had an effect on Thai agricultural exports and 
resulted in the reduction particularly of tapioca and processed canned fruit exports as in 
1993-1997 the number of agricultural products export decreased from Bt15366.4 million, 
8t12074.5 million, 8t9813.5 million, Btl0983.7 million respectively (MOC document: 
1990-2000). 
Before 1994, the EU considered the Asian region as a whole as rather 
insignificant, mostly focusing their efforts on Japan, China, India, and in some instances, 
Korea. At this stage, important developments had been taking place in Asia, and ASEAN 
had become the world's tenth largest exporter and had developd a trade surplus with the 
EU. EU trade in Asia totalled $312.5 billion, compared with $235 billion trade with the 
US. East and Southeast Asia's economy grew by 44 percent between 1990 and 1995, 
accounting for almost half of the world's growth (Forster 2000:793-795). Despite these 
factors, the Asia-Pacific continued to be a 'a striking omission in the EU's profile as the 
world's leading trading power' (Holland 2002:63). The US, along with the partners in the 
North American Free Trade Area recognised East Asia's post war economic significance 
long before the EU (Dent 1997: I 62). The EU was also aware that its exclusion from 
APEC, established in 1989, could have negative effects on its economic ties with the 
region (Holland 2002:67). 
This prompted the EU to devise a 1994 Towards a New Asia Strategy, which 
aimed at increasing the EU's economic presence in Asia. This focused on development 
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issues, extending political dialogues, and promoting democracy, good governance, and 
the rule of law. It has been argued that due to the decreasing significance of ASEAN 
compared to Japan and the NICs, ASEAN had been relegated to being merely 'one of the 
key elements of its Asia Policy' (Forster 2000:795). 
1997 brought about mixed results between the Thailand and the EU. Thailand's 
development led to its graduation from 9 sectors in the EU's GSP scheme (MOC Strategy 
Paper 2001). The 1997 GSP cut of 50% in relation to shrimp exports especially affected 
the Thai shrimp industry. Shrimp farmers in Thailand lost BtlO billion in income in 1999. 
The quantity of exports to the EU had fallen from 32,866 tons in 1995 to 5,181 tonnes in 
2003, a reduction of 27,685 tons or 84.24 per cent. This caused shrimp exporters in 
Thailand to push the government to request tariff privileges from the EU under the GSP. 
This was particularly because Thailand's major competitors were receiving tariff breaks 
and privileges which were taken from Thailand in 1999. This has been a longstanding 
problem which has persisted to the present day (The Nation 8th Sep. 2004).8 
The Asian Economic Crisis, Trade Imbalances and 
Consequences 
1997, however was the year of the Asian economic crisis in Thailand and what Thailand 
lost in GSP was covered by the Baht devaluation. As a result, Thailand was able to export 
more and this resulted in the first Thailand trade surplus against the EU. Between 1998 to 
2001, exports to the EU added up to $10276 million US dollars which is an increase of 
6.3% per year. In the meantime, imports from the EU decreased by 12.8% per year. The 
main Thai exports were computers, computer parts, automobile parts, clothes, gems, air 
conditioning units and parts, footwear, electronic transistors, rubber products, telephone 
parts, and electronic circuits (Tassanai 2002:43). 
In 1998, due to Thailand's increased capacity to export, the EU cut Thailand's 
GSP in the areas of plastic products, rubber products, footwear, leather products, and 
gems and valuable minerals. In 1999, further GSP cuts took away seafood privileges 
8 A more detailed study ofthe shrimp export problems Thailand faced with the EU is made in Chapter 3. 
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completely. In addition, processed food and drinks GSP cuts were also made 
(Roongwattana, Business Highlight Magazine: 2005). 
In 1999, EU was Thailand's second most important trading partner and Thailand's 
4th largest market for shrimps. In 2002, contamination in Thai shrimps released in the 
Netherlands prompted the EU to implement its 'zero tolerance' food safety policy 
(Bangkok Post 1 Jan. 2003). 100% inspections of Thai shrimp products were conducted 
within the EU after the shrimps were found to be contaminated with two .chemicals 
known as chloramphenicol and nitrofurans The EU set very high standards for import of 
shrimps, for the residues of two antibiotics used between 0.1 and 0.3 parts per billion, but 
the standard was considered impossible to reach by Thai producers and much higher than 
accepted international standards (Market Report: Food Market Exchange Jan 31 2003). 
When Thailand's GSP was cut, the tariff on Thai shrimps imported into the EU increased 
from 4.5% to 14.5%. Ready to cook shrimp tariffs increased from 6% to 20% causing 
Thailand's shrimps to become more expensive and less competitive in the EU 
(Chauvin,11 March 1999). 
The EU's system for GSP consideration has been considered unequal and 
discriminatory because the other large exporters of shrimp including Ecuador, India, 
Bangladesh, and Indonesia continued to retain GSP privileges and benefits (Bangkok 
Post October 16 2002). Thai shrimp exporters eventually called for a boycott starting in 
January 1997 on EU products such as French wine, Scotch whisky, and milk from 
Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. In December of 1996, the association of shrimp 
exporters also urged the Thai government to suspend purchases of Airbus airplanes from 
Germany and Belgium (Shrimp Sentinel Online 1997). In addition, the CP Group also 
decided to abort its imports of aquatic feed from the EU for its aquacultural operations 
(Shrimp Sentinel Online 1997). 
Trends from 1997 and the weakened Thai baht resulting in a widening trade gap 
between the EU and Thailand appear to have caused a rash of protectionist measures 
from theEU. 
In 2003, Thailand prepared to lodge a complaint with the WTO against the EU, 
complaining that its sugar subsidies violated EU commitments on agricultural trade. The 
move was among the first organised by an informal sugar cartel consisting of the world's 
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five top sugar exporters. Thailand, exporting 4.5 million tonnes a year is only second to 
Brazil in the list of top exporters. In 2003, analysts noted how the EU's sugar regime was 
strongly protectionist, with tariffs as high as 339% for raw sugar, and 419% for white 
sugar. The EU made use of a quota system to allow imports at lower tariff rates, but the 
amount added up to less than two million tonnes a year (Bangkok Post 8th Jul. 2003:8). 
In this year, the EU also gave Thai canned tuna a 13,000 tons annual tariff quota 
with half duty, starting from July 2003. This was a result of the WTO Ministerial 
Meeting in Doha in November 2001 when Thailand and the Philippines put in a joint 
request to ask for the consideration of tariff preferences, citing the cases of the EU's 
preferential treatment of canned tuna from the ACP states. Negotiations broke down, but 
the negotiating parties agreed to pass this issue on for mediation under the WTO. The 
WTO eventually ruled that the EU should open a Most Favoured Nation - based tariff 
quota of 25,000 tonnes for 2004 at an in-quota tariff rate of 12% (Delegation of the 
European Commission in Thailand 2005). The most recent progress with regard to 
shrimp exports is that the EU agreed to give back shrimp GSPs in January 2006. There 
have also been considerations as to whether Thailand should be given temporary 
privileges even before the agreed date. 
In 2004, the outbreak of avian flu in Thailand and many countries in Asia affected 
Thailand's chicken exports to the EU. This is one of the most significant incidents which 
destroyed the reputation of Thailand as a reliable exporter. The story started when David 
Byrne, the EU Health Commissioner, arrived in Thailand and went back to confirm with 
the EU that there was not anything to be worried about Thailand's chicken because they 
were definitely safe from any disease. Two days after his return, the news about avian flu 
outbreaks in Thailand became widespread everywhere after it has been concealed by the 
Thai government for many months (The Nation 18th December 2004: 14). 
This was very unpleasant for the EU, as the second biggest market for Thailand's 
chicken export and where safety standards were given a high priority. The EU decided to 
ban all Thailand's poultry products and poultry slaughtered after 1 January 2004. The 
situation of the outbreak became worse when it appeared that the disease could spread to 
other animals and even human beings. Both Japan, Thailand's biggest chicken export 
market, and the EU, therefore, continued to ban poultry products from Thailand because 
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the outbreaks in Thailand were reported even in April 2005, several months later. 
(www.deltha.ec.europa.eu) 
The banning resulted in the significant reduction of Thailand's chicken exports, 
by 88% from the previous year. However, this situation was not considered to have a 
significant effect on Thailand's export, because poultry exports constituted just less than 
1 % of Thailand's total export. The Thai government, however, managed to reduce the 
surplus chicken stock, which added up to more than 100,000 tonnes, by 'counter trade' 
tactics. This occurred, for example, when the Thai air force wanted to buy airplanes from 
Sweden. In this case, Thailand also requested that Sweden buy chickens from Thailand as 
a countertrade measure. (Tarnsettakij 21 st September 2005:7) 
The Present Partnership and Onwards 
The countertrade strategy has helped effectively in reducing surplus poultry stock. 
However, even though Thailand has managed to eliminate the surplus stock 'to gain trade 
balance back, Thailand continues to face the problem as an unreliable exporter since the 
government tried to conceal the facts about the avian flu outbreak. This was an event 
which has totally destroyed trust from two significant importers, the EU and Japan. 
Moreover, since 2001 the EU has been increasingly aware of the potential of 
ASEAN as a strong exporter. There has recently been a study showing that the centre of 
the world economy will be shifted to Asia Pacific region by 2050 and ASEAN will 
appear to the world as the world's largest exporter. Furthermore, the significant growing 
export economies and a quickly developing domestic market of 530 million people in 
Asia Pacific made the EU believe that ASEAN is a region of great economic significance 
(Commission: 2003a). 
The EU, therefore, aimed to pursue deeper integration through the ASEAN 
dialogue by pursuing bilateral relations with countries in ASEAN within a broader 
multilateral framework. The 2003 'A new partnership with South-East Asia' 
Communication is a new initiative which appeared to support the creation of further 
bilateral agreements between the EU and countries in South East Asia. This 
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Communication formed the foundation for the EU's initiation of negotiations for a 
bilateral framework agreement with Thailand (Commission: 2003b). 
Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister of Thailand, agreed to start 
working on this first bilateral cooperation agreement with the EU in 2002. It was initially 
expected that the bilateral framework agreement between Thailand and the EU were to be 
completed by the end of 2005. The cooperation aimed to develop many factors which 
were aimed at enhancing good relations between the EU and Thailand. These included 
trade and investment issues such as market access, technical barriers to trade and trade 
facilitation; food safety; industrial policy; energy; science and technology; education and 
culture; the environment; health; as well as human rights and good governance (l7'h Dec 
04: delegation of the European commission to Thailand.). 
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Conclusion 
The trends between 1969 to 2005 clearly point out towards various key characteristics in 
Thailand and the EU's partnership. Agricultural and textile products clearly are two of 
the most problematic and sensitive areas in the partnership. Electronic products, while 
being one of Thailand's most important exports, are yet to become a problem in 
Thailand's commercial relations with the EU. Throughout the analysed period, various 
attempts at diplomacy, the use of commercial pressure, high-level negotiations, and the 
influence of interest groups have been detected. The influence of certain member states 
such as France over overall EU agricultural policy could also be seen. More specifically, 
this chapter reaches a number of major conclusions in the analysis of the Thai-EU 
partnership. 
The first conclusion is that the EU's use of its status as a global economic power 
is highly visible. The provision of GSPs to developing nations such as Thailand can only 
be given by an economic power such as the EU, and this has created a Thai dependency 
on the EU market. The Thai government is often troubled by threats to cut EU GSPs, and 
this has led to heated high level government negotiations with the EU Commission. 
Another example of the EU's economic power is how the EU picks the 
partnerships it wants and also determines how the partnership is made. Eventually, the 
EU also draws others to follow trading practices which it finds most comfortable. When 
the EU was not interested in Thailand as a trading partner, it decided to create the 
partnership in the form of ASEAN, and later, ASEM. Thailand's partnership with the EU 
in these formats may not have been through choice, but rather by necessity. The Thai 
government, in turn, has been able to exercise its power against the EU's economic 
power by making use of multilateral forums such as the WTO and the Cairns group. 
The second conclusion is how the EU's struggle between national and 
supranational position has been both a problem and a solution for Thai policy-makers. 
The issue of agricultural quotas, for example, can be explained at both the macro and 
meso level. While the European Commission may have extended GSPs for Thai 
agricultural products on a purely philanthropic basis, the French government eventually 
54 
played a role in urging the Commission to put a limit on certain Thai agricultural exports 
such as tapioca. This was also visible in the case of pirated cassette tapes where the 
cutting of GSPs was also threatened, but eventually resolved through successful 
negotiations between the Thai Ministry of Commerce and the European Commission. 
Both of these sets of conclusions seem to support the 'state-centred' approach to 
Thai-EU commercial relations outlined in chapter 1; they embody a series of power-
related factors, and they point to the adoption of various strategies by the Thai state with 
the aim of countering the EU's preponderant power. But in chapter 1, it was argued that 
this may only be part of the story of Thai commercial policy making, and that both the 
Thai state and the broader policy process might reflect more complex and differentiated 
forces em~nating from the interaction of government departments and commercial 
entities. The third conclusion is thus that there is a requirement for further detailed case 
studies on the relationship between the major Thai commercial policy actors themselves, 
as well as between the Thai actors and the EU, specifically in the critical area of 
agriculture. The research to date focuses mainly on governments and there is a serious 
lack of literature with regards to how Thai firms or private consultative committees have 
tried to gain a competitive edge within the EU's space for competition. This has clearly 
happened to some degree, since the EU is Thailand's third largest market and a 
significant trade partner. The case studies in chapters 3-4 will provide further 
information on the major actors in Thai-EU commercial relations, and in particular form 
the basis for an evaluation in terms of corporatist frameworks. 
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Chapter 3 
Thai Governments and Commercial Policy·Making 
Towards the EU 
Introduction 
An understanding of the manner in which Thailand deals with its commercial 
relationships relies very strongly on the manner in which the Thai state designs its 
commercial policy for its trade with the EU. An analysis ofthe Thai state, comprising of 
the Thai government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce 
covers the most important governmental actors in the Thai state policy-making process. 
In the process of modernisation, Thailand's commercial strategies have continued to be 
very strongly led by state mechanisms, and a systematic analysis of the Thai state's 
strategy in dealing with the EU will contribute to the overall comprehension of 
Thailand's commercial dealings with the EU. In particular, it will throw light on the 
'state-centred' approaches outlined in chapter 1 towards the study of commercial policy-
making. 
This Chapter firstly makes use of existing literature on Thai politics and Thai 
political economy to describe the Thai state's progress from the 1980s onwards. In the 
subsequent sections, this Chapter draws on elite interviews with top Thai bureaucrats 
involved in Thailand's external commercial policy-making in the past few years. The 
interviews have been designed to extract the importance of Thai state agencies and 
individual state actors in order to gauge the role of the Thai state agencies in government 
and commercial policy-making with the EU. 
The first section of this Chapter aims to cover the main actors involved in the 
Thai state policy-making process. This covers the various governments which have 
played roles in Thailand's international commercial strategy starting from 1980 when 
international trade began to gain significant momentum in Thailand. The analysis will 
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also extensively cover the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has been charged with 
the duty of conducting Thai diplomacy towards the EU, a lot of which concerns 
international negotiations, legislation, and dialogue. The role of the Thai Ministry of 
Commerce, directly involved in Thailand's external commercial policy is also analysed in 
order to comprehensively assess the manner in which Thailand's international 
commercial strategy has developed. These three agencies, the Thai government, the 
MF A, and the MOC are considered to be the spearhead of Thai external commercial 
policy and an assessment of these actors will go a long way into explaining Thailand's 
overall strategy as well as specific actions over the years. We would also expect the EU's 
policy to recognise the Thai state agencies' importance, and for EU strategy to reflect the 
importance of these Thai state agencies. The interaction between these agencies will also 
be examined to see how the actors coordinate in order to achieve a common state strategy 
for Thailand. 
The second section of this Chapter deals with the Thai state agencies' interaction 
with the EU and the agencies' reaction to this interaction. This includes an analysis of 
how the Thai state handles each of the relations and policy areas and problems or 
opportunities as perceived by the Thai state so far. This section is based on elite 
interviews with senior officials within the MFA and the MOC and is aimed at giving a 
more in depth insight into the current trade relationship between Thailand and the EU. An 
analysis is later made on the Thai state strategies as weIl as any external factors affecting 
the strategy and outcomes in relation to the EU. 
The final part of this Chapter observes a sample of empirical issue areas. This is 
divided into three issues, including the GSP battles, the NTB battles and the bilateral and 
multilateral pursuit of Thailand-EU trade relations. This part is aimed at providing 
empirical evidence of major events featuring the Thai state agencies in their interaction 
with the EU, particularly in areas concerning trade policy. It is also aimed at highlighting 
the roles of each of the Thai state agencies, the Thai policy-making process in 
commercial strategy, their interaction with each other, and their interaction with the EU 
institutions. 
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Main actors in Thai state policy-making 
This section argues that for the purposes of the analysis here, the Thai state can be 
divided into the government level and the state agency levels. The g~vernment' s main 
policy making unit is the cabinet and the parliament, and this section further clarifies how 
the Thai government can determine Thailand's policy direction. The state agency consists 
of Thailand's bureaucratic units run by civil servants who usually maintain their positions 
for long periods at a time. This section goes on to examine what kind of role the state 
agencies, particularly the MFA and the MOC, have for Thailand's external commercial 
policy-making and argues that the role of these state agencies is actually most important 
when the Thai state as an actor is considered. 
The Thai Government: Determining Policy Direction 
It is accepted almost without question that policies in Thailand are bound to change with 
the arrival of each newly elected government (Chumpol, 1985 : 114). Thailand's politics 
since the 1980s has experienced very few periods of stability, particularly after the 
departure of the very popular former Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda, who 
was in position from 1980 to 1988. Ever since, Thailand's experience with Prime 
Ministers has not been a very positive one, with each of the subsequent governments 
either disgraced by corruption or in the case of Chuan Leekpai' s first term downfall, 
heavy vote-buying by the incoming government (Pongmukkapat, 1993: 73). Government 
incompetence during the Chavalit government also fed fuel to the pending Asian 
Economic Crisis in 1997 and the turmoil that followed reflected Thailand's early 
experience with democracy where democratically elected politicians with relatively poor 
economic knowledge were proven to be unable to handle the economy (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 2000 : 80). 
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TABLE 3.1: THAI GOVERNMENTS 1980-2001 
1980 Prem Tinsulanonda 
1988 Chatichai Choonhavan 
1991 Anand Panyarachun 
1992 Chuan Leekpai 
1995 Banharn Silpa·archa 
1996 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 
1997 Chuan Leekpai 
2001·2006 Thaksin Shinawatra 
The government (here understood as the elected or other appointed political leadership ) is 
certainly one of the most important actors in commercial policy making in Thailand. 
Each important level in making policy has been directly and indirectly influenced by the 
government. Significantly, the importance of each government's roles may increase or 
decrease by the difference of attitudes and interests of the government in that period of 
time. In each era of Thai governments, it is quite clear that the strategic character 
transfers into commercial policy. The role of government in commercial policy has 
grown into an era of 'politico-business' which means politico-businessmen enter politics 
with the aim of using politics as their stepping -stone to achieve their business purpose 
(Wingfield, 2002 :250-255). 
General Prem's rule from 1980 to 1988 was perhaps one of Thailand's most stable 
and productive years. (Interview: 26)This was a period when Thailand's GDP rose by 
close to 10 percent per year and Thailand seemed to be on the way to rapid 
industrialisation. Exports and tourism became Thailand's major earners, with the country 
quickly becoming a force in exports of manufactured goods such as computer parts, 
textiles, and footwear, a trend which saw the relative decline of traditional exports such 
as rice, rubber and tin (Interview: 10). 
Exports may have been on the rise, but in an era when the Thai government was 
highly unfamiliar with international trade, the Prem government went along with its 
instincts to set up a number of trade barriers which would protect Thailand's fledgling 
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industries. This included impositions of import taxes which discouraged importers from 
importing any products which might harm local industries (Interview :26). 
According to Thai Banker's Association Secretary General, under the governance of 
Prime minister Prem Thailand experienced one of the cleanest political periods and also 
saw the beginning of a commercial policy which focused on exports. An insightful move 
from a military government which was admittedly inexperienced in the commercial area 
the Prem government established an Associated Committee from the private sector in 
order to expand their knowledge and allow the government sector to understand 
international trade from the perspectives of the private sector. The Associated 
Committee, therefore, was a representation from the private sector and had a main role in 
commercial policy making with private sector. Moreover, that was the first time that the 
Thai private sector and the government had joined hands in creating commercial policies 
(Interview: 26). 
At this period, bureaucratic arms of the government were given a free reign to 
conduct policies as they wished. According to Hewison, Prem's government strengthened 
the links between technocrats and metropolitican businessmen. Meanwhile, peasants and 
elite bureaucrats remained important in the political economy (Hewison 1997: 27). This 
may have been attributable to the relative inexperience in dealing with international trade 
of the military government as well as the knowledge that this was Thailand's first venture 
in the world of international trade. Meanwhile, it is also true that although Thailand's 
economic success was relatively assured, continued progress was not yet guaranteed. 
Another suggestion is that General Prem's government might have been merely fortunate 
enough to reap the gains of the economic progress which was proliferating in East and 
Southeast Asia between 1980 and 1988. 
It appeared that towards the end ofthe Prem Government, the people of Thailand 
were getting ready for a more democratic government. After a succession of unsuccessful 
coups, General Prem stepped down and allowed for new elections which brought about 
the short, but strongly controversial rule of General Chatichai Choonhavan, Thailand's 
first democratically elected leader. This was a period where the military general 
advocated the policy of 'Changing the Battlefield to a Commercial Field' (Udornvit, 
1993, 254). This policy prompted extremely aggressive tactics to draw in foreign direct 
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investment, a process which eventually led to a strong boom in the property market. 
There are indications that historically, Thailand's economic planning followed the 
Harrod-Domar model, which put a strong emphasis on capital and a strong foreign 
currency reserve (Nartsupha 1973: lOO). General Chatichai urged all bureaucratic units to 
put a strong emphasis on attracting foreign investors as well as exploiting the opportunity 
to increase trade between Thailand and any interested counterparts. It was rather clear at 
this stage that the advocated policies were unsustainable (Pongmukkapat, 1993:109). 
These unfettered capitalist and often incompetently implemented policies coupled with 
General Chatichai's corruption scandals, eventually led to a military coup which initiated 
a period of serious political uncertainty and later led to the establishment of Anand 
Panyarachun as a royally appointed Prime Minister (Chai, 2005:31). 
While Prime Minister Anand was responsible for several domestic economic and 
political reforms, his leadership was only temporary and did not result in any far-reaching 
consequences for Thailand's international trade policy. This period, however, did signify 
the end of Thailand's strong emphasis on capitalism, although a culture of drawing in 
foreign direct investment in areas which would not sustain Thailand's industrial growth 
continued. Anand did encourage a liberalisation of the trade system, although the effects 
were unclear (Chai, 2005:48). 
The eventual election of Thailand's first civilian Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai 
marked a period of relative stability for Thailand although his government's notoriously 
slow working style became an irritation for bureaucrats and businessmen alike. Apart 
from being slow and indecisive, the Chuan government was also considered to have 
initiated rather ineffective policies. The character and personality of this government was 
inevitably transferred to the culture in ministries, resulting in the beginning of notorious 
red tape in the Thai bureaucracy. Regulations and cultures of various ministries became 
an obstacle to effective policy-making, especially to the speed of decision-making .. 
According to a number of observers, the Chuan government's indecisiveness and 
ineffectiveness was reflected in the policies made during this period (Panichapak 2003, 
Chai, 2005). 
However, under Chuan's governance, he initiated the Asian Promotion Centre on 
Trade, Investment and Tourism by seeking assistance from Japanese government. 
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Moreover, for the benefit of the farmers nationwide, he proposed the reduction of the 
export tariff on agricultural production of export tariff on in July 1991. As a result of this 
initiative, farmers have gained some strong benefits from the policies (Farmers News, 
May 1993). 
Chuan's slow working style, coupled with aggressive vote-buying tactics by the 
Chat Thai party led by Banharn Silpa-archa, led to Banharn's eventual short rule as Prime 
Minister. It was quite clear that Banharn was merely a provincial leader with extremely 
limited knowledge of national governance, let alone international trade. His short period 
as Prime Minister led to the eventual demise of his party and the election of General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh as Prime Minister in 1996 (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1998). 
General Chavalit proved to be no more knowledgeable than his predecessor and an 
extremely flawed decision-making process led to the attack on the Thai baht in 1997. A 
fumble by the Thai Ministry of Finance, which decided to try to defend the baht instead 
of floating it led to the collapse of the Thai economy and started off the 1997 Asian 
Economic Crisis (Phongpaichit, 2000). After the Asian economic crisis, Chuan Leekpai 
was begrudgingly re-elected as Prime Minister again by a public left with few other 
options, and a process of economic reform was initiated (Chai, 2005). 
The period of 1992 to 1997 was clearly a challenging experience in democracy 
for Thailand and did not seem to bring many benefits to the Thai public sector. Ministries 
were left without clear policy directions and allowed to initiate policies without due 
consultation with the ruling goverments (Laird, 2000, 231). A culture of slow and 
indecisive policy-making was also established due to the ruling governments during this 
period. This was all to change after telecommunications tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra was 
elected Prime Minister in 2001 (Hogue, 2002, 54). 
The Thai government sector experienced dramatic change again under the 
government of Prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. According to the interview with the 
MFA Officers, this government has been known as a government who runs the country 
like its own firm. Most of leaders in this government consisted of business people. 
Therefore, their work culture has proven to be similar to the private sector rather than 
government sector in the past. The system and work process was fully redesigned in a 
limited time, and there was a process of restructuring for all ministries. 
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According to officer of Ministry of Foreign Affair (Interview: I), in the government 
of Chuan Leekpai, there was established a 'Team Thailand' responsible for foreign 
affairs. Team Thailand consisted of permanant officers from the MF A, the MOC, the 
MOA, and the MOl. All officers from this team normally coordinated on foreign affairs, 
but this pattern of work tightened links between ministries and was more systematic. The 
work pattern of team Thailand was continuously followed during the period of the 
Thaksin government. There were significant changes under this government as the 
primary decision-making powers were granted to the MFA. Moreover, the perspective 
regarding the role of each officer in the team was changed to become more commercial. 
Diplomats from the MF A in the team were seen as the chair of a company while officials 
from other ministries were executives and the process of creating policies and plans was 
viewed in the same way as companies' strategies (Interview: I). 
While a new experience for Thailand, Prime Minister Thaksin' s CEO style may have 
resulted to be as much a hindrance as it has been beneficial. Immense pressure was put on 
senior government officials to monitor all work and policy implementation. Policy during 
this government, therefore, was quickly processed and its effectiveness increased. 
However, the strong character and reputation of new forms of corruption from this 
government made a number permanent officers of government ministries oppose the 
government. Thai governmental politics towards 2005 thus interfered with the system and 
structure which had recently been redesigned, resulting in the delay of several planned 
policies as well as more politicisation of the process (Interview: 4, 6). 
The Thai Civil Service: Policy-making and Policy Implementation 
A common observation among Thai political scientists is that while politicians, prime 
ministers and cabinets come and go, the civil servants remain in place more or less 
permanently. There have been indications, particularly during the relatively indecisive 
and ineffective governments of the 90s, that civil servants were a far more potent force 
than politicians (Pongmukkapat, 1993, 95). Elite civil servants were accepted as policy-
makers with more specialised knowledge of their policy areas and were given a rather 
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free hand in conducting external commercial policy in any way which seemed suitable. 
With this perspective, the roles of Thai civil servants in the MF A and the MOC are 
extremely important in ensuring the continuity of Thailand's international trade policy. 
These two ministries are considered to be Thailand's primary link to the outside world 
and are held in extremely high regard by both the government agencies in Thailand as 
well as outsiders in contact with Thailand (Panichapak, 2003, Tanapornpan, 1989). 
This section includes an evaluation of the MFA and the MOC's most important 
operational features in an attempt to assess the bureaucratic side of Thailand's 
governmental policy-making process. The first feature is the organizational structure and 
policy-making process of the two civil service organizations. This will assist in the 
understanding of the MFA and MOC's means of dealing with external trade relations. 
Secondly, the section discusses the development of the MFA and MOC's working and 
organisational culture (Wannakij 2004). The MFA and the MOC are considered to be two 
of Thailand's most prestigious organizations, and an understanding of the working 
culture and mentality of these two organizations is necessary for a better evaluation of its 
policy-making process (Interview:1?). To this effect, this research also makes use of elite 
interviews from senior officials in the MF A and the MOC to assess the current status of 
the relationship between Thailand and the ED. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main actor in international trade affairs. They 
are responsible for all international affairs at the national level. The most significant role 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to only focus on international relations (MFA 2005-
2006). Most of their roles in the past were linked to traditional diplomacy. Policy making 
in the area of their responsibility, therefore, was predominantly about political relations 
rather than international trade relations (Interview: 2, 4, 5, 8). 
Nowadays, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been changed. Most 
relations between countries are focused on international trade relation rather than just 
political relations. The MFA and its officials, therefore, have been re-cultured to have a 
character of merchant alongside that of diplomat (Interview: 3). Moreover, The MFA has 
been ranked as the most senior ministry for all international affairs and this also includes 
international trade (Interview: 2). Therefore, the MF A is the main leader in commercial 
policy making. Its jurisdiction over international affairs cover all issues at national level 
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(MFA Dec 2005: 2). All issues at national levels from abroad will thus be passed on to 
the MFA first and the MFA will analyse and transfer to the relevant ministries. Moreover, 
in the case of international trade conflicts under the responsibilities of other ministries, 
the MF A will also act as the most senior ministry to deal with those issues (Interview: 2, 
6). 
In the process of international commercial policy making, there is a meeting between 
ministries with the Associated Committee of private sectors under the lead of the MF A. 
All other ministries will conclude the direction and strategies for policy and the MF A will 
collect all suggestions and process them into international trade policies. Furthermore, the 
MFA is also responsible for monitoring systems and divisions in other ministries related 
to international affairs. Therefore, the MF A has the power in managing those divisions to 
shape their activities towards the policy direction that the MFA and the government 
wants to pursue (Interview: 6). 
Moreover, the MFA is also working for the MOC in order to encourage a better 
working atmosphere in international relations. It can be stated that most of the work 
related to detail and the content of external commercial policy is the MOC's 
responsibility, while the MFA is responsible for a higher level including issues 
concerning principles, rationales, and regulations. The MF A is also responsible for all 
bilateral agreements, which are considered a key aspect of international affairs. The 
MFA, which is responsible for principles, rationales, and regulations, will study any 
proposed agreement in the first place before passing this to the MOC in order to analyse 
the content and then send back to the MF A again to get the final approval from the senior 
ministers at the MFA (Interview: 13). 
The Department of European Affairs at the Thai MFA is thus officially Thailand's 
chief contact for European affairs. This department is divided into the Secretariat to the 
department, Division I (EC and Western Europe), Division II (Northern and Southern 
Europe) and Division III (Central and Eastern Europe). Through this organisational logic, 
most affairs dealing with the EU are expected to primarily go through Division I. 
Division I itsel f is divided into bilateral affairs, EC affairs, and ASEM affairs. This 
particular division contains a total of nine diplomatic officials, and this is divided into 
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four, two, and three officials in the bilateral, EC, and ASEM affairs divisions respectively 
(Interview: 14). 
It is apparent that charging Division I alone with responsibility for EU affairs is 
impractical, particularly due to the limited personnel dealing with rather complicated 
issues. As such, Division II and Division III, although not specified as responsible for EC 
affairs, also deal with any issues arising from the EU. In fact, a lot of the bilateral work in 
Division II and Division III is strongly related to the EU. Although there are very clear 
divisions and allocations of responsibility, all divisions work in the same office area and 
coordination is expected between all divisions. These divisions are overseen by the 
Secretariat under the authority of the Director-General of European Affairs (Interview: 
22). 
In addition to this, Thailand's foreign mission to Brussels is also considered one of 
the most high priority posts in the MF A's profile of foreign missions (Interview: 25). 
This mission includes II diplomats ranked at every level from three second secretaries, 
three first secretaries, one counsellor, two minister counsellors, one minister, and an 
ambassador. It should be noted that foreign missions with such a comprehensive 
workforce are only present in countries where Thailand attaches the highest importance 
to relations. The Brussels mission is classified by the MF A as a multilateral post, along 
with its New York and Geneva posts, meaning that the MF A expects the Brussels 
mission to deal strongly in multilateral issues (Interview: 25). The duty of the Thai 
Brussels mission is to pass on information on a day to day basis to the MF A as well as to 
act as a middle person between the institutions of the EU and the Thai MFA in any 
political, economic or social issues arising between the two. 
The Ministry of Commerce is the main key to commercial policy-making in 
Thailand, and deals much more specifically with the technical side of Thailand's external 
commercial policy-making. It has some similarities with the MFA's roles, but covers 
more technocratic issues than the MFA's generally more diplomatic role. Moreover, 
when considering the process of policy making, the MOC is responsible for the technical 
detail of the policy and how the policy will specifically be put into implementation 
(Interview: 15, 16). The main role of the MOC covers all trade areas which means the 
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MOC has a role in networking with other ministries which may have concerns touching 
upon Thai-EU relations (Interview: 13). 
The MOC is potentially as important a body in negotiation with the EU as the 
MFA, since the overwhelming priority in Thailand's relationship with EU is mostly 
based on trade. The MOC, therefore, is responsible for the negotiation process which 
covers mainly technical issues such as GSP, product requirements, and production 
standards (Interview: 15, 16). Therefore, the MOC's role in contacting with other 
ministries is very significant since work on technical details may require specialists such 
as officials from the Ministry of Industry or Ministry of Agriculture (Interview: 6, 7, 8). 
Moreover, the MOC is also responsible for the connections between government, 
companies and related trade organizations. One of the main roles which distinguishes the 
MOC from the MFA is the MOC's duty in connecting the govemment sector to the 
private sector (Interview: 6, 13). Therefore, the MOC also corresponds with firms in 
order to tighten the international relations between the firm and the EU. The MOC is also 
responsible for monitoring the firms and urging each of the Thai firms to strictly adhere 
to EU regulations as detailed in technical negotiations (Interview: 26, 6). 
Furthermore, one of the main duties of the MOC is promoting international trade. The 
MOC is also responsible in connecting Thai firms and foreign firms together through 
activities and events. The primary department responsible for this is the Department of 
Export Promotion which is a very large organization in itself. The DEP deals with all 
aspects of export promotion, and also includes a few personnel from the Office of 
International Trade Marketing which deals specifically with export promotion to the EU. 
This office branches out from the demand and services section ofthe DEP (Interview: 15, 
16). 
The government, the MFA and the MOC appear to have their own roles in dealing 
with Thailand trade policy towards the EU. In order to analyse the ongoing trade 
relationship between Thailand and the EU, this research makes use of elite interviews 
conducted within the MFA and the MOC to gauge the advances or problems which exist 
in the different organizations dealing with the EU. 
First let us look at the MFA. Politics in Thailand has had a significant impact on the 
working culture in the Ministry since the Thaksin goverment has given more power to the 
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MP A in dealing with other countries than any government in the past. The MP A claimed 
that this has helped all international negotiations to become more diplomatic and more 
successful. However, this point has raised an important question: might the change of 
working culture between ministries become an obstacle or create conflicts in the view of 
other main players, such as the Department of Trade Negotiation and the Department of 
Poreign Trade of the MOC (Interview: 6, 13). 
One of the main themes arising from this research is the manner in which the work of 
various Thai stage agencies overlaps. As such the task of verifying who to talk to when 
dealing with Thai commercial policy might be just as complicated as when an 
international actor tries to talk to the EU. MP A officials claim they are the most 
important actor in negotiations with the EU since they are responsible for the main 
decisions while the MOC has a secondary role as a technical information provider for the 
details in negotiation (Interview: 1, 3). The MPA is responsible for the general and main 
picture of any negotiation, which can be considered as the strategic level level 
(Tanapornpan 1989:154 and Interview: I). In terms specifically of Thai-EU relations 
negotiations mostly take place between the senior officials of MP A and DO Trade from 
the EU. In the process of negotiation, the MPA will co-ordinate with the MOC in order to 
get technical details on the topic· of negotiations such as customs details, product 
standards and product specifications (Interview: I, 6 ). This creates a potential tension 
with the MOC, given that MOC prefer to be seen as the most important actor, and that 
technical details will often be crucial in giving directions to the MP A on how they 
should react and decide in negotiations (Interview: 1). 
Another main theme arising from the interviews conducted with senior officials in 
the MP A and the MOC is that cultural differences within the organizations often have an 
impact on policy-making. The MOC claims that the personality of the MOC is less 
flexible than the MP A and the MOC is the most important body in negotiation with the 
EU as much as MP A (Interview: 6). MOC is responsible for negotiation which centre on 
technical issues such as OSP, product requirements, and production standards. The MOC 
is also responsible for the connection between governments, companies and related trade 
organizations. Morever, all international trade strategies and activities both in Thailand 
and in the EU are under the responsibility of this ministry (Interview: 6 and Tanapornpan 
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1989:123). The MOC, therefore, is the ministry which interacts with all levels of policy-
making. 
Moreover, Thailand has not especially designed any system or organization to 
support trading with the EU (Interview: 10). Therefore, formulating trade strategies and 
solving the problems that might occur in trading with the EU has been done traditionally 
through Government ministries and the nonnal systems adopted for trading with foreign 
countries. These have created several problems for Thai exporters because the traditional 
process could take a very long time to produce and communicate decisions (Interview: 
10). Thus, the Thaksin government aimed to redesign the system to facilitate trading with 
foreign countries, including the EU (Interview: 26). For instance, as already noted, the 
personality of the MF A is required to be more like that of a merchant rather than just 
being a polite diplomat (Interview: 26, 23). This has facilitated work with the MOC well 
since the MFA will be able to understand the importance of the role of the MOC better 
than the past. From the interviews conducted, the effects of this strategic change 
implemented by the Thaksin government have not been in place long enough to 
detennine any specific changes, although one might expect that the MFA and the MOC 
could be engaged in further competition due to their increasingly overlapping roles. 
Furthennore, there have been initiatives to establish centres which will facilitate Thai 
exporters in trading with the EU. This includes the One Stop Service, which has the role 
of an association for Thai exporters to the EU. This centre will help all Thai exporters 
communicate with each other and to Thai government divisions more easily (Interview: 
22). 
While the MF A and the MOC appear to be the main contacts for those dealing with 
Thailand's international commercial policies, the Ministry of Agriculture also plays a role 
in sharing expertise with MFA and the MOC (Interview: 31). The MOA is responsible 
for the technical details relating to agricultural products, one of Thailand's major exports 
(see Chapter 2). The MOA therefore has an important role in the relationship between the 
EU and Thailand. They have a role to protect the benefit of Thai farmers by joining some 
negotiations and providing technical details for the MOC and the MFA (Interview: 31, 
32). Moreover, most negotiations resulting in sensitive areas (agricultural products) will 
be studied and interpreted and implemented by the MOA before transferring the 
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information to other organizations. Agriculture has been one of the most problematic 
areas in Thailand's conduct of trade relations with the EU, hence the MONs expertise 
has turned out to be indispensable (Interview: 6,8). 
The Thai State relations with the EU in Context 
A number of problems continue to exist in Thailand's trade with the EU. As noted in 
chapter 2, Thailand has faced difficulties, especially in the sector of agricultural products. 
According to indications from senior officials at the MF A, the EU market is a high value 
market with complex rules and requirement such as NTB, life and safety of workers, 
quality control in production, and testability rules (Interview: 13). These requirements 
have added to the costs of production and investment which have also created difficulties 
for Thai exporter as well. Thai exporters have faced high costs in shipping to the EU 
since the products have to be shipped to one port in the first place (for some products) 
then transferred again to the final destination for each product. One means of reducing 
some of the barriers is a barter trade strategy; such a strategy has recently helped 
Thailand to evade quota limits on imports in The EU. The countries with which Thailand 
has entered into barter trade are the United Kingdom and Sweden. The barter trade with 
these two countries aims to reduce the Thai surplus of chicken by exchange with arms. 
This strategy has also tightened the relationship between Thailand and the countries 
Thailand has had barter trade with (Thairath 8th Nov 2005: 3 ). 
However, EU regulations are still a crucial barrier for Thai exporters since the 
number of rules has continually increased (Interview: 3 and Interview: 24). In the 
meantime, Thai exporters have been slow to adapt. The Thai government, therefore, has 
tried to have the EU agree on a MRA (mutual recognition agreement) (Interview: 13). 
The MRA is an agreement on Thai product standards which Thailand wants the EU to 
accept as a universal standard for Thai exporters who want to export to the EU. Thailand 
is still in the process of negotiating on this issue, but current opinion among officials is 
that this is very unlikely to be resolved (Interview:23). 
70 
- ---_._-- - --- - -------------
The MF A has also found that communication and negotiations with the EU are 
complicated and time consuming since the EU has a system of multi-level governance; 
the increased number of members after the 2004 enlargement has slowed down the 
process (Interview: 1, 3). A very specific example is the manner in which recent 
negotiations on bilateral agreements for the EU and Thailand could not be concluded 
since the new members from the latest enlargement asserted their right to be a part of the 
negotiation process (Interview: 1,2). Senior officials from the MFA pointed out that the 
relationship and the commercial partnership between the EU and Thailand could be 
improved (Interview: I, 3). At the moment, however, networking and connection of 
Thailand with other countries is not considered to be strong enough. This puts Thailand at 
a disadvantage against Singapore which sometimes does not produce products in specific 
sectors, but has been successful in finding connections to source those products from 
other countries in Asia (Interview: 2). This can contribute to increasing exports to a much 
larger extent than Thailand. Moreoever, Thailand does not employ active lobbyists within 
the EU even despite the fact that there are lobbyists for Thai companies in the USA and 
other regions (Interview: 6). One possible compensation for these weaknesses is that the 
Thai government has a good coordination strategy between MOC and MF A which has 
helped negotiations with the EU become more successful. For example, when the MOC 
needs to negotiate on some issues, the MF A will help to facilitate the negotiation of the 
MOC by lobbying at a high level within the EU institutions (Interview: 31). 
The MOC has experienced similar problems to the MFA in Thailand's 
relationship with the EU. Although there is a Commerce Minister Counsellor's office in 
Brussels, Thailand has Commerce Minister Counsellor offices in only some individual 
countries in the EU. Some important Commerce Minister Counsellor offices such as the 
one in Sweden have been closed down since the Thai government reduced its budget 
(Interview: 6). This has decreased the chance for Thai companies to find ways to target 
their exports on some specific countries. Also, sometimes the MOC has been guilty of 
delaying the trade policy process when trade issues have emerged in relation to specific 
EU Member States (Interview: 27). The net result is that Thailand's strategies have been 
largely limited to dealing with the EU collectively in Brussels, while strategies with 
individual EU member states are often difficult. 
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It may come as a blow to the Thai-EU commercial relationship that drawing 
towards 2005, Thailand has begun to pay more attention to the ASEAN market than the 
EU market. This has had an impact on the Thai strategy towards the EU which has 
slowed down and become less active (Interview: 22, 24). The market purchasing power 
within the ASEAN is stronger than the past. The EU's tight rules, complexity and 
dynamics from the enlargement have created a feeling of instability towards Thailand and 
Thai companies. Thailand and Thai companies, therefore, are aiming to be more self-
reliant and looking for alternative strong markets such as those available in ASEAN 
(Interview: 1,3). The closer and more solid relationship between Thailand and ASEAN 
has given Thailand stronger power in the WTO and a clearer presence in the world 
market. Thailand's focus on ASEAN inevitably has consequences for the organisation of 
trade policy towards the EU, since it draws already limited personnel away from 
divisions which focus on trade relations with the EU towards those working on relations 
with ASEAN. An example is the manner in which divisions within the MFA focused on 
ASEAN are usually much larger than those dealing with the EU. 
On the other hand, strong export business sectors in Thailand, such as electrical 
parts, is the business sector within the EU which is not very competitive (Hormkoson 
2002:67). This has increased the chance for Thailand to be able to compete within the EU 
through these business sectors. These sectors include those such as computer parts and 
office appliances. Thailand still has a channel to compete with China within the EU by 
maintaining better networking and relationships. Officials at the MOC warn that the 
emergence of China onto the world market can be a threat to countries like Thailand, 
especially in the area of food products. Better networking and relationships with the EU 
help to maintain the channel to the EU market although many Thai products have less 
competitive prices compared to China (Interview: 6, Hormkoson 2002: 89). This is an 
issue addressed in Chapter 4, when this research focuses on firm strategies within 
Thailand's trade policies. 
The re-positioning strategy of Thai product has widened the chance to compete 
within the EU market. The emergence of China has come with price cutting competition. 
Thailand, therefore, has re-positioned its products to target more sophisticated markets. 
For instance, Thailand has now aimed to focus on producing ready food rather than just 
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exporting raw food or raw material. This strategy has brought Thailand to a higher level 
market where the competition is less fierce and the chance to remain in the market is 
more stable. Consequently, this means that Thailand's products are better suited to the 
required high standards the EU insists on their imports (Interview: 27, 28, 6 and 
Hormkoson 2002: 89). 
Other positive developments have also been evident in Thailand's trade with the 
EU, according to the MFA and the Mac. The trading situation with the EU has improved 
in a positive way after Thailand has regained GSP for some sensitive products such as 
shrimps (Interview: 27, 28, 13). Moreover, an enlargement which could have caused the 
EU to decrease some import products from outsiders, has not changed the situation as 
previously predicted. Thailand can still export to the EU at the same level and actually 2-
5% more in some areas. Furthermore, there have not been any other impacts from the 
enlargement on trading between the EU and Thailand (Interview: 13). Officials from the 
MaC have remarked that while some areas of development in trade between Thailand 
and the EU are apparent, there has not been any obvious changes over the recent period 
or even after the enlargement. Previously, Thailand had predicted that the EU market 
might become more self-sufficient and an even more powerful market. This, therefore, 
may decrease the power of Thailand in negotiation. Thus, Thailand's future strategy aims 
to become more self-reliant on its own economy (Interview: 26, I). 
Shrimp GSP battles 
An area which has been extremely sensitive in Thai-EU trade, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
is the issue of the shrimp GSP battles. In the past, the EU was one of Thailand's major 
markets for shrimp products. Before 1997, Thailand had greatly benefited from the GSP 
offered by the European Union and with the support offered by the GSP scheme, Thai 
exporters were able to sell their shrimp products to the European Union at a lowered 
tariff rate. The benefit helped reduce their production costs and enhance the country's 
competitiveness. It also attracted more investment and generated more jobs in other 
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industries, such as food production and the manufacturing of leather, jewellery, furniture, 
electronics, and electrical appliances. 
In 1997, Thailand's shrimp industry was hit by a cut of 50% in shrimp exports 
due to Thailand's economy being qualified for a graduation9 in 9 sectors from the EU's 
GSP scheme (MOC Strategy Paper: 2001). This resulted in a lost of BtlO billion of 
income in 1999 and saw the quantity of exports to the EU falling from 32,866 tonnes in 
1995 to only 5,181 tonnes, a reduction of 84.24 percent. As an additional result, Thai 
shrimp exports to the EU market accounted for only 2 percent of Thailand's total shrimp 
exports. In 1998, Thai shrimp exports to the European Union totalled US5 million. The 
figure dropped to only .7 million in 2004 (thailand.prd.go.th 1o). Thailand's competitive 
advantage in the world market was being hit by tariff breaks and privileges which had 
already been taken away from Thailand in 1999. Thailand has attacked the EU's system 
for consideration of GSP as unequal and discriminatory under trade laws because the 
other large exporters of shrimp including Ecuador, India,. Bangladesh and Indonesia 
continued to retain GSP privileges and benefits whilst Thailand was penalised (Bangkok 
Post 16th Oct. 2002:6). There were also reasons to believe that the withdrawal of GSP 
privileges might not have been for purely regulatory reasons. Calls from the head of the 
Thai Marine Shrimp Association indicated that due .to Thailand's extremely high shrimp 
export potential, the EU had been planning the GSP cuts since 1995 to protect European 
industries. It is perhaps no coincidence that along with the 1997 GSP cut, the US and 
Japan also improvised similar measures to reduce the export of Thai shrimp to their 
respective countries. On the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter 2, some of the EU's 
embargoes on Thai shrimp have been due to proven health and safety concerns and 
problems concerning the traceability of the shrimp. 
This caused anxiety within the shrimp farmers m Thailand and exporters 
subsequently called for a boycott starting in January 1997 on EU products such as French 
wine, Scotch whisky, and milk from Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands. In 
December 1996, the Thai association of shrimp exporters also called for the suspension 
of Airbus airplanes from Germany and Belgium (Shrimp Sentinel Online 1997). The 
9 A 'graduation' from the asp scheme, refers to a product's sufficient competitiveness within the EU 
market, and normally means that the product no longer qualifies for GSP privileges. . 
IQ hllp:lllhailand.prd.go.th 
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powerful CP group also made a decision to cancel its imports of aquatic feed from the EU 
typically used for its aquacultural operations (Shrimp Sentinel Online 1997). 
At this stage, it was rather clear that the Thai government was obliged to find a 
serious solution, particularly because the GSP cut had so drastically affected the Thai 
shrimp industry (Interview:l, 6). The EU's decision to cut Thai GSP on shrimp had 
turned into a major crisis between Thailand and the EU's trading regime and had caused 
serious anti-European sentiment in Thailand (Interview: 26 ). To make matters worse, 
this came only slightly before the Asian economic crisis and the bust of the Thai 
economy, which added further complications to the trade conflict. One of the most salient 
points is how the weakened Thai baht contributed to an ever widening trade gap between 
Thailand and the EU, giving the Europeans a further reason not to restore Thailand's 
shrimp GSP rights. 
The problem of declining shrimp exports started to become very apparent during 
the Thaksin government, while Commerce Minister Somkid Chatusripitak was steering 
Thailand's commerce policy. Shortly after being installed into the cabinet, Somkid urged 
the Economic Council to find a resolution on restoring Thai shrimp exports, not only to 
the the EU, but also to the US and Japan (Manager 8th Sep 2005: 9). The Economic 
Council, consisting of senior officials from the MF A, the MOC, and the MOA passed on 
this task to the respective ministries 
The Economic Council, through the research and advice of primarily the MOA as 
well as the MOC's junior officials, concluded that for some countries such as Japan, the 
provision of stringent standards would go a long way to restoring market access. This 
was, to some degree also true with the EU, particularly since 2002 when the EU 
implemented a zero tolerance food safety policy on Thai shrimp imports after finding 
chemical contamination in shrimps sent to the Netherlands (Bangkok Post 1st Jan 
2003:11). Chemical contamination and below average standards had been a major 
obstacle against Thai shrimp exports in the past, and had been held as a main reasons for 
the imposition of various trade embargoes against Thai shrimp products (Interview: 13). 
The Fisheries Department of the MOA, for example, had continually urged shrimp 
farmers and exporters to put an emphasis on farm management to match EU food safety 
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requirements. The department has also more recently stressed traceability of food 
products as a mandatory condition for exports to the EU (The Nation 5th May 2006: 19). 
A very strong conclusion reached primarily by the MOA aided by the MOC in 
issues concerning commercial regulations was that the GSP cut by the EU was both a 
trade diversion and a trade reduction tactic. Findings indicated that if the price of frozen 
shrimp was increased by merely one percent, it would reduce the total exports of Thai 
frozen shrimp by 3.492 percent. Making use of data, this eventually resulted in the 
decrease by 20.23 percent over six years in Thailand export of frozen shrimp to the EU 
(Robroo 2001: 76). The additional knowledge that Thailand's shrimp exports were being 
taxed at 12 to 14.4 percent compared to only 3.6 to 5 percent of tax by other major 
shrimp exporters to the EU led the MOA and MOC to conclude that this was unfair and 
discriminatory treatment. 
The MF A played the role of coordinator and lobbyist during this period. While 
the MOC and the MOA made use of highly specialized and technical expertise, the duty 
of medium level MF A officials was to coordinate the data and pass the M OC and the 
MOA's recommendations on to the Cabinet. Its role was also to continually hold talks 
with EU officials and push on this agenda to various meetings, held at least every two 
months throughout the period of negotiations. The European Commission, for example, 
acknowledged that while 74 percent of Thai exports to the EU fell under GSP and 7 
percent fell under special arrangements, use of existing preferences had been relatively 
low. On average, less than half of Thai exports took advantage of the existing 
preferences. The European Commission also acknowledged that Thailand did not demand 
a sweeping re-grant of all GSP privileges, but only persistently asked for the return of 
GSP privileges, specifically in the area offood and fisheries products (Brussels 2002:11). 
Currently analysts make little note of how Thai state agencies might have 
successfully put pressure on the EU for the restoration of GSP privileges in the area of 
shrimp exports, but these GSP privileges were eventually returned to Thailand in 2005 
(Supachai 2006:271). Media reports indicate that the tsunami disaster which hit areas in 
Asia towards the end of 2004 was the main reason for the restoration of Thai shrimp GSP 
privileges. This was due to the reason that Thailand's shrimp industry may have been 
significantly hit during the tsunami disaster (Thairath 30th Jun 2005:7). 
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In fact, state agencies have played a very strong role in the restoration of Thai 
shrimp GSP privileges. To begin with, PM Thaksin refused financial assistance from 
outside countries, instead opting for technical assistance and expertise. During a meeting 
with British Foreign Minister Jack Straw in Phuket, Thaksin also asked that the UK back 
Thailand's ongoing request for the restoration of GSP for Thai shrimp exports to the EU 
(Interview: 27, 28). The Prime Minister said that the request for the restoration of GSP 
was a call for fair treatment. Straw promised to hold talks with other members of the 
European Union to resume GSP for Thai shrimp products. At this stage, PM Thaksin 
admitted that, in fact, the European Union was likely to resume GSP for Thailand, but the 
request would help in accelerating the EU's decision (Interview: 27, 13). 
One of the reasons for Thaksin's quiet confidence was because negotiations 
behind the scenes between the MFA and the MOC on the one hand and the European 
Commission on the other hand, had already yielded positive results (Interview: 27, 13). 
By 2004, Thai shrimp exports to the EU had already fallen to less than 20 percent of the 
figures Thailand had been exporting just five years before. This was made known to the 
European Commission by the MF A in no uncertain terms, and continual pressure put on 
the EU meant that the EU was already in the process of restoring Thailand's shrimp GSP 
privileges. At that point, the percentage of Thai shrimp exports to the EU had already 
fallen to a point where shrimp GSP privileges would already be restored regardless of 
the negotiations, but Thai government agencies contend that without the additional 
pressure, this would have been delayed for a while longer (Interview: 27, 28). 
The EU's decision to grant autonomous measure with regard to the rate of duty on Thai 
shrimp exports to the EU was made on the 31 sI of August 2005 and reduced the duty from 
12 percent to 4.2 percent. The MF A cited the decision taken by the European Council of 
Ministers as 'the result of close cooperation between Thailand and the European Union'. 
The. MFA also said that this 'success is attributed to the various steps taken by Thai 
officials, as well as the Mission of Thailand to the European Communities in Brussels 
and all Thai embassies in Europe' (www.thailand.prd.go.th). The effects of the 
autonomous measure on Thai shrimp exports was immediate and exports to the area 
increased by 211 percent, totalling US$ 11.2 million in the first four months of 2006 
(Interview: 27). The outlook is also extremely bullish, with Thai shrimp exporters hoping 
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to increase their EU market share to 10 percent in the next few years from the current 
share of less than 1 percent. The Commerce Ministry plans a rise in the country's annual 
shrimp export volume to 500,000 tonnes, with the EU market accounting for 30,000 
tonnes (Interview: 27, 29). Clearly the Thai government units continue to play a role in 
sustaining this growth, as there have been strategic plans to boost overall exports to 
Europe. The Commerce Ministry has at present hired a lobbyist to protect Thailand's 
export benefits. It has also helped in setting up a Thailand-EU Business Council 
comprising private Thai companies and EU enterprises. To top this off, the Commerce 
Ministry has additional plans to create links with EU members and to use specific 
European countries as distribution centres for Thai exports. In addition to this, the MF A 
has also urged Thai shrimp exporters to diversify their products as well as to focus further 
on Eastern Europe (The Nation 5th May 2006: 6). 
This case study of the shrimp dispute is a useful illustration of the Thai state's 
role in commercial policy making towards the EU for several reasons. It displays the 
close coordination between all state agencies ranging from the head of the government to 
the MF A and the MOC as well as the MOA. The different units have clearly worked in 
conjunction to bring back GSP privileges the loss of 'which was regarded as a serious 
detriment to Thai shrimp exports. It also highlights the different roles the state agencies 
play, including the negotiation role of the MFA and the lending of technical expertise by 
the MOC and the MOA. Thaksin as the head of government might have been 
instrumental in putting further pressure on the EU and could have been the catalyst for 
the success. 
Apart from the perceived success as viewed by the Thai side, this case study 
might also draw out the limitations of the Thai state agencies in quickly achieving 
progress in negotiations. The next Chapter indicates that major shrimp exporters, 
especially the CP Group, have continually noted that even without the help of Thai state 
agencies, GSP privileges would have been restored in any case due to the very low export 
share in Thailand's shrimp market in the EU towards the end of 2004. While this case 
study portrays a sold display of cooperation between the Thai state agencies, the value of 
the efforts may have been merely to raise awareness of the shrimp export reduction rather 
than to substantially negotiate for anything. Thai state agencies would however argue that 
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the restoration of GSP privileges is far from being an automatic process, and without the 
continual negotiation, dialogue, and political pressure, the GSP privileges would not have 
been restored so quickly. 
Conclusion 
The arguments in the chapter 3 have raised several significant issues, on the one hand 
about the nature and role of the Thai state apparatus and on the other about the ways in 
which it has responded to the demands of Thai-EU commercial relations. The purpose 
here is to review these issues and then to identify the ways in which they can form the 
basis for analysis of other actors such as firms and Private Consultative Committees in 
the next chapter. 
First, it can be seen from the evidence in this chapter that Thailand's governments 
have had a role in influencing the political environment of Thai-EU trade relations, 
particularly due to the way they work and the policies which result from the ruling 
party's governance mentality. This places Thai governments as important actors, 
although their significance is limited by the uncertainty of Thailand's political situation, 
which throughout the history of modem Thai politics, has seen numerous changes in 
ruling government coalitions. This clearly results in politically-driven changes in the 
policy direction as well as complaints from the civil service about the lack of consistent 
direction. Thailand's political situation means that there is limited utility in trying to 
understand the government's policy directions and that the analysis of Thai external 
commercial policy-making is perhaps better served by looking at the other main actors 
such as the civil service, firms, and the PCCs. 
Secondly, The MF A has the upper hand over the rest of the ministries in dealing 
with international trade issues, including Thailand's trade relations with the EU. It is 
uncertain whether the relatively small workforce in the MFA is capable enough to handle 
relatively complex EU affairs. This is potentially an important issue in the analysis of 
Thai external commercial policy-making since it means that Thailand's policy direction 
is not necessarily optimised with thorough and knowledgeable decision-making. This 
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also means that the MF A may need to borrow expertise from other actors such as the 
MOC as well as Thai and foreign firms. 
Third, the MOC offers indispensable technical expertise and advice before and 
during negotiations and has a key role in export promotion. In addition, other relevant 
ministries include the MOA and MOl, which also lend expertise in the area of key 
exports of agriculture and industrial technologies. The MOC's role has been traditionally 
overlooked in the past, despite their technical expertise. This is perhaps because the MOC 
is perceived as only a unit which takes orders from other actors and drafts technical 
documents accordingly. This research has found that this is an underestimation of the 
MOC's importance and that the MOC perceives itself as an important and often 
independent actor within the Thai external commercial policy-making process. 
Fourth, the case study of shrimp GSP shows the relative success in co-ordination 
between Thai state agencies, although it remains uncertain what the effect and value of 
this coordination might have been. Was the restoration of GSP automatic, or was it a 
process of negotiation and pressure? The Thai state agencies would argue the latter while 
Thai firms such as CP Group argue for the former. The analysis of the role of the firm as 
an important actor in Thailand's external commercial policy-making is carried out in 
further detail in the following Chapter and will help to clarify how firms figure in the 
policy-making process. 
Fifth, the MF A and MOC realise that numerous obstacles stand in the way of 
optimal Thai-EU trade relations, and this has been reflected in numerous interviews 
conducted during the research trip in Thailand. This admission of the Thai state's 
limitations is extremely important in the analysis of Thai external commercial policy-
making because it implies that even the seemingly powerful Thai state is incapable of 
carrying out policy-making and policy direction on its own. This means that the Thai 
firms and the PCCs could have an important role to play, an issue which is carried 
forward in the following Chapter. 
Overall, the evidence in this chapter has raised important questions about the 
explanatory power of a 'state-centred' approach to Thai-EU commercial relations, and 
about the capacity of the Thai state to formulate consistent and effective policy positions. 
By doing so, it has also raised questions about the ways in which the Thai state and firms 
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interact within the commercial policy-making process - questions that link back to the 
corporatist framework outlined in Chapter 1. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to explore the 
roles of firms and Private Consultative Committees in the commercial policy-making 
process, and to evaluate their impact upon it. 
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Chapter 4 
Firms, Trade Associations and Thai-EU Commercial 
Relations 
Introduction 
The study of governmental policy processes carried out in Chapter 3 is important to 
understanding the Thai government's role in commercial policy-making towards the EU, 
but it only provides a partial explanation of the Thai-EU commercial relationship. More 
and more, the modem economic world has revealed the increased significance of the 
private sector. In today's world, it is not enough to study the old form of state-to-state 
cooperation. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the role of the private sector has become 
very important to the process of policy-making between two partners. 
When looking at the commercial relations between partners, it is very important 
to look at what the private sector wants, and how the government is delivering the 
demands of the private sector (interview: 10). This view needs to be taken into account, 
but is not enough for a complete understanding of the Thai-EU commercial relationship. 
This chapter looks at a more detailed picture of the Thai private sector's role in dealing 
with the EU by analyzing how the private sector may act on its own in setting its own 
goals and achieving these goals. The Thai private sector is analyzed as a powerful actor 
in its own right, capable of making strategies and influencing government policy to 
accommodate its own targets. This directly leads to the question of whether state and firm 
interests are indeed mixed together and whether convergence between the interests of 
states and firms has become a Thai norm together with Thailand's modernisation process. 
The purpose of this Chapter is thus to support the propositions in Chapter 2 which 
argue about how the public and private sector either work together, against each other, 
and individually to create a commercial policy towards the EU. The chapter should also 
contribute to our further understanding of the extent to which state and firms interests do 
have a tendency to get mixed together in Thailand, and if this may have some effect on 
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the Thai-EU commercial relationship. In line with the ideas of corporatism presented in 
Chapter 2, signs of interest representation from the private sector involved in the policy-
making process and interest intermediation between the Thai state and Thai firms should 
also be present. The analysis of the state sector in Chapter 3 is important to the analysis 
here, since it indicates that the state itself is not a monolithic entity, and that there are 
important differences of interest and approach within the governmental structure .. 
As in chapter 3, this Chapter uses evidence from elite interviews - in this case, of 
leading members of the Thai private sector - and uses their perceptions to create an 
understanding of how the Thai private sector deals with the EU in its commercial 
relations. The questions asked also try to highlight perceptions that Thai private sector 
representatives have of their own roles. This understanding of roles helps to explain how 
the private sector may act in developing strategies or influencing state policy. Primary 
sources such as company brochures or trade representative mission statements are 
similarly used to further explore perceptions and analyse existing strategies. As well as 
interviews, some secondary resources such as research on the role of the Thai private 
sector are also used to support how the Thai private sector has behaved in the past 
through various commercial engagements with the EU. 
The first section of this Chapter explains what is meant by the Thai private sector 
and which actors may be included. It is proposed that the private sector includes Thai 
firms exporting to the EU, Private Consultative Committees (Thai Banker's Association, 
Industrial Association Federation, Thai Chamber of Commerce), and a range of interest 
groups. It is not only important to know what the private sector is, but also what their 
importance is in Thai-EU commercial relations and how they think of the EU. Each of 
these private sector actors has a role and these roles are important in the analysis and the 
understanding of the commercial relationship because it may help to explain their 
strategies in dealing with the EU. The firms which are covered by the analysis of this 
section include the Charoen Phokapand Food Group, Pak Food Company, and 
Sanguanwong Starch Group. Private Consultative Committees include the Federation of 
Trade Industry, the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the Thai Banker's Association. 
Interest groups include those at the national/regional level, non-governmental 
organizations, and vocational groupings. 
83 
I 
----
The second section of this Chapter goes on more closely to examine details of the 
strategy of the private sector in dealing with the EU's commercial side. This section first 
examines the business strategies in which firms trade with other firms. Firm strategies 
analysed in this section include repositioning, match-making, production capabilities, the 
exercise of lobbying power, and the development of distribution capabilities. These 
strategies are specifically designed for the EU's unique market and analysis of these 
strategies will help to further understanding of the Thai-EU commercial partnership. The 
second part of the section examines the strategies of Private Consultative Committees. 
This section argues that the committees exist to strengthen linkages between firms and 
government, maximize Thailand's economic interest, and act as problem mediators. 
The third section looks in detail at how the private sector may influence the 
government sector and does this by exploring two very different channels. One is the 
regular officially created channels, usually represented by the Private Consultative 
Committees, supported by the state sector and encouraged for use. The second is the 
specialised unofficial channels, normally taken by powerful Thai firms, which the private 
sector may choose to use for several reasons which could include increased efficiency or 
quicker results. The section looks carefully at both of these channels and evaluates 
whether they have positive or negative influences on the Thai-EU commercial 
relationship. This section also examines the policy coordination undertaken by the private 
sector. The section proposes that this policy coordination contains two levels: primary 
relationships, which are between the firm and the government, and secondary 
relationships, which include the 'firm to private consultative committee' and 'private 
consultative committee to government' relationships. Each of these policy coordination 
processes is important by itself and significant in bringing about policy results which 
could significantly affect Thailand's commercial relationship with the outside world. 
The Chapter concludes by discussing ways in which the Thai private sector has 
reacted to the challenge of the EU and 'talks' to a very institutionally unique EU. This is 
done at a firm-to-firm level, through Private Consultative Committees, and through Thai 
government lobbying. Each of the main actors studied in the private sector also appears 
to have its own style and value in dealing with the EU, with the private sector often 
acting as a self-contained actor, while Private Consultative Committees' roles might be to 
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provide communication and understanding between the government and firms. Whether 
the developed role of Thai firms and their influence over the government reflects 
corporatism is an issue which will be discussed in the Conclusion. 
Private Sector Actors and Their Importance in Thai-EU Commercial 
Relations 
When the discussion is focusing on markets and trade, it is perceptible that the actors 
which will be a crucial centre of the analysis are firms (Laothammathat, 1996). The EU 
market standards and requirements are high and difficult to meetll (also see Chapter 1). 
Therefore, it might be assumed that most firms could work more effectively with 
assistance from the government sector. Private Consultative Committees have been 
assigned by firms and government, also another key factor to analyze since they are a 
crucial component in trade policy making which connects firms and government together 
(Sungsuwan, 2000, 2). However, it is important to note that different firms with different 
capacities and influences have certainly obtained different levels of policy facilitation 
from the government (interview: 10). Moreover, a more controversial possibility is that 
there are some firms which have received preferential assistance from government and 
that some of the company strategies can very closely fit with the policy of the 
government. 
The Thai private sector dealing with the EU can be divided into three main 
categories. The first category is the multinational Thai firms which deal directly in the 
business side of Thai EU commercial relations. The second category is the Private 
Consultative Committees, which consist of Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, Thai 
Banker's Association, and Industrial Federation Association, groupings of independent 
business consultants organized to facilitate trade between the firms at both the national 
and international levels. The third category is the interest groups, which in Thailand 
11 From every interviewee, most notably by Ministry of Foreign Affair, Thai Banker's 
Association, and Chamber of Commerce 
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usually consist of ad hoc groupings which are created on a case by case basis to pressure 
the government to follow some sort of policy (Tarnsettakij 13rd July 2003). 
This section proposes to examine three issues. First, the section examines the 
three main categories of the Thai private sector and explains how they work individually 
and together in dealing with commercial issues related to the EU. This section secondly 
tries to differentiate between perceived and de facto roles of each of the categories. This 
is important in understanding Thai-EU commercial relations because quite often, the 
perceived role does not quite match the de facto role and creates expectations which are 
unrealistic or simply erroneous. The final aim of this section is to explain the significance 
of each of the private sector categories directly in the context of Thai-EU commercial 
relations. 
In Thailand, large firms which are the top of the national level and have 
international capabilities are normally considered to be the most significant players in the 
private sector. This Chapter's case study focuses on Charoen Pokphand Group (CP 
Group), Pak Food, and Sanguanwong Group which are three companies of varying sizes, 
but all considered to be significant players in their own right. These three firms are 
selected as firms whose activities focus largely on agricultural products. In fact, 
Agricultural products are one of the main product sectors for Thai exports although their 
total value comes a significant second to industrial products (see table 4.1). However, 
firms which export mainly agricultural products are very crucial to analyse as their 
products often fall into sensitive sectors such as poultry, seafood and starch. These three 
main products have caused a number of trade conflicts between the EU and Thailand for 
as long as a decade and resulted in creation of tariff barriers such as revoking GSP 
privileges, contamination issue and avian flu (see chapter 2). Moreover, in Thailand these 
product sectors have related to large numbers of farmers in Thailand which certainly are 
the main group politicians try to gain popularity with as they are the largest occupational 
group in the total popUlation in Thailand. Therefore, several sets of policies have been 
designed to appeal to these farmers and a number of trade associations have been created 
to present and protect these farmers interests even though those interests are often 
mediated through powerful firms (Interview: 49). 
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TABLE 4.1: Thailand's Exports by Main Product (Source: Department of Foreign 
Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand) 
value: million baht 
description 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Firms 
The CP Food Group is Thailand's biggest food export finn and has 27,854 Million baht 
revenues, the highest revenues among all Thai food export firms (Justin, Forbes 
Magazine: 2006). Moreover, CP is considered as one of the most powerful finns in 
Thailand since it has been established more than 60 years. CP's power also derives from 
a close connection between the finn and governments built for several years and growing 
stronger (Interview: 48). CP Food also possesses the strongest competence among all 
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Thai food exporters in exporting agricultural products and food to the European Union 
(EU) market. The ep Group exports to the EU are third in rank after those to the USA 
and ASEAN, making the EU its third largest market and amongst these exports poultry is 
the third largest product category (Interview: 27). The ep group exports more than 25% 
of its total poultry production in Thailand and exports more than 50% of Thailand's total 
processed chicken exports to the EU (ep export report 2006) 
TABLE 4.2: Thailand's Major Poultry Exporters to the EU (Source: Department of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand: 2007) 
i I. C.P. Intel1rade Co., Ltd. : 2006 total revenue: 42.628,071 ,000 baht 
! 
i 2. B. Foods Product International Co., Ltd. : 2006 total revenue: 9,679,833,993 haht 
i 3. Saha Farm Co., Ltd : 2006 total revenue: 7,641,262,777 baht 
, 
i 4. GFPT Public Co., Ltd. : 2006 total revenue: 3,300,456,173 baht 
i 5. Better Pood Co., Ltd. : 2006 total revenue: 765,004,508 baht 
The most important markets for ep group poultry exports are countries in the EU as 
presented in the following chart (table 4.3) which shows the five most important national 
markets for ep poultry exports. Four members from the list are EU member states. The 
UK is now the most important national market within the EU, reflecting a move in the 
past few years to a strategy of product distribution through large supermarket groups such 
as such as Somerfield, Iceland and Tesco. The level of ep Group poultry exports to the 
UK has significantly increased over the past few years (interview: 37). 
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TABLE 4.3: CP Group Poultry exports(in Thai baht): top 5 National Markets 
(Source: Department of Statistic, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, CP Food Poultry 
export) 
Netherland 
0.00 5,000.00 10,000.0015,000.0020,000.0025,000.00 
02006 
02005 
1112004 
02003 
However, shrimp is the individual product which the firm is most concerned about since 
the quota offered by the EU is very limited and the requirements for entry are extremely 
high. One of the requirements which has created a barrier and a high cost in production is 
the Traceability12 (Interview: 50). Nevertheless, CP food has typically exported more 
than 40% of Thailand's total shrimp exports to the EU. The following table (table 4.4) 
presents the dramatic increase of shrimp export to the EU after Thailand regained its GSP 
privileges in 2006. More than 60% of Thai shrimp exports to the EU from 2003-2005 are 
from the CP group since during the period of GSP withdrawal, it was one of the few 
exporters that were strong enough to cross the high tariff barrier (Interview: 28). 
12 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines traceability as the 
'ability to trace the history, application, or location of any entity by means of recorded 
identification'. This definition is very broad and is intended to be useful in many 
different sectors of science and industry. 
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TABLE 4.4: CP's Shrimp Exports, 2003-2006 (Source: Department of Fisheries, 
Ministry of Agriculture) 
, VALUE = Thai Million Baht 
i )Destination 
L003 2004 ~005 ~006 
j 
, 
11. rrota1 16,140.0 12,720 17,878 17,954 
12. ~SEAN 587 610.2 r<\17.4 384 
! 
13. EU 138.2 
! 
348.4 584.6 835.6 
r· Japan ~,621 4,190.5 3,132 3,211.3 
'5 \. PSA 9,698 7,01l 10,102 110,990 
Pak Food is a public limited company which is a substantial exporter of seafood from 
Thailand. This is not a big company, but has been in business for 38 years. Pak Food 
considers the EU to be a market which is too highly regulated and not suitable for 
investment especially since the traceability rules have been reinforced for exporting to the 
EU. Therefore, in the shrimp product sector, Pak food has typically exported less than 5% 
market share of Thailand's total shrimp export to the EU, amounting by value to only 
about 39 million baht in 2006 (Interview: 33). In the shrimp industry, Pak Food has had 
some serious problems with the EU on contamination issues, and has not received any 
additional help from the Thai government in dealing with problems that EU regulation . 
has presented to the company. Hence, the main Pak Food markets are currently ASEAN, 
USA, Japan, and the Middle East where the company has had more success in exports. 
And their main export product to the EU is tuna (Interview: 34). 
Sanguanwong Company is one of Asia's top five exporters of starch and an active 
exporter to the ED. The firm is a highly respected member of the business sector and 
accounts for more than 40% of total starch exports to the EU. However, as can be seen 
from the following table, the level of starch exports to the EU is very low compared to 
other market destinations. This has been an effect of the removal of GSP privileges 
during the 1980s which effectively means that the EU is no longer important to 
Thailand's starch exporters (interview: \1). 
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TABLE 4.5 :Thailand's Starch Exports, 2003-2006 (Source: Department of Statistics 
and Information of Thailand) 
I ~003 J~04 ~005 006 
I 
Destination !value in~alue inlvalue in Value in 
Baht abt ~aht Babt 
1 
18,286.2 ~,465.1 frotal 7,533.3 13,680.8 
i ASEAN ~,865.6 1,782.5 12,872.7 5,274.6 iO 
, 
r EU 141.0 12.8 ~13.2 239.7 
r apan 688.3 1,015.6 762.0 947.3 ,. 
I 
I~ USA ~33.1 287.2 331.2 1262.9 
Sanguanwong's main EU customer base is in Germany. When dealing with the EU, the 
company mainly exports processed, rather than raw, starch because of the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) limits. According to a senior manager, Sanguanwong has a 
very good relationship with its partner companies in the EU and has maintained a very 
strong trading record with the EU, at least until the Thaksin government came into power 
and shifted certain agricultural policies. The company's ties with EU firms are so strong 
that it is known to have received direct technical assistance from these European based 
firms (interview: 11). 
These three firms are suitable for this case study because they are three different 
companies of different sizes and very varied experiences. CP Food Group is a 
multinational company with very strong ties to the Thai government sector and the ability 
to strongly influence government policy to suit its goals. Pak Food on the other hand, 
faces serious problems with dealing with the EU, and has openly complained about not 
having sufficient support from the Thai government. Additionally, the company seems to 
not have sufficient pulling power to influence the Thai government to shift policies to suit 
their needs. Sanguanwong company, finally, despite its good relationship with the EU in 
general and with EU partners, has run into problems with government policies which do 
not facilitate its business. This indicates that problems for Thai firms can come directly 
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from the ED, from their inability to influence ED policy, and from Thai government 
policies which may hinder a company's ability to operate efficiently. 
Private Consultative Committees 
The second category of private sector actors to be examined here are the Private 
Consultative Committees [which play an important role in Thai-ED commercial relations 
policy since they are the main key to link firms and the government sector together 
(Sungsuwan, 2000, 2-7)]. Chapter 3 referred to the Private Consultative Committees as 
PM General Prem Tinsulanonda's initiative to provide representation from the private 
sector (Page 60. They could be seen as serving to strengthen a much needed link between 
technocrats and metropolitan businessmen (Hewison 1997: 27). The three main Private 
Consultative Committees in Thailand are The Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) the 
Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC), and the Thai Banker's Association (TBA). 
The Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), established in December 1987, is an 
'upgraded body' of the Association of Thai Industries and acts under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Industry. This private consultative committee is focused towards 
strengthening the private sector institutions involved in assisting the industrialization 
process in Thailand. This involves supporting sustainable growth amongst Thai industries 
as well as coordinating with the national economic development processes. The FT! also 
aims at protecting Thailand's interests in the world economic environment. Officially, the 
FTI perceive themselves as the main linkage between industrial firms and the government 
sector (FT! official document, 2005). The FTI has more than 1,000 member firms. 
According to the organization chart, the green circle represents the position of the firms 
where they gather as an industrial club (see chart 4.1). In addition to member firms, there 
are 25 industrial clubs/trade associations within the FT!. The members of the FT! can 
present themselves more strongly through their club or association. For instance CP Food 
is an important member of the FT! but since the CP has varied food product, it has joined 
both the Frozen food Association and Seafood Exporters Association. Firms will present 
their needs through meetings with the club and the major needs of the club will then be 
transferred to meetings within the FT! (Pitsamaicha, 2001, 32-35). 
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Chart 4.1 : The Federation 0/ Thai Industries O/flce Organization Chart 
(Official Document/rom F.T.I. 2005) 
From the organization chart, it should be noted that the positions from Executive Director 
down to all other division heads are occupied by permanent staff. This seems to indicate 
that the Industrial Clubs (25 industrial clubs) and committees, which are composed of 
private firms and representatives from private firms, are more powerful in the practical 
governance system of the FT! since they are at a position higher than the Executive 
Director (as shown in the chart). This means that they also have the power to intervene in 
the Executive Director's decisions at practical levels. 
The 'Assistant Executive Director' level is the division which mainly deals with 
EU issues. When members of the industrial clubs face problems in dealing with EU 
customers about issues which relate to the Thai government sector, they will contact the 
foreign affairs division of the FT! and the division will forward the issue up to the line to 
the executive directors meeting which takes place every month. However, if the issue is 
urgent, the Assistant Executive Director may forward this to the board of directors 
directly without waiting to follow the normal process (Interview: 17). This can show that 
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the process is very complicated and mutilayered and even when there is an urgent issue, 
they still have to go through another process which is also time consuming. 
Chart 4.2: Thai Chamber of Commerce & Board of Trade of Thailand Organization 
Chart (Official Document from Thai Chamber: 2006) 
The Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC) was established in March 1933 by a group of 
experienced Thai merchants with the view of establishing a central organization to assist 
Thai merchants and businessmen through intermediation between the government and 
private sectors. The intent of the founders of the Tee was for the organization to promote 
businesses and protect interests by improving the competitiveness of Thai firms. In 1966, 
the Thai government noted the significance of the Tee and established the Chamber of 
Commerce Act to officially appoint the organization as a representative of the Thai 
private sector in facilitating cooperation between the government and private institutions 
in foreign countries. The TeC also has an international face, formed by trade 
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representatives who actively negotiate with foreign governments to expand commercial 
and investment channels abroad, and organize meetings with foreign trade representatives 
visiting Thailand for business negotiations (Document presenting the TCC from the TCC 
and from the MOC, 2006). According to the Organization chart, the position where the 
firms can intervene in the working process is similar to that in the FT!. The Industrial 
Clubs/Trade Associations gather in the position of the green box in the chart (see Thai 
Chamber of Commerce & Board of Trade of Thailand Organization Chart). There are 26 
trade associations in the Thai Chamber of Commerce which consisted of more than 1,000 
firms in 2006 (Pitsamaicha, 2001, 28-30). 
Chart 4.3: The Thai Banker's Association Organization Chart (Official Document 
from The Thai Banker's Association 2007) 
,,' Ihl,er'natioUfii 
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The Thai Banker's Association (TBA) consists of representatives from Thailand's 
commercial banks who regularly meet to discuss and coordinate key economic policies 
with the Bank of Thailand, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce as 
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well as a number of other government agencies. Established since 1958, the management 
consists of an elected Board of Directors, including a Chairman, a vice Chairman, and 
three directors. The TBA is also in constant collaboration with the Board of Trade and the 
FTI in establishing a Joint Public-Private Consultative Committee, which deals directly 
with the government and works towards potentially positive adjustment of government 
policies or amendments to laws and regulations with a focus on trade and investment 
(Document presenting from the MOF and interview: 26). 
The TBA has broadly the same organization structure as the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce, but with fewer members. The TBA (chart 4.3) consists of 17 clubs and 
approximately 80 firms while the TCC has a membership of more than 25 clubs and more 
than 1000 firms (listed in the green box which is shown in the TCC organization chart). 
Moreover, the TCC has a more complicated structure as there is not only a larger number 
of members but also more than 500 staff, while there only 27 staff at the TBA. 
Furthermore, the main activity of the TCC is also similar to the Department of Trade 
Promotion of The Ministry of Commerce. Therefore, at the operational level, which is not 
reflected in the chart, there are more detail of the division which work on trade promotion 
of export firms, co-operation between firms and problem solving while the TBA mostly 
focuses only on co-operation between them and MOF and the government, and financial 
policy making (Interview: 26). 
Interest Groups 
The third type of private sector actor in Thailand is interest groups, which can be 
generally divided into three types, including the nationalist-regional group, voluntary 
non-governmental organizations, and vocational groups (Thepchatree, 2003, 65-70). The 
two latter groups, particularly the vocational groups, are highly relevant to the Thai-EU 
commercial relationship. The NGO interest groups are known to be keen admirers of EU 
legislation, particularly in relation to environmental standards. An example is the manner 
in which Thai NGOs have backed the EU requirement of Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE), which demands the meeting of certain requirements in destroying 
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electrical and electronic equipment as well as in recycling (www.tisi.go.th). (Manager 
12th_18th July 2006). The WEEE directive to restrict hazardous substances in electrical 
and electronic equipment and waste electrical and electronic equipment is designed to 
reduce high technology waste and encourage recycling by the producers13• 
The most important type of interest group in Thai-EU commercial relations, due 
to its constant activism, lobbying and focused goals is professional groups, which can be 
divided into two categories. The first group consists of low level agricultural groupings 
such as farmers and blue collar workers. The second group are the trade associations 
which are formally established and directly lobby the Private Consultative Committees 
(Interview: 44). On several occasions, the trade associations have also tried to influence 
the low level agricultural groupings in order to add extra lobbying pressure. The value of 
the trade associations as powerful interest groups varies according to the size and 
influence of the firms involved in them. Larger firms such as the CP group rarely use this 
channel, or any other official channel, to lobby the government (Interview: 49, 50). For 
the purposes of the argument here, the direct role and influence of interest groups is 
effectively marginal, and they will not be considered at any length in the following 
analysis which focuses on firms and the PCCs. 
Private Sector Strategies 
The EU is considered by Thai Government and Thai firms to be a very competitive and 
demanding market. Thai firms interviewed for this study agree that the EU market has 
high value, a large demand, and has the potential to expand through processes such as 
enlargement14• Consequently the Thai private sector has developed numerous strategies 
to cope with other competitors and with broad regulatory requirements in the EU market. 
The strategies need to be developed through several simultaneous dimensions which can 
be used together because exporting firms need to be competitive first at the national level 
in order to prove that they have standards which qualify at the international level 
13 h_I!n:li~g .•. ~~Jrgll~.<:\IL~DYi[QmJl.<:n1/}Y~.>I~lll'~<:~_in<:t<:~"hlill 3/10/2007 10:30 PM 
14 From all interviewees from firms (The CP, Sanguanwong, Pakfood) 
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(Committees of Research of Thailand, 1998). The EU, of course, is one of the strongest 
tests of this ability to achieve an international standard. 
This section analyses the strategies of the Thai private sector in dealing 
commercially with the EU. The argument is that there are two main strategies: a business 
strategy and a political strategy. The business strategy focuses mainly on prioritising 
market access, production standards, distribution channels, and promotion. The political 
strategy is strongly related to the concept of corporatism in Thai states and markets. This 
strategy focuses on how the private sector influences and works with the government 
sector. This section presents two channels to influence th'e government sector; the regular 
officially created channels and the specialised unofficial channels. The two strategies are 
often used together to maximize efficiency for the private sector, although firms, Private 
Consultative Committees and interest groups put different emphasis on each of the 
strategies. Firms of different sizes and influences also use different strategies. 
Understanding these strategies and the way they are used will help to clarify how the 
Thai private sector has became such a strong influence and a key actor in Thai-EU 
commercial relations. 
Firm Strategies 
Thai firms do not define the EU as a transnational government, a supranational entity, or 
anything as complicated as these terms imply. According to interviews with top firm 
management, Thai firms view the EU as a regional grouping with highly regulated 
standards which have been harmonized by the member countries. In reality, Thai firms 
place much less importance on the EU as a transnational union, and more on the 
individual member states. According to interviewees, Thai firms know that the EU makes 
regulations which are harmonized, but it is only important as far as standards and 
regulations are concerned (Interview: 26). Thai firms realize that firm strategies need to 
be concentrated individually on single member states the firm is interested in and 
specifically on the customer firm. According to the interviews, Thai firms are not very 
interested in other aspects of European integration which would not affect the ability to 
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export to specific member states. Moreover, a Sanguanwong officer explained that 
customer European firms would go as far as to call and warn of any upcoming European 
legislation which would affect his company's ability to export. These calls would include 
additional advice on how to 'avoid' and 'work around' any stricter legislation and the 
customer European firms would provide information on 'more facilitating' ports through 
which to deliver products (Interview: 11). 
The Thai firms' uncomplicated understanding of the EU may mean several things. 
It may show that Thai firms are very selective in their understanding of the EU and only 
concern themselves with what they need to know. This shows itself in the way that top 
Thai firm workers actually know far more about EU regulations and procedures in the 
business context than does the state sector, including both the Thai government and its 
bureaucracy. This also means that Thai firms are very aware that the EU is a unique 
trading partner, which requires specialized knowledge and an equally unique firm 
strategy. This awareness of only certain parts of the EU integration process and 
institutions could mean negative approaches in firm strategies as well. According to a top 
Thai industrialist, 'greedy' companies will aim to please mainly their European 
customers rather than take into consideration the importance of the overall commercial 
relationship between Thailand and Europe (Interview: 26). This eventually results in 
rule-breaking to cut costs. When the rule-breaking is unsuccessful, these Thai firms will 
require government sector help to solve the problem, as was the case when a single Thai 
shrimp exporter tried to export contaminated shrimps to the EU and this resulted in all 
shrimp from exports from Thailand to the EU being suspended (Interview: 50). 
However, Thai firms' selective understanding of the EU means that firm 
strategies have been created to accommodate this understanding. This section explains 
the strategies which firms have decided to adopt in order to enhance their competence in 
exporting to the EU. The section makes use of the three main companies in this research, 
including the ep group, Pak Food company and Sanguanwong Starch company to 
demonstrate the different strategies used by different companies. 
Two very observable main strategies that Thai firms exporting to the EU use 
together are repositioning and match-making. Repositioning, which Thai companies 
adopted, is a business strategy in which firms add value to a product and re-define 
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themselves in a new and higher-level market sector in order to increase profit margins 
(National Reseach Committee Office, 2006). This is important for the EU market because 
Thai firms consider the EU consumer market to have top purchasing power and to 
demand the best products available with the highest production standards (Interview: 36). 
In the past, companies exporting raw products to the EU were already considered to be 
amongst the top companies in the world when considering standards. Recently, Thai 
competitors such as Vietnam which previously did not meet the required standards for 
exporting to the EU have developed their capacities and can now match Thailand in 
export of raw products. Repositioning of products by adding value means that Thai firms 
do not have to compete directly in the same market with new entries to the market 
(Interview: 33). 
This repositioning strategy has been used by all three companies studied for this 
thesis, including the CP Group, Pak Food and Sanguanwong Starch Company. CP Group 
has actively diversified its products into the ready-to-eat market, instead of trying to 
export only raw agricultural products. Sanguanwong Starch Company now converts its 
starch into finer grain which is ready to convert into high quality paper, a know-how 
which requires the expertise of only world class starch production facilities. Pak Food 
similarly has tried to follow a strategy of diversifying products although this may not be a 
direct response to EU regulations and quotas. Pak Food has planned this diversification 
strategy for the firm in the long term for all markets and the strategy is not exclusively for 
the EU (Interview: 11). 
The second main common strategy Thai firms use to export to the EU is match-
making, which was first established by the initiative of the Ministry of Commerce which 
wanted Thai firms to meet foreign firms through holding of events and fairs, both in 
Thailand and in Europe. This is not an EU-specific strategy, but Thai SMEs have found 
this very helpful in supporting their access to the EU market. This is because Thai SMEs 
usually do not have the same pulling power that bigger firms such as the CP group have 
and participation in the match-making promotions schemes gives a much needed push for 
entry into a more complicated market such as the EO. However, the three above firms 
(CP, Sanguanwong, and Pak Food) are too big and more powerful to be considered as 
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SMEs but they still find match making strategies are useful for them as well (Interview: 
17,20). 
Even though there are a couple of broad common strategies, individual firm 
strategies are different according to their size, influence and capabilities. The CP Group 
is a good case study of firm strategies because it is a multinational firm which has strong 
production capabilities, very close ties to the government and has powerful international 
distribution capabilities. The CP Group owns its own farms and has, compared to other 
Thai firms, massive agricultural production capabilities (Interview: 50). This not only 
means that the firm is most efficient in exporting agricultural products, but also means 
that the firms can follow the EU's Traceability Regulations (Interview: 36, 37). This 
regulation demands that all agricultural products, if contaminated, need to be able to be 
traced back to their origins to find the root of the problems (National Reseach Centre for 
Environmental Management). Companies such as Pak Food have limited production 
capability and often do not own their own farms. This means that they cannot fully take 
control of their production quality and as a result, cannot follow the EU's Traceability 
Regulations. Consequently, Pak Food believes that the EU market requires a cost margin 
in investment which is too high and might be unprofitable (Interview: 34,35). 
One of the CP Groups' most powerful firm strategies is the use of lobbyists both 
in the US and the EU markets. The CP Group does not make the identity of these 
lobbyists public, but admits that the lobbyists in the EU market get directly involved in 
the legislative process of the EU. They especially try to make contact with Commission 
officials who are involved in the decision-making process in technical commercial issues 
which may have an effect on the company. Apart from lobbying Commission officials, 
the lobbyists which the CP Group employs also communicate directly with Thai 
government agency representatives based in Brussels (Interview: 46). This process is 
designed to ensure that the CP Group as an exporter to the EU is given the highest 
priority by both the Commission and the Thai government agency representatives. The 
two main issues the lobbyists press for involve problems with certain EU exports and 
problematic standard EU requirements.( Interview: 50) 
By contrast, an interviewee from Sanguanwong Starch believes that Company 
does not possess such lobbying capabilities but instead makes use of special relationships 
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with their European customer client base to obtain some privileges very similar to 
lobbying. A German starch importer which converts starch into paper, for example, 
regularly passes on information about potentially problematic EU technical regulations to 
the Thai firm. Sanguanwong does not find that the lack of lobbying is too problematic, 
because it is exporting at almost its full capacity. However, the firm does admit that CAP 
regulations restrict them from exporting more raw starch, and that the firm is aware that 
its lack of lobbying capabilities make it impossible to make progress in this area. The 
interviewee said that the CAP restrictions were so restrictive that a month's EU quota 
was usually fulfilled in just a week of the company's maximum raw starch production 
capacity (Interview: 11). 
Pak Food, the seafood exporter, does not have any lobbying capabilities and does 
not have any special relationships with EU customers. Pak food officers currently say that 
the technical difficulty of exporting to the EU makes it unprofitable to expand their 
business in the EU. The firm's product line, unlike CP Group, is limited to seafood and is 
focused very strongly on frozen shrimp, in which the EU gives a very small quota. The 
current strategy ofPak Food is to stop expanding to the EU entirely and to focus on other 
markets which do not have market restrictions and do not have such strict standards. The 
EU market for Pak Food is not attractive, even compared to the US which requires the 
use of sea bonds 15 (Interview: 34). Sea bonds are a system the US uses to protect the 
import quota, whereby a percentage of sea bond purchase is required per each import, 
hence increasing the price for exporters and decreasing their competitiveness (Interview: 
35). 
The ep Group's distribution capabilities in the EU are very interesting and its 
strategies are very sophisticated in comparison to smaller firms such as Sanguanwong 
Starch and Pak Food. The firm plans to install a distribution centre in Spain for raw and 
frozen shrimp, due to Spain being the main importer of Thai shrimp (Interview: 36). 
Spain is known to either process or re-export the shrimp within the EU, and with the 
enlargement process, Spain is expected to be able to sell more shrimps to new members. 
15 The USA requires Thai companies to buy their sea bonds at the price of import tax. Then, the USA will 
reserve their right to keep the bond and ifthere are any rules broken by the company, the USA reserves 
their right to confiscate the bond. CP and several companies, therefore, are consulting about bringing this 
issue to the WTO. 
102 
--- .---- ------------------------------------------------------------
The distribution centre in Spain is designed to stock products from Thailand and get 
products ready to send to Spanish customers or even the rest of Europe as soon as it is 
required. Centring the distribution capabilities in a single country reduces logistical 
problems in distributing products to the rest of the EU (Interview: 27, 37). 
The CP Group also pushes products to discount stores and the hypermarket sector 
in the EU. CP Group explains that if the product push is successful it results in two very 
useful outcomes. First, the contracts to discount stores and hypermarkets are more long 
term. Second, it is a very useful way to promote its products directly to EU consumers 
and create a long-term customer base. The main CP Group hypermarket customers in the 
EU are Tesco-Lotus, Carrefour, Somerfield, Sainsbury and Iceland. The OK market 
demands ready-to-eat products in large amounts, and according to interviewees this firm 
strategy is very successful with UK consumers (Interview: 27, 28). 
The other main strategy adopted by CP Group is to maintain their space in 
competition as well as market share. CP still exported shrimps to the EU even when the 
GSP was removed and the firm has lost profits. The company believes that gaining a 
customer base in the EU is far more difficult and thus only useful for the distant future. 
CP, therefore, has chosen to remain in the market with profit loss while other Thai shrimp 
exporters withdrew from the EU market during that period. Consequently, when Thailand 
regained its GSP privileges, CP was the first company which was ready to fully re-enter 
the EU market (Interview:28). 
Moreover, CP also sees that some of the EU product requirements are tedious and 
complicated. There are only a few food exporters in Thailand which are able to meet the 
EU standards since they require a high cost in investment into all infrastructures, 
technologies, work practices and quality controls. Nonetheless, CP thinks that when the 
company can meet the requirements, it will upgrade the status of the company in the 
world market as a competent company with a high quality standard. CP, therefore, sees 
trading with the EU as a stable long-term commitment which is worth the investment. 
Furthermore, the EU shrimp market, the biggest shrimp consumer market in the world, 
still has a huge potential for CP to grow more (Interview:27, 29). 
CP's strategy, as a strongly influential exporting company in Thailand, is 
understandably more comprehensive and strategically deeper than that of Pak Food or 
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Sanguanwong Starch Company. Despite being respectable firms in their own right, Pak 
Food and Sanguanwong Starch Company are not classified among Thailand's top 100 
firms, unlike CP Food Group which is well in the top twenty. The relative simplicity of 
Pak Food and Sanguanwong Starch Company's strategies are clearly reflected in the 
contrast of their own strategies compared to the CP Group's strategies. 
Private Consultative Committees Strategies 
The Private Consultative Committees' duties and job description mandate that their key 
role is to acquire knowledge about the EO which is more comprehensive, when compared 
to the Thai firms which are strongly focused on the business side when dealing with the 
EO. The job description requires continual contact between officials of the committees 
and EO Commission officials, diplomats, and European firms. This contact means that 
officials in the consultative committees have acquired a very detailed understanding of 
the EO and how it works. The consultative committees give a much needed link between 
the government sector and firms. To be accurately described, the committees are 
independent bodies which are self established to facilitate firms and provide a better 
understanding of the private sector to the government (Private Consultative Committees 
document, 2003). These committees are not, therefore, simply established by the 
government sector as promotional units. Although the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) 
is under supervision by the Ministry of Industry, the government only acts as consultant, 
and these committees work independently (Interview: 26). 
The roles of the committees which have been assigned by the government have 
helped several exporters in generating new paths for Thai-EO trade relations. However, it 
seems their roles are not strong enough to intervene in the process of government policy 
making. Their roles are limited to support for new exporters and for established 
exporters who still need some support from government (Pitsamaicha, 2001: 48). The 
three main committees from the private sector, nevertheless are still a part of the 
commercial policy making process, and meetings between the Ministry of Commerce and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and committees from the private sector are seen by observers 
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as an important part of the Thai-EU commercial policy making process (Pitsamaicha, 
2001: 48). 
Private Consultative Committees have a duty to strengthen linkages between 
firms and the government. Therefore, as noted by one interviewee, their role is not to 
generate ideas for policies but to understand the needs and requirements from both firms 
and government and then link these two together (Interview: 20). Moreover, they are also 
responsible for connecting Thai firms to EU firms directly and also acting as a partner to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce when governments need 
representatives from the private sector (Pitsamaicha, 2001: 36). 
However, an economist from the FTI claims that Private Consultative Committees 
are a part of several policy making processes since the government needs to receive 
knowledge about firms and the private sector from these three main committees in order 
to produce policy relevant to the competence of Thai companies. Moreover, what the 
committee transfers to the government side will have a significant impact on the direction 
of policies. Therefore, there are some companies who find these organizations useful as a 
way to intervene in government policies (Interview: 17). 
The Private Consultative Committees have been established as groups focused on 
maximising Thailand's economic interest (Tinsulanonda: 1981). The role of the 
committees is seen by them as attempting to influence government policy, but the 
consequence of the influence is usually very low impact, despite their high expectations 
of themselves. There are several reasons that the committees cannot play a more 
important role in Thai politics and economy. From the perspective of the members of the 
committees from private sectors, they expect that Private Consultative Committees could 
play a more important part in solving problems, supporting trade and connecting the 
government and firms. The Private Consultative Committees also have demanded rights 
to make decisions on some important issues. However, the expectation from the 
government of the Private Consultative Committees' role is totally different (Wattana, 
2002, 70). The government has seen the committees as a link to understanding the firm 
and receiving all important information from the private sector, but not as a partner to 
solve problems and initiate ideas or policies (Wattana, 2002, 73). These contrasting 
opinions from two opposite sides have created difficulties for the Private Consultative 
105 
Committees in shaping the direction of the policies since they might cause conflicting 
policy prescriptions and prevent coordination between the government and private sector 
groups (Interview: 50) . 
Some prominent members of the private sector believe that the private sector 
committees are still unable to clearly perceive and follow their objectives since they see 
these organizations as 'coalitions' not as 'organizations' (Wattana, 2002, 80). This has 
had crucial effects on the perspective of the members (firms) towards the organization. 
Many firms have seen the organization of the private sector committees as only a 
coalition composed partly of government and partly of the private sector with them 
(firms) as key members. Thus, the committees are unable to deliver the strong linkage 
between the government and private sector that they promise, and thus unable to provide 
advantages to their firms and country (Laddawal, 1999,42). Most members (firms) in the 
committees, therefore, have not given sufficient co-operation to them and this has made 
the cooperation between the committees and the government more difficult (Interview: 
6). 
Policy Coordination 
When examining policy coordination in the Thai private sector to deal with the EU 
commercially, it is possible to identify three levels. The first level is concerned with 
policy coordination between firms and the government. The second level is between 
firms and Private Consultative Committees. The final level is between the Private 
Consultative Committees and the government. These three levels add up to how the 
private sector coordinates policy and strategy to maximise its ability to function 
effectively in Thai-EU commercial relations. As such they form a first criterion for 
judging the possibility of effective policy coordination. 
The second criterion to consider is that these three levels use either official 
(presented as Green lines in chart 4.4) or unofficial channels (presented as Blue lines in 
chart 4.4). Official channels, whereby guidelines are provided by the government to the 
public, are considered to be formal ways to interact with the Thai state and are usually 
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covered under legislation. Unofficial channels, on the other hand, are informal ways of 
interacting with the Thai state and the rules for interaction are usually ad hoc and 
dependent on personal connections. This section explains how the firms-government 
level makes use mostly of unofficial channels to influence policy or procedures. The two 
other levels, including 'firms to Private Consultative Committees' and 'Private 
Consultative Committees to government' use official channels given by the government 
to influence policy. 
Primary Relationship: Firm-Government 
The firm to government policy coordination level is extremely important in this study and 
is considered to be the primary relationship which needs to be analysed in full. Before 
going into details, an argument that needs to be explored is that policy coordination does 
not really have to exist. Firms and Private Consultative Committees are the main actors in 
the commercial relations between the EU and Thailand, and often feel that their strategies 
are designed to serve them most efficiently, especially when slow and bureaucratic 
government rules and regulations could be avoided. Powerful firms in Thailand such as 
CP Group have said that they would rather contact firms within the EU directly without 
going through the process of government and ministries because the MOC and some Thai 
ministries are known to be very slow to process work (see Chapter 3). CP Group usually 
tries to avoid all work and processes which will have to pass through the Thai 
bureaucracy since it will slow down everything and sometimes causes the company to 
lose their opportunity and benefits in business (Interview: 6,8). 
As noted in Chapter 3, most ministries still have characteristics of government 
organization which means (in the Thai context) low effectiveness and efficiency and 
extreme delays. These factors are difficult for firms since they slow the process and can 
create significant losses in business when the issue is urgent (Interview: 28). The 
coordination between the government sector and firms has been improved but from time 
to time weakness of government departments still creates difficulties for exporting firms 
rather than promoting their interests (Interview: 27). 
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One of the examples, presented by an interviewee from CP, is a case where CP 
Group asked the MOC to issue the Form A document to support new GSP (GSP gave 
import tax decrease from 12% to 4.2%) to export shrimp to the EU. The company would 
not be able to receive a new rate of GSP without this Form A. The MOC was one month 
slow in processing the Form A document which forced the company to pay 12% import 
tax instead of 4% and thus lose millions of Euros in that month. The MOC's explanation 
was that there is a procedure which takes a set time which is notified in advance to the 
firms, but that the firms do not take notice of this and usually send in requests at the last 
minute. 
Avoiding government rules and regulations is often not a choice and firms have 
learnt that it is best to have a good relationship with the government sector and officials 
within the ministries. Special relationships help to speed up required government rules 
and regulatory processes as well as to pressure the government to restructure government 
agencies to better suit the firms' needs (Interview: 46). A CP shrimp export division 
officer claims that help from the government sector does not give a significant increase in 
exporting to the EU at all. However, in the process of exporting to the EU, the firm needs 
to have strong connections with several ministries. This is not for promoting exports but 
to help the process work effectively without serious delay in any decision making from 
the government sector (Interview: 28). 
Thanwa, an economist from Kasetsart University, believes that most of the 
powerful export companies in Thailand have some sort of connection with the 
government, while Private Consultative Committees such as the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce do not play an especially important role in commercial policy making. The 
main actors who create the direction of the policy, apart from the government, mostly are 
powerful export companies. Especially, the government of Thaksin has emphasised 
strong links between the government and the most powerful companies in Thailand 
(Interview: 10). 
Top management officials of an EU export company explained that the strategy 
firms use to intervene in government policy is not officially informed or disclosed since it 
is the duty oftheir firm's board to discuss their demands with the government. The firm 
has a strong connection with both permanent government officials and politicians. 
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Politics in Thailand changes dynamically so most powerful firms also need to create 
connections with permanent government officers from relevant and important ministries 
as well. Therefore, the firms which receive the most effective help from the government 
are usually powerful companies (Interview: 48,50). At the level of policy, a CP Group 
officer denied that the firm has intervened in commercial policy in order to gain benefit 
for the firm. However, the officer knew that there are several commercial policies which 
importantly facilitate the direction of the firm strategies, but he is uncertain whether this 
is a direct effect from the lobbying of a senior board of the firm (Interview: 27). 
However, there is evidence to support this argument which wiJI be mentioned below. 
In this context, it is interesting that most of the interviewees who felt that tbe 
government was potentially not very helpful are junior operational level officers of firms. 
However, sources from the private consultative committee, ministries and media confirm 
that senior management of powerful firms such as CP Food Group are treated in a very 
special way by the government. This may mean that at the operational level, officers are 
mostly unaware of the continual assistance and support the government provides to firms 
with which tbey have special relationships. 
It may also be more than coincidence that after several interviews with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and firm officers (Interview: 13, 15), it was found that the 
MF A strategies are similar to the strategies being implemented by CP. Officers from the 
firms have confirmed that the strategies of the firms were genuinely initiated by the 
firms' needs, not from the needs of tbe government. The MFA claims that the strategies 
are a direct result of consultation between the MF A and Private Consultative 
Committees. There is reason to believe, however, that this consultation had little 
influence on the MF A' s strategies. Media sources say that powerful firms such as CP 
Group make very little use of Private Consultative Committees, so the similarity in 
strategy that can be seen between the MFA and CP Group could be a direct result of the 
co-ordination between the senior executives of CP with the government through informal 
channels (Interview: 49). 
A political journalist from also mentioned that 'The CP never pursues its interest 
through official methods such as other smaller firms do. If the CP requires anything, CP 
will certainly have it and no-one will know exactly how those policies derived. There was 
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one occasion that I talked to officers from Ministry of Public Health to receive a notice 
that chicken meat is now safe from Avian Flu and perfectly safe to be consumed. The 
MOPH asked me to publish the notice as soon as possible and in the evening of the same 
day, PR from CP just called me and asked if I had received the notice from MOPH yet.' 
(Interview'. 49). 
The Thaksin government is currently considered as the government which has had 
the strongest connection with the CP firm. At the operational level, both junior 
management at firms and civil servants at the ministries mostly conduct day-to-day 
activities and are not told to use any obvious unofficial channels. The government sector 
is continually trying to improve the bureaucracy and to modernise the ministries. The 
government of Thaksin tried to modernise and reorganise the whole system of all 
government organizations. This, however, included closing down several Thai 
commercial representative offices in several ED countries. The government claimed that 
minimizing costs was one of their most important tasks since the previous government 
overspent the budget. Moreover, the government believed that restructuring all 
government organizations and cost cutting would help the bureaucracy to work more 
effectively. Therefore, they closed a number of commercial diplomatic offices of 
Thailand abroad and aimed to transfer some tasks to consulting firms and trading firms 
(MOC document 2005). This move was strongly opposed by government officials 
themselves. An official at the MOC's Department of Negotiation believes that reducing 
commercial diplomatic office of Thailand in some countries has created difficulties for 
Thailand's exporting firms (Interview: 16, 32). They claimed that the government 
ministries still lack knowledge in accessing the ED market's new members. The new 
additions to the ED from the recent enlargement process are countries which will also be 
a valuable market for Thailand's exports and investment. Therefore, having the 
commercial representative offices in the ED closed can result in a negative effect for both 
governments and small export firms rather than giving any positive impact to any Thai 
firms or Thai ministries (Interview: 16,45). 
Recent changes in Thai politics also show how dynamics in Thai politics can 
cause some very serious effects for policy coordination between firms and government. 
Several ministers and politicians in the government of Prime Minister Thaksin had strong 
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connections with firms and also several of them had owned many powerful export firms 
in Thailand(Interview: 26). Therefore, Thaksin's governrnent was an age in which 
commercial policies may have been abused to give advantages to politicians in the 
government party (Interview: 26). The competitive situation in Thailand was significantly 
changed in some business sectors and it also had a negative impact on many powerful 
export companies. For instance, in Thaksin's cabinet, the Minister of Agriculture owned 
a tapioca company and the Minister of Industry owned a car part export company. Their 
companies gained significant competitiveness after they had been in their posts for only a 
few months. Sanguanwong Starch Company, originally a major Thai tapioca exporter to 
the EU, quickly lost their ability to compete at one stage because of a controversial 
commercial policy on starch subsidies which prevented them from accessing low cost 
resources (Interview: 40). 
The policy restructuring of certain governments such as the Thaksin 
administration has brought both positive and negative effects to Thai bureaucracy. Severe 
problems which have been a main obstacle for both Thai firms and Private Consultative 
Committees or even between cooperating ministries, still exist and have not been solved. 
There were complaints from officers from the MOC that in some divisions and ministries 
such as the MF A, officials rotate duties and expertise every 2-4 years and sometimes as 
quickly as 5 months. This has created difficulties in co-ordination because the officers in 
the respective divisions will not have expertise in the area they are working in. This has 
resulted in delays and weak understanding in policy making (Interview: 45). It is the view 
of some government officials that since the government of Thaksin, there have been 
significant changes of structure within the organization and linkages between private 
sector and government sector. The Thaksin government transferred more power from the 
government sector to the private sector since they believed that in the area of commercial 
issues, the private sector could produce a more effective result. The Thaksin government 
also agreed that the private sector has a more significant role in commercial policy 
making (Interview: 39). 
One of the most recent and best illustrations of this primary relationship (firm-
government) is the avian flu crisis which occurred in early 2004. When the news of avian 
flu broke, it quickly became a national crisis. In 2003, Thailand was the fourth largest 
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exporter of poultry in the word, and up to 90% of Thai chicken production is exported, 
mainly to the EU and Japan (Thai Broiler Association 2003). The fall out from the crisis 
was estimated at 30 million Baht ($763,000) (The Bangkok Post, 6th February 2004). CP 
Group's stock immediately fell by 12.5% and affected the entire Thai business 
community (Bangkok Post, 6th February 2004). CP quickly announced that birds on its 
farms had not become infected by the avian virus and put immediate pressure on the 
government to make this known to its main export markets such as the EU «The 
Bangkok Post, 6th February 2004: 39). The firm claimed that precautionary measures and 
its up to standard chicken farms were located in an area distant from the reach of wild 
birds that carried the virus. Dr. Hans Wagner, a senior regional officer (Bangkok) of the 
U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization, gave additional support to CP's claim that 
their farms were safe. He also announced that enclosed factory farms such as the ones CP 
had, were one of the best methods to prevent the dispersal of the deadly viruses. CP 
simultaneously launched advertisement campaigns through various media to guarantee 
safety of its food products and regain consumer trust. This campaign to ensure the safety 
of CP's poultry produce was reported to cost over 22.2 million 
bahtI6(www.icmr.icfai.org). 
During this period, CP Group worked very closely with the government to ensure 
to the public that its poultry was also viable for exports. Some commentators have gone 
as far as to assert how 'the story of the avian flu outbreak in Thailand reveals how 
agribusiness, and CP in particular, managed to influence the political leaders to make 
sure that the government defended the interests of the export industry before protecting 
consumers' and producers' rights' (Chanyapate: on the Global South, 20th April 2004). 
According to a Ministry of Commerce official as well as a Thai journalist, CP put 
additional pressure on the government to contact EU officials to travel to Thailand and 
confirm that CP's poultry was safe. This resulted in the EU allowing export ofCP poultry 
while continuing to place a ban on other Thai poultry companies which had not been 
strictly examined (Interview: 38, 46). The close relationship between CP Group and the 
Thaksin government in 2004 in resolving the problem of poultry exports to the EU as 
16 http://www.icmr.icfai.org/casestudies/catalogue!Business%20StrategyZ/Charoen%20Pokphand.htm 
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well as local and international perception shows how the firm to government relationship 
is absolutely critical in solving serious commercial problems. 
Secondary Relationships: 'Firm to Private Consultative Committee' 
and 'Private Consultative Committee to Government' 
Due to the nature of the Thai policy-making process 'Firm to Private Consultative 
Committee' and 'Private Consultative Committee to Government' are, by design, 
secondary in importance to the government to firm relationship. The co-operation 
between Firm-Private Consultative Committee has been mentioned in general in the first 
part of this chapter which explained how firms can work through the Private Consultative 
Committees. Moreover, the chart of Policy Coordination and Policy Influence Channels 
presented the co-operation between Private Consultative Committee to Government 
through the orange arrows in the charts. The chart shows that the Private Consultative 
Committees are designed to be the main representative for firms and work alongside the 
government. The orange arrows also show that the power has been transferred directly 
from the cabinet, which is considered to be the most powerful actor. From this, it can be 
implied that the Private Consultative Committees were initially created to be a powerful 
partner of the government in the policy making process. 
The secondary relationships, firm to Private Consultative Committee and Private 
Consultative Committee to government, suffer from the Private Consultative 
Committees' relegation to a less important position in the relationships. More recently, 
the Thaksin administration initiated an increased number of important meetings in policy 
decision making which included Private Consultative Committees as a main participant at 
the meeting. The initial view on the role of the Private Consultative Committees is, 
however, not promising. The aim of the Private Consultative Committees which is to 
initiate co-operation, meetings, and process all tasks by focusing on the co-operation 
between government and private sector, is not successful since the government sector still 
has not received sufficient co-operation from firms. With firms reluctant to cooperate 
with the government under the framework in which Private Consultative Committees 
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have been set up, the primary role of the Private Consultative Committees is strongly 
undermined (Interview: 16, 17). 
Under the structure of each committee, there is a group oftrade associations who 
are the member of each committee organization. In each trade association (called 
'industrial club' as in the chart 4.1), there is a chair of the association who is mostly from 
the powerful firm in that trade association. The meeting in each trade association 
normally occurs once or twice a month depending on the issue. If there is an important 
issue which holds the most common interest of the association, the issue will be raised in 
a meeting with officers from the PCC committees. During this process, there is a belief 
that there might be political issues within the related associations with the most powerful 
firms in the trade association tending to be able to select the issues which the association 
will represent. The selected issue will be presented by representatives of each committee 
in the meeting with Ministry in the process of policy making. 
During the government of Thaksin, the extent of co-operation between the 
government and the Private Consultative Committees was negligible. The government set 
up a process which was called 'pp Dialogue' which is a bottom-up process when 
compared to the previous pattern of co-operation which relied more on orders relayed 
from the top . In the pp Dialogue, top government officials worked much more closely 
with individual officers from the Private Consultative Committees before generating 
policy. According to an Officer from MOC, the government of Thaksin had closer 
relations with the private sector as demonstrated in the PP Dialogue where officials from 
the government side join in the meeting of the Private Consultative Committees in order 
to generate ideas and thoughts right from the beginning of the process(Interview: 17). If 
the issue is urgent, it will be forwarded directly to the government without passing 
through the whole process of meetings with ministries. This demonstrates how 
governments coordinate with firms to generate ideas and aware of their needs. 
At the Private Consultative Committee to firm coordination level, it appears that 
firms may not be putting a lot of trust into the Private Consultative Committees. Two 
interviewees, who work for one important seafood export company, Claim that the roles 
of these three Private Consultative Committees are insignificant for firms. Especially 
when the firms are considered to be very powerful in Thailand (as is the company they 
114 
work for or firms such as CP which are very powerful in Thailand), the firms will view 
the organizations as just a government programme and stage for firms to speak but the 
consequence of the action from these organizations rarely brings any change in policy or 
benefit to them at all (Interview: 51, 52). Furthermore, one interviewee pointed out an 
irony in the way firms might be able to coordinate with Private Consultative Committees. 
While powerful firms find the Private Consultative Committees to have too little 
influence and power to ask for assistance, at the same time, small firms find that they 
have too little power to ask for the attention of Private Consultative Committees. 
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Conclusion 
There are two ways to look at the Thai-EU commercial relationship and the way it has 
developed through the views of the Thai private sector. One way is to look at the EU and 
how the unique nature of the EU forces the Thai private sector to act. The second way is 
to look inside Thailand and analyse the way that the Thai private sector interacts within 
itself and with government. 
The unique nature of the EU is both a challenging opportunity and an obstacle. 
The strict rules and regulations set by the EU mean that firms are forced to prove that 
their standards are high enough to compete in the European market with very demanding 
consumers. Being able to export competitively to the EU provides the firms with a higher 
profile in the international business community. Increasing competitiveness is not only 
about standards, but is also about diversifying products and competing in value-added 
products instead of just raw products. This responds to the needs of EU consumers as 
well as helping Thai firms to avoid direct competition with neighbouring developing 
country competitors such as Vietnam. 
In some cases, the challenges the EU presents as a unique market may mean that 
Thai firms choose to leave the complex rules and regulations the EU sets, as is the case 
with Pak Food, and focus on other markets. Pak Food has found that its production 
capabilities and the strict standards the EU has set for products makes the EU market not 
as profitable as other markets. This is a potential problem for Thai-EU commercial 
relations, because trends are that Thai businesses seem to be focusing more on the 
ASEAN and Asian markets. 
The question of who to talk to when dealing with the EU has also been partly 
solved by the Thai private sector and seems to be a critical part of Thai-EU commercial 
relationship development. Talking to a very unique EU can be done in several ways, and 
the Thai private sector has adopted its own ways of doing this. The first way is to deal 
with the EU firms directly. In some cases like with Sanguanwong Starch Company, Thai 
and EU firms have created such strong links that the European firms give direct 
assistance to the Thai firms, and effectively provide Thai firms with any understanding 
required to operate in the European market. CP Food Group has also developed a similar 
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concept by talking directly to firms such as supermarkets and obtaining long term 
contracts for export of agricultural products. CP Food Group also uses its own lobbyists 
to talk to Commission officials to make sure that the firm has the highest priority possible 
as an exporter. 
The second way to talk to the EU is for Thai firms to talk through the government 
sector and Private Consultative Committees. Apart from being the link between the Thai 
government and Thai firms, Private Consultative Committees give an extra 
communication channel with the EU to Thai firms and the many meetings the committees 
have with EU firms and officials are useful in providing further understanding of how the 
EU operates. 
The third way the Thai private sector can talk to the EU is through lobbying the 
Thai government. Thai firms as well the Private Consultative Committees lobby 
government, ministries, and Thai missions in Brussels on commercial issues, which 
often require the development of policy. More often, the lobbying takes place at a late 
stage during trading problems with the EU and Thai firms put pressure on the Thai 
government and official missions to solve their problems. This has happened in the case 
of shrimp contamination, poultry, and GSP limitations which the EU has put on Thai 
exports. In cases like this, the Thai firms have found it most effective to seek the help of 
the government sector in talking to the EU and solving the problems. 
In many ways, the Thai private sector can act with considerable autonomy in 
relations with the EU. As the independence in many areas of large firms shows, these 
firms can act independently to achieve their own goals in many situations. The case of CP 
Food Group shows how the government sector can be as much an obstacle as it can be a 
facilitator to exports of Thai agricultural products. The Thai bureaucracy, which is known 
to be slow, ineffective, and often corrupt, is something operational level officers normally 
want to avoid when they can. 
This may not be true with larger firms with more influence in the government. 
The CP Food Group and its influence with the government, especially the recent Thaksin 
government, may be able to actively use its senior management to shift policy the way it 
wants to. It is very surprising how the policy paper for Thai-EU commercial relations 
from the Thai Foreign Ministry was almost the same as the CP Food Group's published 
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strategy (MF A document: 2006). It is also surprising how operational level officers at 
the Thai Foreign Ministry and CP Food Group were not aware how similar the Foreign 
Ministry's policy papers were to the CP Food Group's strategy. In the interviews 
conducted, however, the academics, media, and professional were aU equaUy aware how 
influential the CP Food Group is in the very highest levels of the Thai government. 
Thai Private Consultative Committees provide some expertise in general issues of 
commercial relations and a link between the government and the private sector. It is 
questionable how well they perform this duty, because their duties are very vaguely 
defined and both the government and firms have different expectations of what the 
committees are for. The firms want a more positive role for the Private Consultative 
Committees and want the committees to be able to decide and execute some key policies. 
The government instead sees the Private Consultative Committees as existing only to 
give information and limits the role of the committees. 
The private consultative committees' true value should be to provide 
communication and understanding between the government and the firms. In the 
conducted interviews, it can be seen that the committee officials feel themselves as half-
government, half-firm working for the best commercial interest of Thailand. If fully 
utilised, private consultative committee could be a very valuable asset to the Thai private 
sector because they could mediate between the government and the firm with the goal of 
optimizing Thailand's opportunity in the global market. The way the Private Consultative 
Committees are being used to date, it is not fulfilling their own potential. 
This study of the Thai private sector also provides significant support for the 
corporatist framework advanced in the thesis. The behaviour of certain firms in 
influencing government policy shows how certain groups in society may have the power 
to strongly influence the economic and political system (Wiarda 1997: IX). This ability to 
influence policy also supports Schmitter's definition that corporatism can be defined as a 
system of interest representation (1997: 13) and WilIiamson's arguments about interest 
intermediation (1989: 14). Apart from the role of corporatism which seems to have 
matured in Thailand under the Thaksin government, the thesis of the 'retreat' of the state 
(Strange, 1996) may also be supported in some degree. The growing independence of 
certain Thai firms and their ability to act independently of the Thai government is a sign 
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that economic enterprises may really have received additional focus in transnational 
relations, over the state or even international organizations. But there is also evidence that 
some of the relationships between Thai firms and governments represent forms of 
collusion rather than the coordination of broader interests, and this cluster of issues will 
be pursued in the Conclusions. 
j' 
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Conclusion 
Actors and Effectiveness in Thai~EU Commercial Relations 
This research has tried to find out who the most significant actors are in Thailand's 
external commercial policy as well as which actors have shown the most effective 
performance and how the actors relate to each other. In chapter I it was noted that most 
work on Thai external commercial policy focuses on how the state is the main actor in 
making policies. The effectiveness of Thailand's external policy is thus measured by how 
effectively the state can do its work. This research has gone further into analysing Thai 
external commercial policy by considering the role of firms and Private Consultative 
Committees in addition to the state, so that we have a more far-reaching understanding of 
how Thai external commercial policy is made. 
The previous chapters have tried to provide a clear picture of Thailand's role in 
the global political economy as well as how Thai actors see commercial policy as a part 
of the national interest. The research began by proposing that in Thailand, the state, firms, 
and private consultative committees work together to create external commercial policy 
under the environment of corporatism. In corporatism, trade associations are seen as the 
most important actors in influencing the working characteristics of the state and firm by 
encouraging good governance in the making of external commercial policies. Therefore, 
these three types of actors working together would explain how Thailand's external 
commercial policies are made. 
The research then explained why the EU can be seen as a good case study for 
Thailand's external trade policy-making because it is a powerful actor in the global 
economy which is also influential and complicated. It was explained that the EU's 
complex institutions and policy-making can provide a good measure of how well Thai 
actors are able to cope with such a difficult challenge. The history of EU-Thailand 
commercial relations was then analysed to reveal that Thailand has had a difficult series 
of trade conflicts with the EU. 
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Analysis of primary and secondary sources later revealed that both the Thai state, 
divided into the government and the bureaucratic civil service, and firms have had to deal 
with the EU's complexity through the use of their own distinctive strategies. The analysis 
also showed how both the state and Thai firms have had a lot of difficulty in maximising 
their own interest and how the two actors sometimes have to collaborate with each other 
to obtain specific goals. According to ideas of corporatism, the Private Consultative 
Committees should have been able to mediate the communication between the Thai state 
and Thai firms, but the evidence shows that state policies and firm strategies have not 
always followed the same course. The evidence from private consultative committees 
clearly shows that they achieve only limited success in their role to communicate 
between the state and the firm. 
There are a number of issues which need to be analysed in these conclusions. First 
of all, the Thai-EU commercial partnership needs to be considered again to see where the 
trade conflicts have mainly started from and what the causes are for these problems 
between the partners. Secondly, the role of the Thai state, Thai firms, and the private 
consultative committees will be examined to explore the differences between external 
commercial policies formulated by the state, firms' strategies in exporting to the EU, and 
the attempts by Private Consultative Committees to exercise influence. Thirdly, the 
effectiveness of each Thai actor's strategies will be analysed to show how conflict can 
arise within the Thai bureaucracy and between state and firm strategies, and whether the 
ineffectiveness of the private consultative committees may lead to informal and indirect 
collusion between powerful Thai firms and the Thai state. 
The final issue which needs to be examined is whether corporatism is the correct 
conceptual framework to assess Thailand's external commercial policy-making process. 
This research proposed corporatism as an explanation for Thailand's commercial policy-
making process as it affects small and powerless firms, but this may not be the same for 
larger firms. The case study of the Thai-EU commercial partnership shows how the 
Private Consultative Committees may have been ineffective in their role as trade 
associations, leading to direct consultation between the state and firms. This uncovers a 
limitation in corporatism's argument, which cannot fully explain why the Private 
Consultative Committee's role has sometimes become limited. This research finally 
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argues that clientelism, which argues for a collusive relationship between the state and 
Thailand's powerful and affluent firms which does not go through official channels, but 
instead makes use of a patron-client relationship, might provide a more persuasive 
explanation. This appears to be particularly relevant in Thailand's most recent democratic 
government, led by Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai party. 
The Roots of Thai-EU Trade Conflict 
Evidence in Chapters 2 to 4 showed that Thailand and the EU have been involved in 
several cases of trade conflict. It is important to understand why these trade conflicts can 
happen before an analysis can be made of who the main facilitating actors are in the Thai-
EU commercial partnership and how effectively they might perform in policy-making 
and creating strategies for exports. The evidence from the previous chapters also shows 
that Thailand's trade conflicts with the EU can be derived from changes in Thailand's 
economic progress, Thai small firms' lack of competitiveness, and the EU's strategy of 
limiting imports through covert and overt barriers. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that Thailand's fluctuating economic progress 
created changes in the trade deficit the EU experienced against Thailand and is one of the 
most important roots of the Thai-EU trade conflicts. Between 1986 and 1987, for 
example, the Thai baht's value decreased due to the global economic downturn caused a 
strong growth in the trade surplus of Thai exports to the EC (Suvimol, 1990, 87). This 
quickly caused trade conflicts in several areas of Thailand's agricultural exports 
including textiles, tapioca, tuna, and shrimp (Suvimol, 1990, 88). In 1992, the area of 
conflict also expanded to pirated cassette tapes which the European Commission claimed 
were causing 'material injuries' to the European music industry (Matipong, 1995, 132). It 
is probably not a coincidence that at another major period of Thailand's economic 
downturn and the Baht's value decrease, in 1997, the EU decided to graduate Thailand 
from its GSP scheme. This cut down Thai shrimp exports by 50% and started another 
round of conflict and negotiations between the EU and Thailand (Thai Shrimp 
Association Document: 200 I). 
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Thai small firms have also admitted that they are unable to conform to the very 
high export standards imposed by the EU, and some minor and unethical Thai firms have 
turned to cheating to avoid these standards. An example is in 2002 when chloramphenicol 
and nitrofurans, considered dangerous chemicals, were found in Thai shrimps sold in the 
Netherlands (Market Report: Food market Exchange Jan 312003). This caused the EU to 
implement a 'zero tolerance' food safety policy on Thai goods and to start a 100% 
inspection of Thai shrimp products within the EU (Bangkok Post: 1st Jan 2003). A similar 
case which is seen in the EU's cutting of Thailand's GSP also happened when frozen 
chicken imports from Thailand were found to contain contaminants and chemical 
substances. 
In chapter 3, it was mentioned that the EU's use of its GSP scheme can also be 
considered as a system of hidden trade barriers. Whether the EU has been fair or not can 
be seen by examining whether the act of cutting GSPs is discriminatory or not, and how 
certain cases have been to a GATT dispute panel, and Thailand managed to win their 
case. The Thais considered the cutting of Thailand's shrimp GSP in 1997 very unfair, 
especially since other large shrimp exporters including Ecuador, India, Bangladesh, and 
Indonesia continue to benefit from the EU's GSP granting (Bangkok Post October 16 
2002). This was a good example of discrimination since other leading shrimp exporter' 
GSP privileges gave them an unfair advantage over Thai shrimp exports. Another 
instance of trade barriers occurred in 1994 when Thailand brought on an ongoing canned 
tuna dispute to GATT, arguing that the EU had acted unfairly by imposing a quota on 
canned tuna from Thailand. The GATT ruling was eventually made in favour of Thailand 
on the 1st of January 1997, and the EU was forced to abolish this canned tuna quota 
(MOC Document:1998) 
State Policies, Firm Strategies, and PCC Mediation 
Findings from the research on the Thai-EU commercial relationship can show that 
Thailand's external commercial policy is not always cohesive. This section argues that 
there three separate directions can be identified. The state generates formal external 
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policies as well as entering into formal written agreements with the EU, and creates basic 
guidelines for how Thai-EU commercial relations should be created. The firm, however, 
has distinctive strategies which do not necessarily follow the basic guidelines offered by 
the formal external policies written by the government. Firms conduct strategies 
according to what they feel would gain the most benefits for themselves. Finally, the 
PCC's role is to mediate and strengthen linkage in relations between the state and firms. 
On the most basic level, if we want to know how the Thai-EU commercial 
partnership is doing, external commercial policies designed by the state can form the best 
guide. Thai state policies are designed at two levels, and which level holds the most 
importance is arguable. The first level is the government level, which creates policies and 
strategies for Thailand's external commercial policy. The second level is the bureaucratic 
civil service level, which takes the government's policies and strategic guidelines and 
conducts the policies on a practical level. At the second level, this research has argued 
that the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce have the most 
important roles in dealing with the EU. This research has also found that the Ministry of 
Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture have secondary roles in dealing with regulations, 
but usually have little to do with influencing policy. 
At the government level, it is usually accepted that policies within the Thai 
bureaucracy will change once a newly elected government comes in (Chumpol 
1985:114). Thailand has changed Prime Minister eight times over the past two decades, 
and though each of the governments has provided general guidelines on international 
trade, none of them have entered into specific details on how Thailand should deal with 
the EU. This is perhaps with the notable exception of Thaksin Shinawatra government, 
which has managed the government in a very business-centred way and eagerly visited 
many European countries to try to sign trade agreements. (interview: 12) This strategy 
has not yielded any visible results, although it has encouraged the Thai civil service to 
adjust their own strategies to suit this business management style (Interview: 12,13). 
The civil service level is the area where visible strategies and policies are 
proposed and finalised (Pongmukkapat 1993: 95). The Thai MFA and the MOC, 
considered to be Thailand's most prestigious ministries, work closely together with the 
European Commission in several meetings for many purposes (Panichapak, 2003, 
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Tanapornpan, 1989). During the past two decades of the Thai partnership with the EU, 
the aim has been mainly to settle trade conflicts and disputes on behalf of the various 
countries. Lately, the MFA and the MOC have also been involved with the EU in trying 
to finalise a bilateral framework agreement, although there have been problems in 
accepting the final draft so far. The MFA and the MOC are also responsible for entering 
into negotiations with the European Commission within ASEM, which is another place 
where policy direction between Thailand and the EU can be generated (Interview: I) 
A focus on the state, however, only provides a partial view of how Thailand wants 
its relationship with the EU to develop, and stresses a negotiated view of Thailand's 
relationship with the EU. Thailand's macro strategy at the present gives some importance 
to the EU, but tries very hard not to be dependent on the EU's economic power 
(Interview: 3). This has turned Thailand's external commercial policy focus on to 
ASEAN as well as India and away from the EU (Interview: 6). 
The state's policy and policy-making procedures can be seen as a good way to 
know where Thailand wants its overall relationship with the EU to go, but Thai firms' 
strategies are a better indicator of where the policy is going and how it will be adopted in 
reality. This research has found that firms usually do not follow the government's 
guidelines and manage instead to create firm-centred strategies which are most beneficial 
for the firm's survival in international trade. One of the reasons for this is that firms view 
the EU as just another market, and use practical trade strategies in order to gain access to 
the EU by ignoring any side effects in the long term which may happen to other Thai 
business sector or competitors in Thailand or to farmers in Thailand. Thus it can be 
argued that Thai firms only concern themselves with what they need to know in order to 
gain access to the EU's market. Therefore, their strategies are frequently effective and 
efficient but might generate some negative impacts for the nation or sometimes for 
themselves in the long run as was mentioned in chapter 4 in respect of the Thai Bankers 
Association. 
Firms main strategies are microeconomic, and focus on channels to improve 
Thailand's exports to the EU. This also includes Thailand's marketing towards the EU to 
promote Thai exports, and to provide further channels of understanding about Thailand's 
products. Some Thai firms, such as Sanguanwong Starch, make use of personal 
126 
friendships with EU firms in order to create further channels and often to avoid the EU's 
complex procedures (Interview: 11). Bigger firms such as ep Group actually make use of 
lobbyists within the EU market, some of which get directly involved in the legislative 
process of the EU (Interview: 49). This is especially true for the issues surrounding 
certain EU exports and problematic EU standards requirements which the ep Group feels 
are pressing issues (Interview: 48). ep Group also benefits from its very extensive 
distribution capabilities, and can formulate sophisticated strategies to enter the European 
market. 
While the Thai state and Thai firms have their own distinctive ways of accessing 
EU markets, this research has found that the role ofthe pees is at best secondary or even 
marginal. At first, it can be argued that playing just a supporting role is probably what the 
pee has been created for. The interviews, however, showed that the pee, who see 
themselves as trade associations, do not feel that their role is secondary. With the 
interviews in mind, it also appears that the role of the pees is similar to trade 
associations, who according to the literature on corporatism, are extremely important in 
influencing the policies formed in collaboration between state and firms. 
In principle, the pee's role in Thailand's external commercial policy making is 
extremely important. They were originally established'as independent bodies to facilitate 
firms and provide a better understanding of the private sector to the state, although their 
independence is sometimes in doubt because they were actually created by the 
government. When dealing with the EU, the pee is the actor which is required to have 
extensive knowledge about the EU as well as of Thai firms and the Thai state. This is 
because the pee has the duty to form friendly relations and maintain contact between the 
Thai state, Thai firms, and the EU commission officials, diplomats and European firms. 
The pees claim that their main strategy is to strengthen linkages between the 
firm and the state. It is not to generate ideas for policies or to initiate policy in any way 
(Peganun 1996: 48). This means that the pees spend most of their time in trying to 
understand the needs and requirements from both firms and government and then 
providing means of/inking these two together (Wattana, 2002:28). The pecs argue that 
their roles are very important and that they retain a role in policy-making process because 
the state needs to receive as much knowledge as possible about firms and the private 
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sector In order to make policies which are relevant for the competence of Thai 
companies. This means that the PCCs see themselves as organizations which have a 
significant impact on policies. This has also led to some firms making use of lobbying 
with the PCC to influence state policy (Interview: 17). 
This section shows that there is a 'vision' of Thai external commercial policy 
given by the state, practical strategies conducted by firms, and a struggle to fulfil this 
important role of mediating between state and firms by PCCs. The next section discusses 
the effectiveness of these actors in their respective roles. 
The effectiveness of Thai actors in the policy-making process. 
When an analysis of Thai trade problems with the EU is made, the main problems seem 
to stem from two basic factors. The first factor is Thailand's - that is the Thai state's -
ability to compete and to be effective in competition in the global market. The second 
factor is that the EU might be sometimes seen as a difficult partner because of its 
complex institutional structure as well as its tendency to become protectionist in relation 
to its market. This means that Thai actors have had to pursue a two-pronged strategy in 
dealing with the EU. The first strategy is trying to adjust state policies and negotiating 
position to cope with the EU's complexity and sometimes protectionist ways. The other is 
to adjust firm strategies so they can be more effective in competing in the EU's market. 
Evidence in chapters two to four shows that both the private sector and Thai 
goverments have gone for a mainly problem-solving and practical strategy to deal with 
the EU. This means that they wait for problems to happen and then try to solve the 
problems when they take place. If problems do not take place, Thai actors might just 
continue using any practical strategy without having advanced planning to take advantage 
of their partnership with the EU. Overall, the evidence shows that Thai actors have not 
been notably effective or forward-looking in their commercial relationship with the EU, 
and this is due to several reasons. 
The first reason is because there is an internal conflict among the actors within the 
Thai bureaucratic civil service. The previous section showed how, in the state structure, 
the civil service has a very important role in creating and implementing policy. While 
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governments come and go, civil servants remain in position for several decades and are 
able to carry on policies for a long time. 
The key bureaucrats in Thailand's external commercial policy-making with the 
EU are the MF A and the MOC. During the interviews conducted with civil servants 
within these two organizations, the lack of coordination and correspondence of policies 
between the bureaucratic organizations was very clear. The MF A has traditionally been 
responsible for international relations with the EU, but recent trends in Thai foreign 
policy have forced the MFA to adapt and become more proactive in Thailand 
international trade relations. The MFA civil servants are normally generalists in 
international relations, and few have specific training in international trade issues or 
economics (Interview: 1,3). The MF A civil servants, however, are normally accepted as 
the primary contact for any important issues between Thailand and international partners 
(Interview: 1, 6). On the other hand, the MOC civil servants are trained experts in issues 
of commerce as well as international trade and deal with technical issues about trade, 
tariff and regulation. They are not, however, international relations experts and are not 
normally knowledgeable about diplomatic protocols, communication channels, and have 
few international contacts at a high level ( Interview: 31, 14). This puts the MFA in a 
position as those who know most about the outside world, and the MOC as those who 
know the most about technical trade issues (Interview: 6,7). 
It is clear that both skills are needed, but this separation of skills into two different 
ministries has caused difficulties in policy coordination and correspondence between the 
two bureaucracies. During the interviews, both organizations claimed with a strong 
degree of certainty to be the key actor in the state sector in conducting external 
commercial policies. This was to such an extent that MF A actors would note how the 
MOC were unable to communicate their technical demands to the EU without the MFA's 
help in lobbying at the high level. The MOC, on the other hand, said that the MFA's 
'general' expertise and constant rotation of officials between departments forced the 
MOC to have to begin briefing to the MFA from the basics again every few years. As a 
consequence of this inherent power play and the separation of skills between the two 
ministries, Thailand's external commercial policies towards the EU has heen far from 
effective, insightful, or forward-thinking (Interview: 6). 
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The second problem in the Thai policy-making process is the lack of coordination 
between state policies and firms' implementation of their own strategies. The previous 
section argued that state policies showed a 'vision' of where Thailand wants its trade 
relations to go, while firm strategies showed where the trade relations actually are and 
how they are implemented. In other words, the Thai state and Thai firms can be perceived 
to be going in completely different directions, a process which can't be effective since the 
two most important actors are not working together. 
It was mentioned in chapter 3 and chapter 4 that the analysis of the interviews 
conducted with the state actors and with firms exporting to the EU shows that the general 
attitude of Thai firms towards the state is negative, especially for those medium and small 
Thai firms which do rely on state policies to create openings within the EU market for 
them but the interviews with small and medium firms show that assistance from the 
government or useful advice are severely deficient. When compared to the assistance the 
state gives to large firms such as CP, small firms explain that they receive delayed 
assistance as well as little priority from the state (Interview: 34, 35). 
This is not to say that the state is useless to Thai firms, but it has resulted in a 
habit of problem-solving only when problems occur, instead of a habit of insightful and 
forward-thinking policies. Small Thai firms, therefore, usually must face trade crisis 
before the state will be able to understand a problem and provide a correct assistance for 
the industry in general. Another use small and medium Thai firms have for the state 
actors is in receiving information about the EU as well as some aspects of communication 
with EU officials. This particularly includes complicated rules and regulations as well as 
technical trade issues which are usually sent and archived by the MF A. The MFA then 
plays an important role in disseminating this information. 
An important issue to note is how this problem of state to firm accessibility 
changes according to the size of the firm. For larger firms such as CP, senior 
management within the firm can actually gain almost unlimited access to key government 
figures. This has been particularly true during the Thaksin government, when the 
government and large firms have been known to have very close ties to each other. One 
of the findings in this thesis, providing evidence of this intimate linkage between 
powerful firm and government, is how the secret MF A external commercial policy 
130 
documents had mission statements which coincided almost word for word with the CP 
Group's strategy for gaining market access to the EU (MFA document 2006, CP 
document 2006). 
The third problem in Thai external commercial policy-making is the lack of trade 
associations to mediate and communicate between states to firms and firms to the state. 
The evidence presented in chapters 2 and chapter 4 points towards a different role by the 
PCCs. While they have been designated as independent bodies established to facilitate 
firms and provide a better understanding of the private sector to the government (PCC 
1981), the PCCs' role has not been as strong as that of trade associations in Western 
capitalist societies. The PCCs' role has turned out to be that of supporting new exporters 
as well as small exporters who need some support from the government (Peganun 1996: 
48). 
Moreover, there has been evidence of the limitation of the PCCs' roles in chapter 
4. First, the PCCs have not been given rights to make decisions on important issues. The 
Thai state sees the PCCs as consultative bodies, only to provide additional information, 
not as an equal partner in policy formation. Secondly, firms expect more from the PCCs 
than they have the capability to provide. This has resulted in the PCCs sometimes being 
seen as 'useless' and just another mechanism for the government to gain information 
from firms through the PCCs (Interview: 3). Thirdly, the PCCs roles are delivered 
themselves as just a coalition, instead of being a formal organization. Firms see the PCCs 
as coalitions of partially state and partially private sector actors, while firms are the main 
members. This particular image of the PCC as an organization means that they cannot 
deliver on the important task in creating a strong linkage between the government and the 
private sector (Laddawal 1999:42). 
Corporatism or Clientelism ? 
The evidence throughout chapters 2-4 as well as the assessment presented in this 
Conclusion of the effectiveness of Thailand's main external commercial policy-making 
actors suggests that the overall ineffectiveness of Thai actors may have forced informal 
and indirect collusion between powerful Thai firms and the Thai state. With regard to the 
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theory of corporatism as presented in Chapter 1, the empirical findings are not fully 
consistent with the ideas presented in corporatism and this section argues for the further 
theoretical insight of clientelism to help us understand the way Thai external commercial 
policy-making works. This section first shows why corporatism is inconsistent with the 
empirical findings, particularly the interviews. Then this section explains the further 
insights clientelism offers in contrast to corporatism. Afterwards, clientelism is used to 
offer new insights into Thai external commercial policy-making. 
As examined in Chapter 1, corporatism is a form of interest representation which 
assumes that social and political organizations and major societal and interest groups 
mediate their interests in order to come up with a particular policy direction (Schmitter 
1974, Wiarda 1997, Williamson 1989). Corporatism assumes that a process of bargaining 
is conducted between interest groups and the state over collective benefits on behalf of 
the members of the group (Kurer 1996:645-668). This can be seen in the other way that 
corporatism mediates interests between major actors, and in the case of the Thai external 
commercial policy process, this should mean that mediation of interest occurs between 
the state and firms by the PCC acting in a capacity similar to trade associations aiming to 
provide a collective benefit for both state and firms. 
Corporatism also assumes 'equivalence of influence among citizens and different 
interests within society' (Williamson 1989: 19). While corporatist theory does not assume 
power symmetry between actors, their main concern is in the 'organisation and the 
mobilisation of bias involved in organisation' which is considered as the most important 
power factor (Cawson 1986: 14). This means that corporatist theorists believe that 
although power asymmetry may exist between actors, this is usually removed through 
mediation of interests, a corporatist feature which distinguishes the theory from other 
power asymmetry theories such as Marxism (Cawson 1986:20). Inherently, corporatism 
believes in more equality of actors rather than theories such as Marxism. 
These two given issues, the mediation of interest through actors within the 
society, and the implication that actors can be treated as equals through interest mediation 
are corporatist assumptions which are called into question by the evidence suggested by 
this research, particularly in the interviews conducted for chapters 3 and 4. 
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Interest mediation between actors, influenced by interest groups and trade 
associations, does not seem to have taken place in Thailand's external commercial 
policy-making. This research has found that the PCCs were considered by the Thai state 
and firms as only consultative actors with no power or ability directly to influence policy. 
The PCCs do not negotiate with the other actors in the Thai external commercial policy 
process and have no authority to do so. Their role is more like that of a public relations 
department, helping to organize events between the EU and Thailand's government and 
firms, rather than having an active role in proposing or negotiating policy. This research 
originally expected the PCCs, because their organizational structure which consisted of 
members of firms as well as state support, to be a main actor in interest mediation on 
their own account, not just a public relations department which provides events for state 
and firm to meet each other. The PCCs view themselves as a place for firms to lobby the 
government officials and civil servants, and the PCCs also see themselves as a place 
where interest mediation between the state and firms can occur. The evidence presented 
in Chapters 3 and 4 is that the PCCs' views of themselves have not been fulfilled, and 
that they only have a supporting role to that of the state and firms. 
In contrast to corporatist assumptions, interest mediation has not helped to solve 
the problem of power asymmetry between the Thai actors. As argued, the PCCs have 
been sidelined in the policy-making process, leaving the state and firms to lead the way. 
Evidence further shows that there is also some disparity between the state and firms, as 
well as between firms themselves. The state, through the MFA and the MOC, has the lead 
role in negotiating with the EU in all matters which are critical to Thailand's present and 
future economic progress. When a trade crisis occurs, it is the government and the civil 
service which lead the team to negotiate with the EU representatives. When it comes to a 
matter of high importance in external commerce, whether it is framing important trade 
policies with the EU or problem-solving, firms rarely have a say and will usually need the 
assistance of the state. This shows that in issues of high importance, mediation does not 
occur between the Thai state and firms. 
There is also a power disparity between powerful Thai firms and smaller Thai 
firms. Powerful Thai firms, as a general rule, will usually be provided with greater access 
to the state as well as to individuals within the state apparatus. As this research has 
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shown, this priority has at times been so great that Thailand's national bilateral trade 
strategy with the EU is a mirror image of the CP Group's corporate strategy. Small firms, 
however, struggle to gain access to the Thai state and can only make use of sections of 
the civil service for the occasional assistance or for information dissemination. 
If corporatism only explains Thailand's external commercial policy-making 
process to a certain extent, the insights provided by clientelism may shed some further 
insights. As a theory, clientelism explores a different organizational structure and process 
of interactions from corporatism. The main difference is that the clientelist actors are 
concerned more with individual benefits, not collective ones (Wilkinson, 56 refI2). In 
corporatism, firms will be more concerned with trying to get as many state collective 
benefits for the group as a whole (Schneider 1997). This means that while interest 
mediation occurs for the entire society in corporatism, interests are negotiated in 
clientelism for the mutual benefits of the patron and the clients only (Schneider, 1997: 
63). 
Corporatism's assumption of each actor as autonomous is also different from 
clientelism's explanation that actors are unequal and need to depend on each other for 
mutual benefits. In political clientelism, the patrons are usually not owners of the means 
of production, but they will normally have the capability of obtaining access to resources 
of the state (Schmidt, 1970). Lower level patrons act as brokers to mediate between their 
clients and high level patrons, who control the government and the bureaucracy. 
Organizationally, clientelism treats the firm's leaders as 'connected with individuals in 
the government through patron-client ties' (Kurer 1996: 645-668). Kurer explains how, 
through this process, the firm becomes an integral part of the political structure of the 
country and 'de facto lost its status as an autonomous body' (1996). With the firms 
becoming part of the political structure, the patron client network expects to have both 
formal and informal access to government, which increases the tendency for corruption to 
happen. 
Clientelism's assumptions on the patron-client relationship seem to be a more 
accurate description of Thailand's external commercial policy-making at the top level, 
between the state and powerful Thai firms. Evidence shows that during the Thaksin 
government, major firms with which Prime Minister Thaksin had a close personal 
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connections benefited from state policy to a great extent. CP is one of Thailand's biggest 
exporters to the EU and as mentioned in chapter 4 they have been facilitated in several 
ways from the government as CP is the main supporter for Thai Rak Thai political party 
and some relatives of the prime minister also own significant amounts of shares in CP 
(Interview: 40, 48, 49). The Thai-EU commercial partnership was not an exception, and 
the CP Group clearly had a very strong role in influencing government trade strategy 
towards Europe. This is a view that has been repeated over again by members of the 
media, officers in smaller firms, as well as high ranking members of the PCC (Interview: 
48). 
Using clientelism as an explanation also helps to explain how the PCC became 
only supporting actors in the Thai external commercial policy making process. The 
patron-client relationship within clientelism is a very strong and mutually benefiting one. 
It also does not leave room for interest mediation for collective benefits (an assumption 
made under corporatism). The personal patron-client ties between the Thai state and 
powerful Thai firms avoid any need to find mediators between the state and the firm. In 
fact, the Thai state and powerful Thai firms would rather avoid interest mediation 
because this would require more formality and commitment, options which a clientelist 
relationship does not encourage. As pointed out in chapter 4, the most successful firms in 
exporting to the EU are those who use their informal access to government to intervene 
within the policy-making process rather than approaching government through PCCs. 
In conclusion as regards the conceptual framework, corporatism appears to be 
unsuitable for the analysis of Thailand external commercial relations and will continue to 
be unsuitable as long as Thailand's political system remains weak and channels for 
interest mediation continue to be insignificant. As previously noted, this is particularly 
well reflected in the PCC's merely supporting role in the policy-making process, 
although the power disparity in the patron-client relationship between the state and firms 
also makes corporatism only partly appropriate for analysis of Thailand's external 
commercial policy-making process. 
This research started off by assuming that the Thai actors were more or less on 
equal footing and that policy would be a result of mediation rather than collusion between 
patrons and clients. The various interviews conducted clearly showed that the power 
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disparity between the state and other actors was clearly too large for policy mediation to 
occur effectively. In addition, the power disparity was actually conducive to an 
atmosphere of policy collusion, a finding in this research which was implied in many of 
the interviews conducted. This has necessitated a reconsideration of corporatism as a 
conceptual framework, and as noted, has strengthened the case for clientelism as a more 
relevant conceptual framework. 
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Interview list 
6th_30 th December 2005 
1" week 
I. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe) : I 
2. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe) : II 
3. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe) : III 
4. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe) : IV 
2nd week 
5. Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade Negotiation: I 
6. Ministry of Commerce: Department of Trade Negotiation: II 
7. Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade Promotion: III 
8. Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade Promotion: IV 
jrd week 
9. Delegation of The European Commission 
lO.Kasetsart University, Faculty of Economics, Academic 
11. Sanguanwong Starch Company 
4th week 
12. CP Group, Shrimp export division 
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9th May 2006 - 22't June 2006 
F'week 
13. Ministry ofForeign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe) : I 
14. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe) : II 
I5.Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade Promotion 
16. Ministry of Commerce, Foreign Trade 
2nd week 
17. Federation of Thai Industries I 
18. Federation of Thai Industries II 
19. Federation of Thai Industries III 
20. Federation of Thai Industries IV 
21. Federation of Thai Industries V 
Jrd week 
22. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division II (Northern 
and Southern Europe) : I 
23. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division II (Northern 
and Southern Europe) : II 
24. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division II (Northern 
and Southern Europe) : III 
25. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Thai Embassador in Brussle 
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6th week 
26. Thai Banker's Association 
27. CP Group, Shrimp export division, I 
28. CP Group, Shrimp export division, II 
29. ep Group, Shrimp export division, III 
7th week 
30. Thai Chamber of Commerce, Europe Division: I 
31. Thai Chamber of Commerce, International Trade: I 
32. Thai Chamber of Commerce, International Trade: II 
5th December 2006 - 10th January 2009 
1st week 
33. Ministry of Foreign Affair, Department of European Affairs Division I (EC and 
Western Europe): I 
34. Pak Food, International Marketing: I 
35. Pak Food, International Trade division: II 
36. CP Group, International Trade Division 
37. CP Group, Chicken Export Division 
38. Thai Chamber Of Commerce, Export Division 
39. Thai Chamber Of Commerce, International Trade 
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3'd week 
40. Matichon Newspaper: Political Journalist 
41. Kaosod Newspaper: Business Journalist 
42. Thai Export Bank, Export Division 
43. Thai Export Bank, international co-operation 
5th week 
44. Thammasat University, Faculty of Politics, Academic 
45. Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade Promotion 
46. Matichon Newspaper: I 
47. Nations Newspaper: International Business Journalist. 
6'h week 
48. Kaosod Newspaper: Political Journalist 
49. Kaosod Newspaper: Thai Political Journalist 
50. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives: Department of Fishery 
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Appendix: 
Interview main questions: 
Ministry of Commerce 
Department o/Trade Negotiations 
Department 0/ Foreign Trade 
-From the past to present, has Thailand been more successful in negotiation with the EU? 
-Who are the main actors in most negotiations? 
-What are the main issues in all negotiations? 
-Did the different actors realise different levels of success? 
-What are the main strategies of each type of actor in the negotiation? 
-What are the factors which control the direction of strategy? (situation in Thailand/the 
EU, player, issue)? 
-What is your role in the policy-making process? 
-What is the nature of cooperation between your agency and other agencies while dealing 
with issues of Thailand's economic interaction with the EU? 
-Could you describe the process of cooperation between your agency and other agencies? 
-What kind of problems have you encountered regarding inter-agency cooperation so far? 
-What kinds of channels for cooperation have been established? Are the channels mainly 
official, or are there ad hoc means of cooperating as well? 
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Department of Thai export promotion 
-What are the main Thai exports to the ED? Why have these expDrts been mDre 
successful than others? 
-HDw dDes the Thai GDvernment help Thai expDrt cDmpany promote to the ED market? 
Are there specific strategies or are most of them made up as issues start tD arise? 
-In your opiniDn, whD are the main actors in prDmDting Thai company to export 
tD the ED? (company/government/organization)? 
-Did the different actors realise different levels Df success in promoting Thai exports to 
the ED market? 
-What are the projects which the government initiated in order to promDte Thai expDrts tD 
the ED? (the lists of the project) 
-How can the projects or plan help to enhance Thai expDrts ability to the ED market? 
-Did the plan/projects help Thai exports to increase their ability in competing in the ED 
market? 
Department of Foreign Trade 
-What is the general picture of trading between the ED and Thailand? 
-What are main factors which have impacts Dn change of the trade relations between 
Thailand and the ED? 
-What are the sensitive goods when Thailand expDrts to the ED? How problematic are the 
issues of sensitive goods, according to the department of foreign trade? 
-What are the non-sensitive goods when Thailand expDrts to the ED? 
-CDmpared to other trade partners of ThaiJand, is the ED a more difficult partner? 
-Which other organizations are responsible for Thai exports to the ED? 
-From the past to the present, has the picture of Thai exports to the ED been clearer in the 
way that Thai exports will be able to grow more in the ED market? 
157 
Academics 
-Does Thailand have an actual ability or capacity to compete effectively in the EU 
market? 
-Is the EU a significantly important market for Thai exports? (if not the EU, are the rest 
of the markets enough?) 
-In order to promote Thai export and reduce trade conflict between Thailand and the EU 
- Who should be the main actors in the situation? 
- What role should each actor play? 
- Have these actors and roles been delivered in a real situation? 
-Are the strategies which have been adopted at the moment making use of the 
correct approach in dealing with the trade conflicts between Thailand and 
the EU? Do these strategies help to enhance Thai export ability? 
-What else should the Thai government! firms/ PCC do in order to increase the ability of 
Thai exports in order to increase its exports to the EU market? 
Ministry of Foreign Affair 
-What is the general picture of the relation between the EU and Thailand? 
-What are the main conflicts in the relation between the EU and Thailand? 
-From the past to present, has Thailand been more successful in negotiation with the EU? 
-Compared to other trade partners of Thailand, is the EU a more difficult partner? 
-Who are the main actors in most negotiations between the EU and Thailand? 
-Did the different actors realise different levels of success in promoting relations between 
Thailand and the EU? 
- What are the main strategies of each type of actor in the negotiation? 
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-What are the factors which control the direction of strategy? (situation in Thailand/the 
EU, player, issue)? 
-What are the projects which the government initiated in order to promote relations 
between Thailand and the EU? (the lists of the project) 
-How can the projects or plan help to improve relations between Thailand and the EU in 
order to increase Thai exports ability to the EU market? 
Firms 
-What are the main exports of your firm to the EU? 
-Have these exports been successful? 
- What are your main strategies in cooperation with the PCC and Government? Does it 
work? How does it work? 
-What are your main strategies in promoting exports to the EU? Does it work? How does 
it work? 
-How does the Thai Government or PCC help your firm promoting to the EU market? 
Are there specific strategies or are most of them made up as issues start to arise? 
-In your opinion, who are the main actors in promoting Thai company to export 
to the EU? (company/government/organization)? 
-Did the different actors realise different levels of success in promoting Thai exports to 
the EU market? 
-How would you describe cooperation between your firm and the PCCs? 
-How would you describe cooperation between your firms and the state? 
-What are the factors which control the direction of strategy? (situation in Thailand/the 
EU, player, issue)? 
-What is your role in the policy-making process? 
-What is the nature of cooperation between your agency and other agencies while dealing 
with issues of Thailand's economic interaction with the EU? 
-Could you describe the process of cooperation between your firms and other agencies? 
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l 
-What kind of problems have you encountered regarding inter-agency cooperation so far? 
-What kinds of channels for cooperation have been established? Are the channels mainly 
official, or are there ad hoc means of cooperating as well? 
PCC 
-What is your role in the policy-making process? 
-What is.the nature of cooperation between your agency and other agencies while dealing 
with issues of Thailand's economic interaction with the EU? 
-Could you describe the process of cooperation between your agency and other agencies? 
-What kind of problems have you encountered regarding inter-agency cooperation so far? 
-What kinds of channels for cooperation have been established? Are the channels mainly 
official, or are there ad hoc means of cooperating as well? 
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